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Abstract 
 
In recent times, the concept of disaster resilience has gained prominence in the light of the 
increased impact of disasters, including natural disasters, epidemics, and terrorism. The 
notion of resilience encompasses the qualities that enable the individual, organisation or 
community to resist, respond to, and recover from the impact of disasters. Health system 
resilience, especially hospital resilience, is essential as it provides ‘lifeline’ services which 
minimize the impact of disasters on the community. In this study, hospital resilience has been 
defined by the author as “the ability of hospitals to resist, absorb, and respond to the shock of 
disasters while maintaining and surging essential health services (e.g., on-site rescue, pre-
hospital care, emergency medical treatment, critical care, decontamination and isolation), and 
then to recover to its original state or adapt to a new one”. 
 
There is some imperative for devising a user-friendly assessment instrument for measuring 
hospital resilience that reflects a developed understanding of the concept. Such an instrument 
could be used to better understand the extent of hospital resilience, and also as a decision-
support tool for promoting strategies and policies aimed at improving hospital resilience. To 
date, few studies have investigated the key domains of hospital resilience, let alone developed 
an assessment instrument.  
 
This thesis aims to build an evaluation framework with identified and validated key measures 
for hospital disaster resilience, set within the context of Shandong Province, China. The study 
had six detailed objectives: (1) to define hospital resilience; (2) to construct a conceptual 
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framework for hospital resilience (including key domains); (3) to propose potential measures 
for inclusion in a preliminary evaluation framework for hospital resilience; (4) to develop and 
revise this preliminary evaluation framework through Modified-Delphi study and empirical 
data, followed by a new validated evaluation framework that integrates key measures; (5) to 
describe the current state of disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals, Shandong Province, 
China, by adapting this validated framework into a questionnaire survey; (6) to calculate, 
compare and categorize the level of resilience among tertiary hospitals in the Province; and 
(7) to identify the major challenges to, and priorities for, future improvement of health system 
disaster resilience in China.  
 
To achieve these objectives, a narrative literature review was undertaken to form a clear 
understanding of hospital resilience, and to build a preliminary conceptual framework. 
Hospital resilience can be assessed by criteria of robustness (pre-event strength), redundancy 
of resources, resourcefulness (flexible plans, procedures and strategies), and rapidity of 
response and recovery. To be more specific, the pre-event robustness and rapidity of response 
and recovery are two goals for hospital disaster resilience, while redundancy and 
resourcefulness are means to achieve these goals. Hospital resilience should also be 
incorporated into a continuum, including disaster prevention and preparation before an event, 
responsiveness during the event and recovery and adaptation after the event. Thus, this new 
concept places hospital disaster capabilities, management phases, practices and disaster 
outcomes together into a comprehensive holistic view, using an integrated approach.  
 
Secondly, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify potential measures that 
could be used for evaluating hospital disaster resilience. As a result, a preliminary three-
layered evaluation framework, including 8 domains, 21 sub-domains, and 50 indicators, was 
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established, with potential measures extracted from the relevant instruments. The primary 
eight domains included: hospital safety, emergency leadership and cooperation, disaster plan, 
disaster stockpile and logistics management, emergency staff, training and drills, emergency 
critical care capacity, and recovery mechanisms. 
 
Thirdly, a Modified-Delphi study was used to validate the content validity of the preliminary 
evaluation framework. Based on a three-round Modified-Delphi study, 33 experts’ opinions 
on the importance of these potential measures were collected and analysed using a 5-point 
Likert scale. Agreement on the measures was defined as at least 70% of the responders rating 
a measure as ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’. After a final consensus, the preliminary evaluation 
framework was modified, with a large proportion of its measures (P=89.47%, n=68/N=76) 
identified as having good potential for assessing hospital disaster resilience. Then a revised 
evaluation framework was established, which modified and categorized key measures into 8 
domains, 17 subdomains and 43 indicators. This framework was further tested using 
empirical data in additional studies. 
 
Fourthly, empirical data from China was used to validate the construct validity and internal 
reliability of the revised evaluation framework. Based on the revised evaluation framework, a 
questionnaire was designed to survey the status of disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals in 
the Shandong Province of China. The questionnaire contains detailed questions that were 
derived from the eight key domains of hospital resilience: hospital safety, emergency 
command, communication and cooperation system, disaster plan, disaster stockpile and 
logistics management, emergency staff, training and drills, emergency services and surge 
capability, and recovery and adaptation strategies. Using Factor Analysis, four component 
factors were extracted from these domains, namely, hospital emergency medical response 
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capability (F1 weight value=0.606), disaster management mechanisms (F2 weight 
value=0.203), hospital infrastructural safety (F3 weight value=0.104), and disaster resources 
(F4 weight value=0.087). The overall level of hospital disaster resilience (F) can be calculated 
using the model: F= 0.606F1+ 0.203F2 +0.104F3+ 0.087F4. Thus, a validated evaluation 
framework was finally established, with its key indicators being divided into these four 
component factors.  
 
Fifthly, by adopting the same questionnaire, the current status of disaster resilience in tertiary 
hospitals in Shandong Province was explored. It was used to validate the feasibility of the 
validated evaluation framework. The result has also revealed considerable variability in the 
breadth of arrangements for hospital internal safety, disaster management mechanisms, 
disaster resources, and emergency medical response capability. The survey found that 
hospitals need to adopt a more cohesive approach to resilience and identified areas for 
improvement. The validated evaluation framework can assist hospital management and 
decision makers to better understand what constitutes effective hospital resilience and what 
can be done to improve it. 
 
Finally, important issues from both a theoretical and practical perspectives were discussed. 
From a theoretical perspective, the understanding of the concept of disaster resilience was 
developed. A novel conceptual framework was developed; it contributes to a larger body of 
knowledge in the research area and provides a basis for further evaluation in different 
organisational settings.   
 
From a practical perspective, a number of the challenges to healthcare disaster resilience in 
China were identified. Future policy and research implications were proposed to overcome 
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these challenges. Considerable progress has been achieved since the milestone event of 
SARS in 2003, in the areas of infectious disease surveillance, the national disaster response 
system, and the utilization of military medical resources. However, there remain challenges 
to healthcare organizations, including: low standards of disaster-resistant infrastructure, the 
lack of specific disaster plans and portable diagnostic equipment, insufficiency in triage 
skills, surge capacity and psychological health management. Additional challenges arise from 
in the Chinese context, including fragmentation of emergency medical service systems, the 
lack of specific emergency legislation, the lack of rational funding distribution, and 
inadequate cost-effective considerations. These challenges can be addressed through policy 
strategies from different jurisdictional levels (community level, health system level, national 
level), in order to improve healthcare resilience to adequately meet future disasters in China.  
 
In summary, this thesis used a mixed-method to achieve the aims and objectives. The thesis 
makes several contributions to the field:  
(1) It has provided a new definition and conceptual framework for hospital disaster resilience;  
(2) It has improved the understanding of what constitutes hospital disaster resilience, and how 
to measure it using different component factors (F1, F2, F3, and F4);  
(3) It has provided hospitals with a validated evaluation framework and a derived instrument 
to evaluate the level of hospital resilience. The instrument is the first of its type in the field 
and will allow hospitals to measure their own resilience levels. At the same time it can enable 
hospitals within a region to compare itself with others, and to identify priority areas for 
improvement; 
(4) It has adapted a validated evaluation framework to investigate the status of tertiary 
hospitals of Shandong Province; 
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(5) It has identified and discussed the major challenges and priorities for future improvement 
of healthcare system’s disaster resilience in China; and  
(6) It has further developed a novel conceptual framework for hospital resilience, based on 
the study’s findings and the author’s understandings. This conceptual framework can be used 
for further evaluating disaster resilience in different organisational settings. It has added an 
important larger body of knowledge to the concept of disaster resilience.  
 
The research, undertaken in one province of China, has a limited generalizability of its 
findings. Thus the results may not be directly transferable to evaluating hospitals in other 
areas or countries. Nevertheless, the nature of this work can be considered as preliminary or 
an exploration study, while the methodological framework and the agreed key indicators may 
assist in informing the adaptation and development of new measurement tools elsewhere. 
Also the proposed framework can be used in understanding and developing the concept of 
hospital resilience. In addition, as most questions in the study required a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, 
it is somewhat reminiscent of neurological physiology. Hence, the categorical data forces a 
yes or no response and it may, therefore, be beneficial to add further categories in order to 
examine gradations in the level of preparedness. 
 
The questionnaire instrument can be used as a user-friendly decision-making tool that can 
quickly evaluate the current status, and identify effective strategies to enhance hospital 
resilience for future disasters, thereby having the potential to reduce post-trauma health 
problems in the community. Thus, the results will be of relevance to hospital managers, 
academic scholars, and government policy makers who are seeking to promote the overall 
effectiveness of the health response and reduce disaster mortality and morbidity in the future.  
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Part A: Introduction 
Chapter 1 Overview 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 Disasters 
 
CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) defines a disaster as “a 
situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or 
international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes 
great damage, destruction and human suffering” (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). All disasters are 
related to specific hazards, and the hazards may be categorised into three types: natural 
hazards, manmade hazards, and mixed (natural adding man made) hazards.  
 
Natural disasters can also be divided into five types: geophysical events, meteorological 
events, hydrological events, climatological events, and biological events (CRED - WHO 
2011). The detailed natural disaster classification is illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
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Figure 1-1. Natural disaster classification (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012) 
 
Disasters including extreme weather events, natural disasters, bioterrorism, and pandemics 
are having an increased global impact (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). The more frequent disasters 
have occurred in the world during the last decade, as illustrated in Figure 1-2 (EM-DAT: 
2010; Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). Between 2000 and 2009, an average of 227.5 million people, 
annually, was affected by natural and technological disasters (EM-DAT: 2010; Guha-Sapir et 
al. 2012; Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). In 2011, natural disasters killed a total of 30 773 people, 
with 244.7 million victims worldwide (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). Over 1.1 million deaths were 
recorded in large scale natural disasters – some 4130 events in all (UN-ISDR search 2012).   
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Figure 1-2. Trends in occurrence and victims (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012) 
 
A total of 101 countries were hit by these disasters. But over the last decade, China, the 
United States, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia constitute the top five (5) countries most 
frequently impacted by natural disasters (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). These countries were also 
the most often hit by natural disasters in 2011, accounting for 31% of the total disaster 
occurrences (see Figure 1-3) (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).   
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Figure 1-3. Top 10 countries by number of reported events in 2011 (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012) 
The main burden of disaster events was carried by a small number of countries. In 2011, the 
countries ranked in the top 10, in terms of disaster mortality, accounted for 89.9% of the 
global disaster mortality (see Figures 1-4) (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012). That same year, these 
countries were ranked in the top 10 in terms of the number of victims (90.4%) reported, 
globally, as victims of natural disasters (see Figures 1-5) (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).  
In China, in 2010, a total of 7 186 deaths and 145.7 million victims were reported as victims 
of natural disasters. This number represents 2.4% of global reported deaths and 67.0% of 
worldwide reported victims (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). A total of 67.9 million victims were 
reported following severe flooding in June of 2011. This natural disaster alone accounted for 
42.6% of all victims in the country, and 27.8% of victims, globally (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).  
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Figure 1-4. Top 10 countries in terms of disaster mortality in 2011 and distributed by disaster 
type (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012) 
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Figure 1-5. Top 10 countries by victims in 2011 and distributed by disaster type (Guha-Sapir 
et al. 2012) 
 
1.1.2 Disaster impact and global actions 
 
Disasters continue to occur and the frequency of catastrophic occurrences is increasing 
(CRED, 2007). Disasters have a great impact on nations irrespective of developing or 
developed countries. It was estimated by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED, 2007) that in the past 50 years, > 10 000 disasters have occurred, > 5 
billion people have been affected, and > 12 million persons were killed, at an economic cost 
of > $US4 trillion. The World Bank’s Building Resilience report, finds that economic losses 
from natural disasters have risen from $50 billion each year in the 1980s to just under $200 
billion each year in the last decade (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 
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The World Bank 2013). The impact of disasters will continue to rise with climate change 
(The World Bank 2010). 
 
Mainstreaming disaster risk management into development planning can reverse the current 
trend of rising disaster impact and thus essential to the achievement of sustainable 
development. In recent years, there is increasing global recognition focus on humanitarian 
efforts after disasters, as well as risk and vulnerability elements in reducing the negative 
impacts of hazards. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held in 2005 in Kobe, 
Hyogo, Japan. The conference adopted the Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. This framework provided a unique 
opportunity to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and 
risks to hazards. It underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience of 
nations and communities to disasters, with the target of substantial reduction of disaster 
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and 
countries (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005a). In 2005, 168 countries 
endorsed the Hyogo Framework for Action and agreed to achieve its target by 2015 (United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 2011). 
 
1.1.3 Resilience 
 
Disasters were one of seven key thematic areas in the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development sponsored by the WHO (World Health Organization) in 2012. The experts at 
that conference highlighted the importance of health system resilience. ‘Resilience’ is 
basically a metaphor used to describe the ability of people or their environment to return to 
their original state (Norris et al. 2008). Thus, the resilience of the health system is critical to 
effective disaster management and supports wider sustainability objectives – regardless of 
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whether the disaster is due to a natural hazard, an environmental incident, a disease threat, 
armed conflict, or some combination of factors (WHO 2012). The terms of ‘health system 
resilience’ and ‘hospital resilience’ are used frequently in this thesis. The main difference 
between them is that, health system resilience has a broader and general usage to include not 
only hospital resilience but also resilience of other key elements of health system, such as 
primary health care facilities, health administration departments, nursing homes and 
emergency medical service system. 
 
Healthcare organisations, and particularly hospitals, are essential to health system resilience, 
as they provide a ‘lifeline’ which can minimise the impact of disasters on the community, and 
achieve improved community resilience (Albanese et al. 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Bruneau et 
al. 2003; Paturas et al. 2010). Hospitals are one of the key parts in the health care systems, 
with the critical role of hospitals in disasters is widely recognised (Alexander 1996; Nigg 
1998; Paturas et al. 2010; Rodríguez and Aguirre 2006); it has been found to influence 
considerably the health outcomes of the population affected by a disaster (Bruneau et al. 
2003; Paturas et al. 2010). For example, the importance of hospitals to remain operational 
extends beyond the necessity to sustain uninterrupted medical services for the community 
after a large-scale disaster. The maintenance of operational capacity also has a symbolic 
value to communities. Hospitals are viewed as safe havens where affected individuals go for 
shelter, food, water and psychosocial assistance, as well as to obtain information about 
missing family members, or learn of impending dangers related to the incident (Paturas et al. 
2010). When hospitals cannot continue to operate during a disaster, they are restricted from 
providing common, everyday public health services, such as vaccinations, and treatments for 
everyday injuries and illnesses; thus, minor illnesses or injuries may progress to life-
threatening ones (Rodríguez and Aguirre 2006). Also, the inoperability of a hospital in a 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  Page 9 
 
community compromises the health of its residents and hinders the community’s ability to 
recover(Rodríguez and Aguirre 2006). 
 
Paradoxically, hospitals are key to service provision in times of disaster; they are arguably 
even more vulnerable than other kinds of facilities in disasters, mainly due to their complex 
combinations of utilities, surgical and diagnostic equipment, and hazardous materials, along 
with ever-changing visitors and patients in various conditions of physical and mental health 
(Pan American Health Organization 2000; Milsten 2000). 
Given the critical role of hospitals, the model of “safe and resilient hospitals” was promoted 
as a key component of disaster risk reduction planning in the healthcare sector during the 
2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
2005b; Pan American Health Organization 2005b). This conference endorsed policies that 
ensure “that all new hospitals are built with a level of resilience that strengthens their 
capacity to remain functional in disaster situations” (International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction 2005b; Pan American Health Organization 2005b). The concept of hospital 
resilience has gained importance in the light of the increased frequency and impact of 
disasters, including natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorism (Bruneau et al. 2003). The 
notion of hospital resilience can encompass the qualities that enable the organisation to 
effectively resist, respond to, recover, and adapt from the impact of disasters (McAslan 
2010a).  
 
To date, however, few studies have focused on hospital disaster resilience as a whole. 
Instead, considerable work has been undertaken to define hospitals’ capacity to cope with 
disasters, from different but quite often narrow perspectives that use various concepts, such 
as hospital safety, hospital preparedness, hospital business continuity, and surge capacity. 
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Additionally, international organizations and countries, such as the WHO, PAHO (Pan 
American Health Organization), and the USA (United States of America), have developed 
specific tools and measures to evaluate, in the main, hospital disaster preparedness and 
hospital safety (Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 
2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011; Higgins et al. 2004; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Thome et al. 
2006; World Health Organization 2011b; Pan American Health Organization and WHO 
2008a; World Health Organization 2010a). However, these disaster concepts occur in 
isolation, provide limited perspectives of disaster capability, and result in gaps and, at times, 
duplication (Nelson et al. 2007).  
 
The exemplar concept is related to disaster preparedness. For instance, there is a great deal of 
overlap but little consistency in what constitutes “hospital preparedness” or how it should be 
measured. Some hospital preparedness studies have focussed on activities across all phases of 
disaster management, but others only focus on activities in the preparedness phase (Nelson et 
al. 2007; Asch et al. 2005). Additionally, a review of preparedness studies shows that these 
studies rely almost exclusively on structural measurable components (e.g., human, 
equipment), but have little concern for hospital infrastructural safety and emergency services, 
which are linked to the hospital’s ability to cope with disasters (Nelson et al. 2007; Asch et 
al. 2005). There is little consensus regarding which measures should be selected and how to 
best integrate these measures into a comprehensive framework for measuring core hospital 
capacity in the face of disasters. Thus, developing the concept of ‘hospital resilience’ would 
provide a starting point for broad agreement about what comprises hospital core capacity, and 
assist with integrating this capacity into a comprehensive whole view. 
 
There is also an imperative for devising a user-friendly assessment instrument measuring 
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hospital resilience that can facilitate the development of the concept. Such an instrument 
could be used to better understand the full extent of hospital resilience and also act as a 
decision-support tool for promoting strategies and policies aimed at improving hospital 
resilience. To date few studies have identified the key domains of hospital resilience, let 
alone developed an assessment instrument.  
 
1.2 Aims, Objectives & Research Plan 
 
1.2.1 Research questions 
 
Improving hospital resilience can minimise the impact of a disaster on the community. 
Therefore, the key question driving this research was: how can hospital resilience be 
evaluated and improved. To achieve this understanding, five research questions were 
developed: 
(1) What is the definition of hospital disaster resilience?  
(2) What is the conceptual framework of hospital resilience (its components, key criteria 
and key domains)? 
(3) What does an evaluation framework of hospital resilience look like (with key 
indicators)?   
(4)  Is the evaluation framework valid and practical for use in China? 
(5) What are the current challenges to healthcare disaster resilience in China, and how can 
these challenges be addressed to improve healthcare disaster resilience in the future? 
 
1.2.2 Research aims and objectives 
 
This thesis aims to develop and examine a hospital disaster resilience evaluation framework, 
with key measures being developed and validated using the context and data of China. The 
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study has seven detailed objectives:  
(1) To define hospital resilience;  
(2) To construct a conceptual framework for hospital resilience (including key domains);  
(3) To propose potential measures for inclusion in a preliminary evaluation framework for 
hospital resilience;  
(4) To develop and revise this preliminary evaluation framework through Modified-
Delphi study and empirical data, and to establish a validated evaluation framework 
that integrates key measures;  
(5) To describe the current state of disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals in the Shandong 
Province of China, by adapting the validated framework into a questionnaire survey;  
(6) To calculate, compare and categorize the level of resilience among tertiary hospitals in 
the Province; 
(7) To identify the major challenges to, and priorities for, future improvement of health 
system disaster resilience in China.  
 
1.2.3 Methodology & research plan  
 
A step by step mixed-methods exploratory design was utilised in this research project.  
• Firstly, a narrative literature review was used to form a clear definition and conceptual 
understanding of hospital disaster resilience. In addition, a systematic literature review 
was undertaken to establish a preliminary evaluation framework which includes potential 
measures of hospital resilience. These potential measures were extracted and synthesized 
from the included relevant instruments.  
• Secondly, a Modified-Delphi study was used to validate the content validity of the 
preliminary evaluation framework. A structured consultation with key experts was 
conducted using a three-round Modified-Delphi Method. This sought the opinions from a 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  Page 13 
 
panel of 33 experts in China on the importance of potential measures using a 5-point 
Likert scale. As a result, key measures were identified after the consensus of the last 
round. A revised evaluation framework was developed from the preliminary evaluation 
framework.  
• Thirdly, a cross-sectional design was used to collect the empirical data in the Shandong 
Province of China, in order to validate the construct validity and internal reliability of the 
revised evaluation framework. A questionnaire was developed, based on the revised 
evaluation framework. A cross-sectional survey was conducted in 50 tertiary hospitals. 
Factor Analysis was used to extract and identify key component factors of hospital 
resilience; the weight of each factor was calculated, and the overall level of hospital 
resilience was calculated and ranked. 
• Fourthly, the same cross-sectional survey was also used to test the utilization and 
feasibility of the validated evaluation framework and its derived questionnaire. It 
measured and described the status of disaster resilience in the tertiary hospitals (using 
descriptive analyses). It identified the strengths and weaknesses in hospital disaster 
resilience that may inform policy makers to improve disaster management in their 
healthcare systems.    
• Finally, the distilled understanding for the concept was used to refine the concept of 
disaster resilience and to identify practical implications. A novel conceptual 
understanding of disaster resilience was developed, which may contribute to further 
research and can be used in different organisation settings. The validated evaluation 
framework was also used as a guide to identify and discuss the major challenges to the 
improvement of the healthcare system’s resilience in China, while strategies for 
improving hospital resilience were proposed.  
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The overall study processes and methodology are illustrated in Figure 1-6. The precise details 
of the methods used for each of the studies are outlined in each of the results chapters.  
 
 
Figure 1-6. Research plan and methodology for the thesis 
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1.3 Context 
 
Within this dissertation, the term ‘China’ in this thesis refers to mainland China. The term 
‘hospital disaster resilience’ is abbreviated as hospital resilience. 
 
The quantitative survey of the thesis was conducted in Shandong Province, which is the 
second largest province in China; it has 17 districts located in the north east of China. In 
2011, the population of the Shandong Province was estimated to total 96.37 million people. 
The maps in Figure 1-7 identify Shandong Province, illustrated in the red area.  
 
 
Figure 1-7. Map of Shandong Province and China with province indicated in red (Google 
map) 
 
According to "the hospital classification system" of the Ministry of Health of the People's 
Republic of China, in 1990, all hospitals were classified into primary, secondary, and tertiary 
hospitals, based on their functions for providing medical care, medical education, and 
conducting medical research. A primary hospital is typically a township hospital that contains 
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less than 100 beds. They are tasked with providing preventive care, minimal health care and 
rehabilitation services. Secondary hospitals tend to be affiliated with a medium size city, 
county or district and contain more than 100 beds, but less than 500. They are responsible for 
providing comprehensive health services, as well as medical education and conducting 
research on a regional basis. Tertiary hospitals round up the list as comprehensive or general 
hospitals at the city, provincial or national level with a bed capacity exceeding 500. They are 
responsible for providing specialist health services perform a bigger role with regard to 
medical education and scientific research, and they serve as medical hubs providing care to 
multiple regions (Guo 1990).  
 
Secondary and tertiary hospitals are further classified into subgroups: Grade A, Grade B, and 
Grade C according to their respective perspectives, such as service levels, size, medical 
technology, medical equipment, and management and medical quality (Guo 1990). Tertiary 
Grade A hospitals have been evaluated and achieve higher comprehensive scores (aggregated 
from the above respective perspectives) than tertiary Grade B and Grade C hospitals. Thus, 
tertiary Grade A hospitals are supposed to be the most advanced hospitals in an area (Chinese 
Ministry of Health 1989).   
 
Additionally, according to the Hospital Classification Method issued by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, the surveyed hospitals included general hospitals, hospitals of 
traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), hospitals of integrated traditional Chinese medicine and 
western medicine (TCM-WM), and specialized hospitals (National Bureau Statistics of 
China).  
 
In 2012, the number of hospitals in the Shandong Province was 1490 (Bureau of Shandong 
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Province 2013). According to the quantification revaluation, issued by the Health Ministry of 
China, there are a total of 76 tertiary hospitals in Shandong Province. Among these tertiary 
hospitals, there are 45 tertiary Grade A hospitals (28 general hospitals, 10 TCM, 2 TCM-
WM, 5 specialized hospitals); 28 tertiary Grade B hospitals (21 general hospitals, 6 TCM, 1 
specialized hospitals), and 3 tertiary Grade C hospitals (3 specialized hospitals).    
 
Shandong province is located in a peninsula area close to the sea; with many rivers. Due to its 
regional location, the province is prone to various kinds of disasters. During recent years, the 
most frequently occurring disasters were caused by hydro-meteorological risks, including 
severe floods, droughts, storm surges, hail, typhoons (tropical storms), sea ice, snowstorm, 
and cryogenic freezing. Other frequent disasters were caused by biological risks, including 
insect infestations and epidemics. However, among all these disasters, floods and droughts 
were the most frequently occurring. Few earthquakes occurred during this decade; the most 
recent earthquake occurred in 1983 in the Heze area; it reached level 5.9 on the Richter scale. 
However, it was environmental pollution (e.g. fog and haze weather, water pollution), and the 
mass casualty accidents (e.g., traffic accidents, mass gathering accidents) that were 
considered as the most recent and frequently occurring disasters in big cities of the province. 
 
All these disasters caused heavy losses to the province's economy, and they had a serious 
impact on social development and human health. Additionally, they affected a large number 
of the province’s population, causing emergency transfers, injuries, and death. 
 
1.4 Significance, Scope and Definitions 
 
This thesis uses a mixed-method approach, and made the following contributions: (1) It 
proposed a definition and conceptual framework for hospital disaster resilience; (2) it 
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improved our understanding of what constitutes hospital disaster resilience, and how to 
measure it; (3) It provided hospitals with a useful instrument designed to evaluate the  status 
of hospital resilience; (4) it explored the status of disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals in the 
Shandong Province; (5) it added to the literature by providing an improved conceptual 
understanding of disaster resilience and disaster management; and (6) it identified the major 
challenges and priorities for future improvement of healthcare disaster resilience in China.  
 
In this thesis, hospital resilience is defined as: 
The ability of hospitals to resist, absorb, and respond to the shock of disasters while 
maintaining and surging essential health services (e.g., on-site rescue, pre-hospital 
care, emergency medical treatment, critical care, decontamination and isolation), and 
then to recover to its original state or adapt to a new one (Zhong et al. 2013a). 
 
Thus, hospital resilience aims to achieve an improvement in a hospital’s robustness, and its 
rapidity to recover or adapt, through measures such as the identification of redundant 
resources and the adaptation of resourceful (flexible) procedures or strategies (McAslan 
2010e; Rogers 2011; Kahan,Allen and George 2010; Sternberg 2003). A clear 
conceptualization of hospital resilience is essential to put hospitals’ disaster abilities, 
management phases, activities and disaster outcomes together into a comprehensive and 
whole view (Devlen 2009). Also, the concept of hospital resilience can be incorporated into a 
comprehensive approach which seeks to improve the resilience of all agencies and promote 
the integration of healthcare facilities within the community’s resilience.  
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
To achieve these objectives, a step-by-step a mixed-method design was used. The structure of 
the thesis includes: literature reviews (chapters 2 and 3), results (chapters 4, 5 and 6), 
discussions (chapters 7 and 8), and conclusions (chapter 9). The framework of the thesis is 
illustrated in Figure 1-8, while the outline and details for each chapter are described below.  
 
Figure 1-8. Framework of the thesis 
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Chapter 1 provides the introduction to the study, and sets out the research questions, aims and 
objectives. It also provides a definition for the term hospital resilience, and the contextual 
information for the study, and highlights the significance of the research.  
 
Chapter 2 uses a narrative literature review to inform a clear definition of hospital resilience, 
and to build a preliminary conceptual understanding of this concept. Resilience is an inherent 
and adaptive capacity to cope with future uncertainty. It can be assessed by the criteria of 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity (Bruneau et al. 2003). Hospital disaster 
resilience is a comprehensive concept that has four key domains for understanding: 
vulnerability and safety, disaster resources and preparedness, continuity of essential medical 
service capability, and disaster recovery and adaptation. This new conceptual work places 
hospital resilience into a broader perspective of community resilience and also identifies its 
component parts. The chapter highlights an important research gap about which little has 
been done, namely, to measure hospital resilience. 
 
Chapter 3 is a systematic literature review to identify potential measures for the evaluation of 
hospital disaster resilience. The final synthesis included 11 evaluation instruments of hospital 
disaster capability. Through extracting and synthesizing measures, a comprehensive 
preliminary evaluation framework was constructed to integrate eight domains, 21 sub-
domains and 50 potential measures (Zhong et al. 2013a). The recognition of an evaluation 
framework provides a foundation for developing a more comprehensive instrument for 
measuring a hospital’s resilience. This chapter distils the concepts and measures, identified in 
the literature, into a preliminary evaluation framework which forms the basic logic for the 
primary data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter 4 is the first of the results chapters. It used outlines the use of a three-round 
Modified-Delphi Method to validate the content validity of the preliminary evaluation 
framework. The potential measures were modified and validated by a panel of 33 experts. 
The importance of the proposed measures was scored by the experts using a 5-point Likert 
scale. As a result, a large proportion of the measures were identified as having good potential 
for assessing hospital disaster resilience. A revised three-layered evaluation framework was 
established; it categorizes these key measures into 8 domains, 17 sub-domains, and 43 
indicators. The revised evaluation framework formed the basis for further testing using 
empirical data. 
 
Chapter 5 is the second of the results chapters. The empirical data in the Shandong Province 
of China was used to validate the construct validity and internal reliability of the revised 
evaluation framework of Chapter 4. Based on the revised evaluation framework, a 
questionnaire was designed to survey the status of disaster resilience. A cross-sectional 
survey was conducted using a convenience sample of 50 tertiary hospitals. The questionnaire 
contained eight domains derived from the evaluation framework: hospital safety, emergency 
command, communication and cooperation system, disaster plan, disaster stockpile and 
logistics management, emergency staff, trainings and drills, emergency services and surge 
capability, and recovery and adaptation strategies. Four component factors were extracted 
from these domains by Factor Analysis; these factors enable hospitals to evaluate their 
overall level of resilience. Then a validated evaluation framework, with key indicators, was 
further developed.   
 
Chapter 6 is the third of the results chapters. By adopting the same questionnaire as used in 
Chapter 5, the current status of disaster resilience in the tertiary hospitals in Shandong 
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Province was explored. It was used to validate the feasibility of the validated evaluation 
framework. The results also revealed considerable variability in the breadth of arrangements 
in regard to the internal safety of hospitals, disaster management mechanisms, disaster 
resources, and emergency critical care. The validated framework also can be used to gain an 
understanding of what constitutes effective hospital resilience, and what can be done to 
improve the resilience of the hospitals.  
 
Chapter 7 is the first discussion chapter; it aimed to advance the theory and understanding of 
the concept of hospital resilience. It, firstly, highlights the key findings, key concepts, and 
also discusses the limitations of the research. Then, it outlines four new key component parts 
of disaster resilience (i.e., strength, flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability), based on the 
findings of this research. It also draws together these component parts, evaluation elements, 
and the criteria of disaster resilience into a novel conceptual understanding for disaster 
resilience. It is anticipated that this novel conceptual understanding of disaster resilience will 
be used for the conceptualization of disaster resilience in a wider range of international 
settings, and that it may have application for organisations other than hospitals. 
 
Chapter 8 is the second discussion chapter and focuses on disaster resilience in China. Using 
the validated evaluation framework and its key component factors, the chapter identifies and 
discusses the major challenges that currently exist in China regarding healthcare resilience, 
and outlines recommendations and policy implications for further improvement. The study 
found that considerable progress has been achieved since a seminal event in 2003, the SARS 
outbreak; however, there remain challenges to healthcare organizations, including challenges 
both internal of the organizations (e.g., standards of disaster-resistant infrastructure and 
disaster plans), and ones that arise from the context (e.g., emergency medical service systems, 
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legal system, and funding distribution). The corresponding recommendations and policy 
strategies are discussed; they address these challenges to assist to authorities to improve 
future healthcare resilience in China. 
 
Chapter 9 provides the overarching conclusions of the research and its limitations. It outlines 
the unique contribution of the research outcomes to public health, and provides suggestions 
for future research. 
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Part B: Literature review 
Chapter 2 : Defining hospital disaster resilience 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been published in the publication: 
Zhong S, Clark M, Hou XY, Zang YL, FitzGerald G. Proposing and 
developing the definition and conceptual framework for healthcare 
resilience to cope with disasters. Emergencias 2014; 26: 69-77. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The term resilience was introduced into the English language in the early 17th Century from 
the Latin verb “resilire”, meaning to rebound or recoil (McAslan 2010b). Over time, the 
concept of resilience has been examined in a number of disciplines, including materials 
science, psychology, economics, and environmental studies. When it is applied to people and 
their environments, ‘resilience’ is basically a metaphor used to describe the ability to return 
to their original state (Norris et al. 2008). It is not concerned with how large the initial 
displacement was or even the severity of the displacement but rather the speed with which 
stability is achieved (Bodin and Wiman 2004; Norris et al. 2008; Gordon 1978). There are 
two foremost concepts of resilience for ecological systems; namely ‘engineering resilience’ 
and ‘ecological resilience’ (Holling 1973). These types of resilience are measures of the size 
or magnitude of disturbance that a system can absorb before it restructures itself and moves 
back to its original state or to another state of equilibrium (Gunderson et al. 2002; Walker et 
al. 2006). The distinction between the two concepts are: firstly, the underlying 
conceptualization of ‘engineering resilience’ is concerned with stability and speed of its 
return; and secondly the underlying conceptualization of ‘ecological resilience’ focuses on  
instability and the tendency to evolve to new or better states (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Holling 1996).  
 
Recent research has focused on the ‘ecological resilience’ of critical organisations which can 
supply ‘lifeline’ services (e.g., electric power, water, and healthcare sectors) as these are 
crucial for minimizing the impact of disasters (Stewart and Bostrom 2002). Disasters include 
environmental incidents, terrorism and pandemics of infectious diseases which continue to 
have a significant impact on human health and wellbeing. It is only more recently that the 
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concept of ‘hospital resilience’ has been added as an important concept into the disaster 
management lexicon, reflecting the critical role of healthcare in the face of disasters 
(Carthey,De Leval and Reason 2001; Jeffcott,Ibrahim and Cameron 2009; McDaniels et al. 
2008). Improving healthcare resilience, particularly hospital resilience, is considered an 
important step for enhancing the health system’s capability to cope with disasters effectively, 
for minimising the damage to health service provision, and thus to reducing the impact that 
disasters may have on the society (Bruneau et al. 2003; Paturas et al. 2010).  
 
The effectiveness of the health system responses has been found to influence considerably the 
community’s response to and recovery from disasters, and ultimately determine health 
outcomes (Paturas et al. 2010; Bruneau et al. 2003; Davidson and Çagnan 2004). Hospitals 
are essential, as they provide a ‘lifeline’ service to their community with a key function of 
minimizing the impact of disasters (Albanese et al. 2008; Paturas et al. 2010; McDaniels et al. 
2008). However, hospitals are arguably more vulnerable than other facilities during disasters, 
as they have a complex combination of utilities, surgical and diagnostic equipment, and 
hazardous materials, along with ever-changing visitors and patients in various states of 
physical and mental health (Pan American Health Organization 2000; Milsten 2000).  
 
In this context, building resilience into healthcare organizations, especially hospitals can be 
used to build their capabilities to resist, respond to and recover from disasters rapidly and 
thus decrease the lives lost or injured. It is also seen as an essential element of resilient 
communities which can better cope with future change and unknown risks (Berkes 2007). 
Understanding and developing healthcare resilience, especially hospital resilience, is a 
pressing public health policy issue with local, national and international application. In 2005, 
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction promoted the model of ‘safe and resilient 
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hospitals’ as an integral component of disaster risk reduction planning in the healthcare sector. 
The conference also endorsed policies that ensure “all new hospitals are built with a level of 
resilience that strengthens their capacity to remain functional in disasters (International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005; Pan American Health Organization 2005b).” 
 
Despite the importance of healthcare resilience, there is still no clear and consistent definition 
and framework identifying its key components. This chapter aims to build a comprehensive 
healthcare disaster management approach guided by the concept of resilience. There are two 
objectives: (1) to define hospital disaster resilience (abbreviated as hospital resilience in 
following chapters and parts); and (2) to propose a conceptual understanding of hospital 
resilience including the criteria and key components which underpins it.  
 
2.2 Materials and Methods 
 
Major health electronic databases including PubMed, Web of Science, EBSCO, ProQuest, 
Scopus, and ScienceDirect were searched so as to identify contributions to the definition, 
criteria, components and conceptual framework of ‘disaster resilience’. The key search words 
used were “resilience OR health management OR hospital management” AND “disaster OR 
emergency OR mass casualty”. In order to retrieve the history of resilience theory, no 
limitations were placed on the publication date and format. Additional references were 
identified through examination of the references from most recent publications (snowballing) 
and through scrutiny of the contents pages of highly relevant journals for the last two years. 
 
Reference titles were scanned by the doctoral candidate (SZ) for relevance to the aims of the 
study and then abstracts were reviewed for relevance, significance and utility. The remaining 
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publications were retrieved in full text format and analyzed for their contribution to the 
definition of resilience, the underpinning concepts and key components. A total of 61 
publications, including public reports, grey literature, and journal articles written in English 
were included in this review, spanning the years 1973 to 2013. The included publications 
were used as the basis for a comprehensive and critical review of theories and definitions 
relevant to disaster healthcare resilience and to propose and develop the definition and 
conceptual framework of hospital resilience.  
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
This section is divided in the following sub-sections: key characterises of hospital resilience, 
definition and concept of hospital resilience, conceptual framework for hospital resilience, 
significance of hospital resilience research. 
 
2.3.1 Key characteristics of hospital resilience 
 
Recently, the notion of resilience has had more broad application than its traditional use in 
engineering and ecology. For example, the term resilience has been used to describe the core 
capabilities of individuals, critical infrastructure, organisations, systems, and human 
communities, to resist, respond to and recover from disasters effectively (McDaniels et al. 
2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; Norris et al. 2008). The specific elements of the resilience 
definition would be operationalised differently depending upon the level of analysis. 
 
To develop the definition of hospital resilience, it is important to firstly examine this more 
generic resilience literature. Key resilience definitions (illustrated in Table 2-1), especially 
from an organisational or system level (ecological or engineering) are essential for the 
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understanding of hospital resilience. Definitions that only focused on individual resilience or 
staff resilience, which cannot supply any key elements or criteria to hospital disaster 
resilience are not discussed in this chapter. The common characteristics for resilience can be 
transposed to the hospital context to develop a definition for hospital resilience. 
 
Table 2-1. An overview and chronology of definitions of resilience 
Author Level of analysis Definitions 
Holling et 
al.,1995 Ecological 
The buffer capacity or ability to absorb perturbation, or the 
magnitude of the disturbance that can be absorbed before a 
system changes its structure by changing the variables and 
processes that control behaviour (Holling et al. 1995). 
Gunderson 
et al., 2002 
Ecological 
 
The capacity of a system to undergo disturbance and maintain 
its functions and controls (Gunderson et al. 2002). 
Bruneau et 
al., 2003 Engineering  
The ability of a system to reduce the chances of a shock, to 
absorb such a shock if it occurs and to recover quickly after a 
shock (Bruneau et al. 2003). 
Longstaff, 
2005 
Ecological 
 
The ability by an individual, group, or organisation to 
continue its existence in the face of some sort of surprise. 
Resilience is found in systems that are highly adaptable and 
have diverse resources (Longstaff 2005). 
Cumming et 
al., 2005 
Ecological 
 
[1]The amount of change that a system can undergo while still 
maintaining the same control on structure and function; [2] 
The system’s ability to self-organize; [3] The degree to which 
the system is capable of learning and adaptation (Cumming et 
al. 2005). 
Renn et al., 
2005 
Ecological 
  
[1] The capacity of a system potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain 
an acceptable level of functioning; [2] The capability to return 
after deflection or perturbation to a stable overall or local state 
of equilibrium (Renn,Graham and IRGC 2005). 
Resilience 
Alliance, 
2006 
Ecological 
 
The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize 
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the 
same function, structure and feedbacks (Resilience Alliance 
2006). 
Seville et al., 
2006 Organisation  
Able to achieve its core objectives in the face of adversity. 
This means not only reducing the vulnerability, but also 
improving the adaptive capacity (Seville et al. 2006). 
United 
Nations, 
2007 
System or 
community  
The capacity of a system/community potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach 
and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. 
It is determined by the degree to which the system is capable 
of organising itself to increase this capacity for learning from 
past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk 
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reduction measures (United Nations 2007). 
Bruneau et 
al., 2007 
Organisation 
/Community 
The ability of social units to mitigate hazards, and carry out 
recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and 
mitigate the effects of future hazards (Bruneau et al. 2007). 
The 
Stockholm 
Resilience 
Centre, 2009 
Ecological 
 
The capacity of a social-ecological system both to withstand 
perturbations from for instance climate or economic shocks 
and to rebuild and renew itself afterwards (The Stockholm 
Resilience Centre 2009). 
Madni and 
Jackson, 
2009 
Engineering  
A multi-faceted capability of a complex system that 
encompasses avoiding, absorbing, adapting to, and recovering 
from disruptions (Madni and Jackson 2009). 
Kahan et al., 
2010 Infrastructure  
An outcome measure with an end goal of limiting damage to 
infrastructure; mitigating the consequences; and recovery to 
the pre-event state (Kahan,Allen and George 2010). 
Australian 
Government, 
2010 
Infrastructure  
[1]Coordinated planning across sectors and networks; [2] 
Responsive, flexible and timely recovery measures; [3] 
Develop an organisation culture that has the ability to provide 
a minimum level of service during disasters, and return to full 
operations quickly; [4] Achieved by undertaking risk 
management, business continuity management and 
organisational resilience initiatives (Australian Government 
2010). 
Rogers, 
2011 Organisation  
[1] Adaptive capacity of an organisation is a complex and 
changing environment; [2] It is a relative expression 
describing one outcome of the organisation’s risk 
management activity (Rogers 2011). 
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(1) Uncertainty. All these resilience definitions refer to threats, adverse events, disturbance 
and perturbations, which interrupt or hinder normal operations by causing confusion, disorder, 
discontinuity or displacement (Gunderson et al. 2002; Holling et al. 1995; Alwang,Siegel and 
Jorgensen 2001; Resilience Alliance 2006). Resilience is seen as the ability to accommodate 
abnormal conditions and extreme events, such as floods, droughts, heat waves, natural 
disasters, or economic shocks (Bruneau et al. 2003; The Stockholm Resilience Centre 2009; 
Hamel and Valikangas 2003). Resilience is forward looking and helps explore policy options 
for dealing with these uncertainties and changes in the future. 
 
(2) Inherent and adaptive capacity. Resilience is commonly understood to entail both 
strength and flexibility (McDaniels et al. 2008). A balance of both inherent and adaptive 
resiliency is necessary to be able to resist, respond to, and recover from disasters in an 
effective manner (Rose 2004). Inherent resiliency indicates an organization’s infrastructural 
resistance or internal safety for resisting, or absorbing the impacts of adverse events. 
Adaptive resiliency implies short term response capability and long term recovery capacity, 
building deliberately by adequate disaster preparedness, such as disaster plans, stockpiles, 
operational procedures and staff capability (Carpenter et al. 2001; Madni and Jackson 2009). 
 
(3) Positive outcome. All resilience definitions refer to positive outcomes when coping with 
adverse events, which could be an adaptation in response to the adversity of an ecological 
system (Waller 2001), or the ability of an engineering system to absorb a shock and recover 
quickly (Bruneau et al. 2003),or the ability of an organisation to reduce its vulnerability and 
improve its crisis management ability (Seville et al. 2006; United Nations 2007). Moreover, 
‘engineering resilience’’ makes a system return to an original structural or functional status 
following a disturbance; whereas ‘ecological resilience’ allows for many possible desirable 
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states emerging that can match the environment (Gunderson 2000). Thus ‘ecological 
resilience’ is arguably the more relevant mechanism for human communities, organisations, 
and societies.  
 
(4) Multiple strategies with all hazards approaches .It would appear wise to use an all-
hazards approach rather than to focus only on one kind of hazard particularly in an 
increasingly volatile, uncertain and complex world. Thus, taking a resilience approach may 
assist organisations, communities and societies to better cope with whatever event may 
unfold in the future (Berkes 2007). Resilience is also a comprehensive ability. In order to 
improve it, multiple strategies and practices were required, which were involved in different 
phases of disasters including pre-event, during event and post-event disaster phases (Berkes 
2007). 
 
(5) Interdependency. People and organisations are more vulnerable as society becomes more 
complex, and the impact of global factors becomes more immediate and apparent (McAslan 
2010b). In facing such interconnected threats, organisations, communities and even nations 
which are well coordinated and share common values and beliefs tend to be more resilient 
(McAslan 2010b; Australian Government 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Definition and concept of hospital resilience 
 
Resilience is an inherent and adaptive capacity to cope with future uncertainty, through 
multiple strategies and using an all hazards approach. Hospitals need to withstand the 
consequences of the event, with both inherent strength (ability to resist and respond to an 
external shock) and adaptive flexibility (ability to bounce back and adapt), while at the same 
time maintaining continuity of operations, and surging their capability to respond to sudden 
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increases in demand (Sauer et al. 2009; Rose 2004; Barbera,Yeatts and Macintyre 2009). 
Thus, hospital resilience is a comprehensive concept which includes structural components 
(e.g., facility infrastructural safety), non-structural components (e.g., staff, equipment, 
medication), health service components (e.g., medical response and treatment, surge capacity, 
continuity of medical service) and disaster management capabilities (e.g., plan and procedure, 
crisis communication) (Veterans Health Administration 2008). It should also be achieved 
through comprehensive continuous management phases, including disaster prevention and 
preparation before an event, responsiveness during the event and recovery and adaptation 
after the event. 
 
The definition of hospital disaster resilience should be comprehensive, and thus needs to be 
in accordance with resilience characteristics. Also it needs to be formulated with reference to 
the illustrated comprehensive definitions from other sectors (e.g. engineering resilience, 
ecological resilience, organisation resilience, community resilience). The author synthesised 
of the work of Albanese, Bruneau etc (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; 
Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010; McAslan 2010a, 2010b), and then proposed the 
definition of hospital resilience. Hospital resilience can be defined as “The ability of hospitals 
to resist, absorb, and respond to the shock of disasters while maintaining and surging 
essential health services (e.g., on-site rescue, pre-hospital care, emergency medical treatment, 
critical care, decontamination and isolation), and then to recover to its original state or adapt 
to a new one (Zhong et al. 2013a).” More specifically, it is a capacity to limit the damage to 
critical infrastructure and functions (termed resistance); mitigate the consequences by 
maintaining the most critical functions (called absorption and responsiveness); and speed the 
time for recovery to the pre-event state (termed recovery) or to a new state of function 
(termed adaptation).  
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There are several basic functions and requirements providing for safe and resilient hospitals. 
These include that urgently needed medical care remains accessible and critical services are 
still functioning, medical leadership is needed by the general public in times of crisis, an 
interface among regional entities is provided and integration within a community-wide 
disaster plan is maximised (Albanese et al. 2008). There are some practical principles that are 
put forward as being essential to achieving hospital resilience. These include the need for 
hospital managers to identify the hospital’s environment and its most critical functions, 
completeness and suitability of the hospital policy and plans. It also includes a hospital’s 
capacity to implement and adapt its disaster policy and plans (McAslan 2010). 
 
The concept of disaster resilience has been described and illustrated by a general resilience 
theoretical framework for community or organisations. Using seismic risks as the exemplar, 
Bruneau et al. proposed the MCEER's framework (Multidisciplinary Center of Earthquake 
Engineering to Extreme Event). In this framework, disaster resilience is characterized by four 
criteria, including robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity. It can be adapted 
slightly for hospital resilience to facilitate a better understanding (Bruneau et al. 2003). 
Figure 2-1 illustrates these hospital resilience characteristics. Resilience is measured with 
reference to some level of hospital function such as the number or percentage of patients 
assessed and treated. The horizontal line showing full hospital operation is fixed, implying a 
single optimum. The occurrence of a disaster leads to a rapid decrease in functional 
performance. The extent to which function is maintained reflects the hospital’s robustness to 
a given external shock. Over time, following the disaster, the hospital regains some level of 
equilibrium, in which different full hospital operation level is experienced due to the 
changing nature of the external environment (from an ecological view of resilience). The 
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speed with which this recovery of function is achieved reflects the hospital’s responsiveness 
(rapidity). The diagram illustrates that robustness and rapidity can be improved by both 
hospital preparedness and responsiveness. In addition, the other characteristics including 
redundancy and resourcefulness are imbedded in each management stage, which can also 
influence robustness and rapid response and recovery (Bruneau et al. 2007). Thus, two of the 
four criteria, robustness and rapidity can be seen as ‘‘ends’’, while the other  two  , 
resourcefulness and redundancy, can be seen as ‘‘means’’(Bruneau et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 2-1. Conceptual definition and four criteria of hospital disaster resilience (adapted by 
the author, from Bruneau et al. 2003) 
 
The four criteria of MCEER's framework was initially proposed by Bruneau et al., 2003 
(Bruneau et al. 2003). These four criteria can be adapted for healthcare resilience to facilitate 
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a better understanding. Thus, the definitions of these four criteria for healthcare resilience 
were adapted from the original ones, and were proposed by the author as follows: 
  
• Robustness: strength or the ability of health facilities or health systems to withstand a given 
level of external shock, and the extent to which the healthcare functions can be maintained;  
• Redundancy: the extent to which the elements of health facilities’ or health systems’ that 
can be substituted for maintaining their health functions, i.e., capable of satisfying functional 
requirements through back-up facilities or facilities surging capacity in the event of disasters;  
• Resourcefulness: the ability to identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilize 
resources when disaster occurs; resourcefulness can be further regarded as flexible plans, 
strategies and procedures to apply or coordinate resources (e.g., human resources, 
medications, and equipment) from different facilities to meet healthcare priorities and achieve 
essential functions;   
• Rapidity: the speed (in a timely manner) of health facilities or systems with which the level 
of their full operational function can be achieved through the activities of responsiveness, 
recovery and adaptation. 
 
2.3.3 Conceptual framework for hospital resilience 
 
The challenge facing researchers, policy makers and health leaders is how to develop and 
promote healthcare resilience in a way that assists governments to develop public health 
policy and to enable managers to build resilient healthcare organisations. Therefore, a 
conceptual framework is urgently needed for the identification of key components of hospital 
resilience.  
 
A community disaster resilience model was developed by undertaking a thematic analysis of 
 Chapter 2: Defining hospital disaster resilience Page 37 
 
the relevant community resilience literature (Arbon et al. 2012). Its four domains are 
community connectedness; risk and vulnerability; planning and procedures; available 
resources. These domains overlap and interact, making relatively equal contributions to 
building community. Another study found that healthcare resilience sits at the centre of 
several integrated domains, including emergency management, risk management, 
safety/security, business continuity, disaster recovery, and crisis communications (Devlen 
2009).Existing resilience frameworks are not hospital-focused. This may limit the extent to 
which existing frameworks can be directly applied to complex entities such as hospitals, 
although it is anticipated that there may be some domains of these frameworks that may have 
implication to a hospital setting.  
 
Based on the discussion of the research team, the preliminary domains for hospital resilience 
were designed based on our understanding regarding hospital resilience and adaptation of the 
above frameworks. The designed process is listed as below: the new domain of ‘vulnerability 
and safety’ was designed based on these domains of ‘risk and vulnerability’ ‘risk 
management’ and ‘safety/security’. The new domain of ‘disaster management and resources’ 
was merged from the domains including ‘community connectedness’, ‘planning and 
procedures’, ‘available resources’, ‘emergency management’, and ‘crisis communications’. 
The new domain of ‘continuity of essential medical service’ can be a representative of the 
domain of ‘business continuity’. The new domain of ‘disaster recovery and adaptation’ was 
derived from the domain of ‘disaster recovery’.  
  
Thus, as Figure 2-2 illustrates, hospital disaster resilience is integrated with the initial four 
domains. They are: vulnerability and safety (i.e., hospital risk and vulnerability, surveillance, 
organization infrastructural safety); disaster management and resources (i.e.,  disaster plan, 
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crisis communication, community cooperation, emergency management and disaster 
resources); continuity of essential medical service (i.e.,   emergency surge capacity, business 
continuity, emergency medical response and treatment); disaster recovery and adaptation (i.e.,   
healthcare function recovery, healthcare capability assisting community recovery, adaptation 
strategies). Based on the understanding on hospital resilience, and using an adaptation 
process from the existent frameworks, major domains have been identified for maintenance 
of a high level of hospital resilience. However, it should be noticed that these are initial 
domains which should be developed further in the following chapters.   
 
 
Figure 2-2. Integrated four domains of hospital disaster resilience [adapted by the author 
from (Arbon et al. 2012; Devlen 2009)] 
 
In addition, the classic disaster management model includes continuous disaster management 
activities, ranging through preventive, preparedness, response, and recovery (as Figure 2-3). 
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All these management activities are applicable to enhancing disaster resilience (Keim 2008; 
Heath 1998; Schipper and Pelling 2006; de Boer J and Dubouloz M 2000).  
 
 
Figure 2-3. Cycled phases of disaster management [adapted by the author from (Keim 2008; 
Heath 1998; Schipper and Pelling 2006; de Boer J and Dubouloz M 2000)]. 
  
The MCEER's framework includes four criteria of disaster resilience, including robustness, 
resourcefulness, redundancy and rapidity. These criteria can be integrated into the four 
domains of hospital resilience via a conceptual framework illustrated as Figure 2-4.  
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Figure 2-4. Draft conceptual model of hospital disaster resilience (developed by the author) 
 
The above models influenced the approach towards a higher-order interpretation. A 
conceptual model of healthcare resilience (Figure 2-4) was developed as an interpretation to 
depict my understanding of healthcare resilience. The management cycle, major dimensions 
and performance criteria could form the conceptual basis of this framework. Within this 
conceptual framework healthcare, resilience can be assessed by robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, and rapidity. It is also contributed to by prevention, preparedness, 
responsiveness, and recovery, which is in turn can be integrated by a complex of key domains, 
including vulnerability and safety, disaster resources and preparedness, continuity of essential 
medical service, and disaster recovery and adaptation. It should be noticed that this literature 
review presents an original preliminary framework that needs to be further developed in this 
thesis and informed by the data.   
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2.3.4 Significance of hospital resilience research  
 
The literature regarding resilience theories and definitions was reviewed to develop the 
definition of hospital resilience. In addition, a comprehensive disaster management approach 
has been built guided by the concept of resilience. To date, without a specific hospital 
resilience framework, the conceptual framework has to be adapted by reviewing and 
extracting key components from relevant resilience frameworks from other sectors. It is 
hoped that the concept of hospital resilience can be incorporated into an approach for 
improving all agencies’ resilience, and which promotes integration of healthcare facilities 
within community resilience.  
 
As in the MCEER framework, robustness and rapidity are ‘ends’, while resourcefulness and 
redundancy are ‘means’ to the concept of disaster resilience (Bruneau et al. 2007). Therefore, 
hospital resilience is an essential concept, which aims to improve a hospital’s robustness, 
rapidity to recover and adapt,  identification of redundant resources and the availability of 
resourceful procedures and strategies (McAslan 2010e; Rogers 2011; Kahan,Allen and 
George 2010; Sternberg 2003). The conceptualization of hospital resilience is essential to put 
hospitals’ disaster capabilities, management tasks, activities and disaster outcomes together 
into a comprehensive and holistic view  
 
In addition, most recent studies have focused on the ability of hospital to cope with disasters 
from different perspectives by using various concepts, including disaster management, 
disaster preparedness, organisation safety, business continuity, hospital surge capacity and 
other specific hospital capabilities. However, to date, these studies and concepts have 
occurred in isolation, provide limited perspectives of disaster capability, and result in gaps 
and (at times) duplication (Nelson et al. 2007). For example, most disaster preparedness 
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studies involve aspects of surge capacity, responsiveness and recovery capability. The 
preparedness concept in most studies includes a full range of prevention, mitigation, and 
recovery activities, not just those designed to enable response to events (Nelson et al. 2007). 
Hospital resilience sits at the centre of these concepts. Thus, it is hoped that these studies and 
perspectives may be consistent with the ethos of hospital resilience, and may contribute to 
building the concept of hospital resilience (Devlen 2009). Developing the concept of 
‘hospital resilience’ would provide a starting point for broad agreement about what it 
comprises and would also assist in integrating this broad range of approaches together into a 
single process with an achievable goal. 
 
Hospital resilience should be distinguished from disaster management. Hospital resilience 
comprises a hospital facilities’ structural components, non-structural components, emergency 
hospital service and disaster management (Veterans Health Administration 2008). It should 
be seen as a comprehensive concept, which links these key components with the achievable 
goal of improving hospital pre-event robustness and promoting rapid response and recovery, 
using redundant resources and resourceful strategies. Thus, it is important to note that 
hospital resilience does not replace disaster management or continuity planning, whereas risk 
management and continuity planning are management tools using a comprehensive 
continuous management approach.  
 
This review is an initial attempt to propose concepts, basic criteria and conceptual 
frameworks for hospital resilience. It also highlights the priority and guidelines for future 
research on hospital disaster resilience, which should include (1) a consensus on how the 
concept of hospital resilience is defined; (2) a further discussion and validation of its key 
components and criteria; (3) further investigation of hospital resilience, which comparers 
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hospital resilience with the concept of resilience from other sectors; (4) incorporation of the 
concept of hospital resilience into an approach for improving all agencies resilience, and 
which promotes integration of healthcare facilities within the community resilience; (5) 
further investigation of hospital resilience including contributions from relevant hospital 
disaster studies; and (6) developing a user friendly evaluation tool with key measurable 
indicators.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Developing the concept of ‘hospital resilience’ provides a starting point for agreement about 
what it comprises and forms a basis for understanding of hospital resilience. A draft 
conceptual model has been developed in Chapter 2 to aid understanding of hospital resilience 
by an analysis of the literature. The following chapter utilises this draft framework to identify 
potential measures of resilience, which leads to a clearer evaluation framework. 
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Chapter 3 : Measuring hospital disaster resilience 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been published in the publication: 
Zhong S, Clark M, Hou XY, Zang YL, FitzGerald G. Development of 
hospital disaster resilience: conceptual framework and potential 
measurement. Emergency Medicine Journal. 2013: doi: 
10.1136/emermed-2012-202282. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the importance of hospital resilience, there are still few studies that have focused on 
hospital resilience measurement. Instead, international organizations and countries, such as 
the USA, WHO and PAHO, have developed specific tools and measures mainly to evaluate 
hospital disaster preparedness, and hospital safety (Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji 
and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b; Pan 
American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 2010a). 
However, most hospital preparedness studies have focussed on a full range of management 
activities, not just those designed to enable responses to events. The preparedness documents 
reviewed rely nearly exclusively on structural measures (e.g., human, equipment), but have 
little concern for hospital infrastructural safety and emergency services that are linked to the 
hospital’s ability to cope with disasters (Nelson et al. 2007; Asch et al. 2005). There is little 
consensus regarding which measures should be selected and how to integrate these measures 
into a comprehensive framework for measuring hospital resilience.  
 
To improve hospital resilience, it is essential to further identify its key measures. There is 
some imperative for devising a user-friendly assessment instrument for hospital resilience 
that can maximise the concept development. Such an instrument could be used to better 
understand the full extent of hospital resilience and also as a decision-support tool for 
promoting strategies and policies aimed at improving hospital resilience. To date there are 
few studies that have identified measurable domains of hospital resilience, let alone 
developed an assessment instrument.  
 
This review aims to build a conceptual framework from the literature, which identifies the 
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key measurable domains of hospital resilience so as to highlight issues that could be used for 
measurement. The study has three objectives (1) it constructs a measurable framework for 
further proposing measures (including key measurable domains); (2) it proposes measures for 
possible inclusion in a preliminary evaluation instrument; and (3) it develops a matrix of 
critical issues to evaluate and improve hospital resilience to cope with future disasters.  
 
3.2 Methods  
 
Major health electronic databases including ProQuest, EBSCO, Web of Science, PubMed, 
and ScienceDirect were searched to retrieve relevant publications, including reports, grey 
literature and published articles that may be applicable to research aims and objectives. Two 
sets of search terms were used, namely (1) ‘resilience and framework or model’, OR (2) 
‘evaluation or assess or measure and hospital and disaster or emergency or mass casualty and 
resilience or capacity or ability or preparedness or response or safety’. Additional references 
were identified through examination of the references from most recent publications 
(snowballing) and through scrutinizing the contents pages of highly relevant journals for the 
last two years.  
 
Inclusion criteria were: (1) journal articles, reports and grey literature written in English; (2) 
within the first search strategy, studies which includes disaster resilience frameworks, models 
or key domains; and (3) within the second search strategy, studies which identify instruments 
and associated measures, for assessing aspects of hospital disaster ability.   
 
Exclusion criteria were: (1) within the first search strategy, studies that only focused on 
individual resilience, staff resilience, resilience engineering without relevance to hospital 
resilience; and (2) within the second search strategy, studies without any evaluation 
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instruments that could assist to inform the identification of measures to evaluate hospital 
disaster ability.  
 
The titles and abstracts of articles were reviewed by the principal researcher (SZ) for 
relevance and significance and the full text of articles retrieved when appropriate. Full text 
articles were analysed for their contribution to the definition, conceptual understanding of 
resilience, identification of the domains of hospital resilience and possible evaluation 
measures. Publications, including public reports, grey literature, and journal articles written 
in English were included in this review, spanning the years 1981 to 2013. A widely accepted 
measurement definition has been used in this study (Handler,Issel and Turnock 2001; Asch et 
al. 2005). The term ‘measure’ includes a statement about the existence or performance of 
healthcare that is deemed to contribute to hospital resilience, under relevant domains and 
subdomains. An instrument is a collection of these measures.  
 
This chapter covers several objectives around a logical core. Firstly, existing frameworks 
from other sectors and their underpinning domains were identified and evaluated for their 
applicability to the health sector. From this analysis, a preliminary conceptual framework was 
developed for further testing and evaluation. Then, evidence of resilience measures was 
sought along with instruments of hospital capacity in the context of disasters (e.g. hospital 
safety, hospital disaster management).  
 
Two reviewers assessed the suitability of these measures based on each measure’s relevance 
to the hospital resilience concept, includes hospital structural components, non-structural 
components, emergency medical functions and disaster management. In cases of substantial 
disagreement between the reviewers, the potential measures were still included in the 
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framework for further experts’ discussion. Such an approach aims to minimise the chances of 
missing or rejecting a relevant measure. Measures need to be included in at least one 
instrument, and perceived relevance to definition of hospital resilience or its measurement. 
The purpose of this extraction was to allow documentation of measurement domains for 
hospital disaster resilience, which is a foundation for future evaluation. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
As illustrated in the Figure 3-1. A total of 1480 potentially eligible publications were 
retrieved initially. Of these 1193 were excluded through screening the title and then the 
abstract. After scanning the full text of the remaining 287 publications, the final analysis was 
conducted on 47 articles which appeared to contribute to the study objectives.  
 
Figure 3-1. Literature review selection process and the included studies (develped by the 
author) 
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As hospital resilience is a relatively new concept and focus of attention, there is still no 
agreed conceptual framework for its usage. There are existing disaster resilience frameworks 
of nonhospital sectors, such as communities or organisations. We reviewed these frameworks 
as a basis for proposing measurable domains for hospital resilience. However, we have not 
included frameworks which do not appear to have significance for the health sector in this 
document. For instance, many publications were not included which devised frameworks or 
models using sophisticated mathematical modelling and calculations, which came largely 
from a resilience engineering paradigm.  
 
Four relevant disaster resilience frameworks, which focus on community disaster resilience 
and organisational resilience, were selected (Arbon et al. 2012; Devlen 2009; McManus et al. 
2007; Bruneau et al. 2003).The selected frameworks were user-friendly and interpretable at 
the lay level, with a description of key domains or criteria for disaster resilience that can be 
adapted into the hospital resilience context.  
 
A total of 11 studies were located which focussed on instruments that evaluated hospital 
disaster ability (8 peer reviewed articles and 3 public reports). The process for extracting and 
synthesizing results from these included instruments was illustrated in Future 3-2. Firstly, a 
number of primary domains were identified through the relevant disaster resilience 
frameworks. Within each domain, we identified and classified sub-domains. Then, the 
measures were then extracted from the 11 studies and synthesized under these sub-domains. 
These measures are relevant to the concept of hospital resilience and at least one of basic 
resilience criteria (robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, rapidity). Similar measures 
across papers were compared and merged in order to ensure key measures which capture 
similar meanings from different papers. Finally, through extracting and synthesizing potential 
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measures, a comprehensive framework was constructed for documentation of the potential 
measures of hospital resilience, and was used to explain about how these measures are 
divided and linked.    
 
 
Figure 3-2. Review processes for extracting and synthesizing the included instruments 
[adapted by the author from (Munro et al. 2007) ] 
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Evidence of resilience measures was sought along with instruments for measuring hospital 
capacity in the context of disasters (e.g. hospital safety, hospital disaster preparedness). 
Research sourced for the second search strategy was expected to be used to synthesize 
potential measures that could be used for evaluating hospital resilience and for highlighting 
critical issues to enhance hospital resilience. Each of the 11 studies contains an instrument 
with associated measures, for assessing aspects of hospital capacity in responding to disasters 
(Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska 
and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Thome et al. 2006; 
World Health Organization 2011b; Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; 
World Health Organization 2010a). Table 3-1 displays the data and categories extracted from 
each instrument (Windle,Bennett and Noyes 2011; Ahern et al. 2006). Most studies (n=7) 
focused on hospital preparedness for disasters, and on hospitals’ response and recovery 
capability and surge capacity. Other studies evaluated hospital safety to disasters (n=2) or 
else focused on hospital linkages with the community during disasters (n=2). It is noteworthy 
that a large number of the studies were based on U.S. experiences post 9/11. Common 
limitations of these studies included a focus on specific disasters rather than all hazards, lack 
of reliability and validity, lack of scoring procedures, or self-report without further 
verification.  
 
There are also several challenges derived from measures of these instruments. Firstly, one of 
the characteristics of good measures is that they encode clear standards, with the data 
elements explicitly detailed (Derose et al. 2002). Many of the measures in the evaluation 
instruments were subjective, in the form of checklists or questionnaires. For example 
measures of timely reporting of key diseases often failed to specify thresholds for timeliness 
and completeness, or whether those thresholds varied by the reportable conditions. These 
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issues of clarity preclude a description of the validity of identified measures, which was also 
lacking in the identified instruments. Secondly, ideal measurement systems span the 
Donabedian categories of structure (capacity), process (service), and outcomes (Donabedian 
1978; Beattie and Mackway-Jones 2004). Structure measures are the human, physical and 
financial resources available to provide health care. Process measures describe the care or 
emergency health service provided to the patient. Outcome measures are the resulting effect 
on the health of the patient or population (Donabedian 1978; Beattie and Mackway-Jones 
2004). However, the preparedness documents reviewed rely nearly exclusively on structural 
measures (e.g., human resources, plans, equipment) over process (emergency service) and 
outcome.  
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Table 3-1. Data extraction and evaluation of assessment instruments of hospital’s capability to cope with disasters (developed by the author) 
Instrument 
name  
Hospital 
integration 
into 
community 
preparedness 
Hospital 
bioterrorism 
preparedness 
linkages with 
the 
community 
Hospital 
Disaster 
Preparedness 
Hospital 
Emergency 
Readiness 
Overview 
(HERO) 
survey 
AHRQ-
HRSA) pilot 
hospital 
preparedness 
assessment 
tool 
 
Emergency 
response 
preparedness 
national 
survey 
Mass 
Casualty 
Disaster Plan 
Checklist                                                                                            
Hospital 
public health 
emergency 
preparedness 
WHO 
hospital 
response 
checklist 
PAHO safe 
hospital index 
WHO safe 
hospitals in 
emergencies 
and disasters 
Author(s) Braun, 
Wineman, 
and etc,  2006 
Braun, 
Darcy, and 
etc,   
 2004 
Kaji, 2007 Kollek, 
Cwinn,  
2011 
Thorne, 
Levitin, and 
etc, 2006 
Niska, 
Shimizu, 
2011 
Higgins,  
Wainright,  
and etc,  2004                    
Li  and etc,  
2008 
WHO report, 
2011 
PAHO report, 
2008 
WHO report, 
2010 
Disaster 
type  
All-hazards Bioterrorism All-hazards Chemical, 
biological, 
radiological, 
or nuclear  
Bioterrorism 
preparedness 
All-hazards Mass 
casualty 
event                                                  
All-hazards All-hazards All-hazards All-hazards 
Purpose  Evaluate 
hospital 
community 
services 
linkages for 
response 
Evaluate 
hospital 
linkages with 
community 
for 
bioterrorism 
Measures of 
hospital 
disaster 
preparedness 
and surge 
capacity 
Assess 
hospital 
chemical, 
biological, 
radiological, 
or nuclear 
readiness 
Assess the 
hospital 
preparedness, 
response and 
surge 
capacity 
Evaluated 
hospital 
preparedness 
and 
emergency 
response 
Assess 
preparedness 
for mass 
casualty 
events in  
hospitals  
Assess the 
statues of 
hospital 
public health 
emergency 
preparedness  
An all 
hazards tool  
for hospital 
administrators 
priority 
response 
actions 
Evaluate hospital 
safety from 
disasters 
Assess 
hospital  
structural, 
non-structural 
and 
functional 
vulnerabilities 
Type of 
tool 
Questionnaire Questionnaire 
with on-site 
verification  
Survey and 
on-site 
verify  
Online 
survey 
Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire                                           Questionnaire                            Checklist Checklist Checklist 
Dimensions 
(measures)  
4(17) 4(51) 6 (117) 5 (48) 6 (38) 6(112)   4(252) 17 (192) 9 (92) 4 (143) 3(69) 
Scaling Yes/No Yes/No and 
open-ended 
items  
Yes/No Yes/No/ 
don’t know 
and 
multiple-
choice items  
Fixed-choice 
question and 
open-ended 
questions 
Yes/No  Yes/No Yes/No/ 
don’t know 
Due for 
review /in 
progress 
/completed 
low/average/high  Yes/No 
Scoring  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A 
Reliability Internal Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Internal Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested 
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consistency  consistency, 
inter-
correlation  
Validity Face validity 
was tested 
Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Face and 
content 
validity  
Not tested Not tested Not tested 
References: (Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b; Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 2010a)
 Chapter 3: Measuring hospital disaster resilience                                              Page 55 
 
3.4 Discussions 
 
This section is divided in the following sub-sections: development of measurable key 
domains, preliminary evaluation framework of hospital resilience, critical issues for 
enhancing hospital resilience, study strengths and weaknesses. 
 
3.4.1 Development of measurable key domains  
 
In the absence of any existing framework, domains drawn from other sectors, such as 
community or organisation resilience may have applicability to health services and may help 
inform a hospital resilience framework. These frameworks were discussed in Chapter 2, and 
are also discussed below which can be used for development of a framework for measuring 
hospital resilience. 
 
An Australian government programme developed a community disaster resilience model by 
undertaking a thematic analysis of the community resilience literature (Arbon et al. 2012). It 
has four domains, including community connectedness; risk and vulnerability; planning and 
procedures; available resources. These domains  overlap and interact, making relatively equal 
contributions to building community resilience Healthcare resiliency sits at the centre of 
several integrated domains, including emergency management, risk management, 
safety/security, business continuity, disaster recovery, and crisis communications (Devlen 
2009). One organisational resilience report concluded that the concept of ‘adaptive capacity’ 
is an essential part of resilience (McManus et al. 2007). Adaptive capacity is defined as the 
ability of an organisation to alter its strategy, operations, management systems, leadership 
structure, and decision-support capacity to withstand disasters, generally by adopting 
adaptive qualities and proactive responses (McManus et al. 2007). 
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It would appear timely to establish a new conceptual framework by adapting relevant 
resilience frameworks to a hospital resilience context. Existing resilience frameworks are not 
hospital-focused. This may limit the extent to which existing frameworks can be directly 
applied to complex entities such as hospitals, although, it is anticipated that there may be 
some domains of these frameworks that may have relevance to a hospital setting.  
 
We have adapted the disaster resilience domains for hospital resilience. The initial key 
domains were aggregated to incorporate all the hospital’s key capacities to cope with 
disasters, including hospital safety (surveillance, safety/security), hospital disaster 
preparedness and resources (disaster planning and procedure, crisis communications, 
community connectedness, available resources and logistics management), continuity of 
essential medical services (emergency medicine, medical continuity and surge capacity), 
recovery and adaptation (recovery, evaluation and adaptation)  
 
The MCEER's framework includes four criteria of disaster resilience, including robustness, 
resourcefulness, redundancy and rapidity. These criteria can be integrated into the domains 
and sub-domains of hospital resilience via a framework for measurement illustrated as Figure 
3-3. This figure is similar to the previous conceptual framework (Figure 2-1), but it has been 
developed to incorporate the key domains and sub-domains for the aim of further 
measurement.  
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Figure 3-3. A preliminary framework for guiding the measurement of hospital resilience 
(developed by the author based on Figure 2-3) 
 
It has been developed to provide a holistic interpretation of key measurable domains of 
hospital resilience. Within this framework, hospital resilience can be measured from 4 
dimensions using key measurable domains. The measures under these key domains can be 
developed and selected using the four criteria of robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and 
rapidity. It is hoped that the ethos of hospital resilience may be consistent with, and 
contribute to, integration of the core ability into a comprehensive hospital disaster 
management framework (PPRR) (Devlen 2009). Under the guidance of this model, key 
measures can be proposed further.  
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3.4.2 Preliminary evaluation framework of hospital resilience 
 
The preliminary conceptual framework of hospital resilience can be used as a foundation to 
further develop an instrument with potential measures for evaluation. Whilst recently some 
work (e.g. preparedness, response capability, surge capacity) has been done on hospital 
capacity to cope with disasters, these current studies have added to the body of knowledge as 
it is the first time that a conceptual framework has been developed for disaster resilience and 
that the work will enable hospitals to examine their level of resilience. This is the first time 
that the literature has been examined from a holistic perspective, in order to draw the diverse 
measures into a coherent whole.  
 
The search extended to hospital disaster studies (e.g., hospital safety, hospital disaster 
preparedness, response capability, surge capacity) and sought to describe the possible 
domains of the framework, and provide measures for further evaluating hospital resilience. 
All selected studies illustrated in Table 3-2 focus on the evaluation of hospital capacity to 
cope with disasters. Although the foci of these studies were different and not all their 
component parts are directly comparable, a number of domains were identified. Within each 
domain, we classified sub-domains. For example, within hospital safety, we identified disease 
surveillance, hospital safety and vulnerability as sub-domains.  
 
The purpose of this classification was to allow documentation of measurement domains and 
comparisons of the scope of the instruments. The authors discussed the relevant sub-domains 
and achieved agreement on the extracted main sub-domains, namely: hospital internal safety, 
disease surveillance, emergency leadership, disaster plan, community linkage, crisis 
communications, emergency staff, available resources and logistics management, disaster 
trainings and drills, emergency response, medical treatment, surge capacity, hospital disaster 
 Chapter 3: Measuring hospital disaster resilience                                              Page 59 
 
recovery and adaptation. The priori hypothesis has been approved that the extracted key 
domains or particular sub-domains be consistent with preliminary recognised domains of 
hospital resilience. All domains and sub-domains were addressed by at least one evaluation 
instrument. The measures were also extracted and synthesized within these sub-domains. 
These measures are relevant to the concept of hospital resilience and at least one of basic 
resilience criteria, including robustness, resourcefulness, redundancy, and rapidity (Bruneau 
et al. 2003; Bruneau et al. 2007; Chang and Shinozuka 2004; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and 
Bruneau 2010c; McDaniels et al. 2008). Similar measures across papers were merged in 
order to ensure key measures which captures similar meanings from different papers (Britten 
et al. 2002; Munro et al. 2007). 
 
Through extracting and synthesizing measures, a comprehensive evaluation framework was 
constructed for documentation of the measurement domains of hospital resilience, which 
integrate potential measures for future development of an evaluation instrument. There are 8 
primary domains, 21 sub-domains and 50 potential measures illustrated in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. Preliminary evaluation framework for hospital resilience (extracted and adapted by the author) 
Dimensions 
 
Domains 
 
Sub-domains 
 
Measures 
 
Hospital safety and 
vulnerability 
 
1. Hospital safety 
1.1Disease surveillance 
1.1.1 The surveillance procedures (e.g., abnormity in admission diagnosis, routine 
microbiological tests,  surveillance of emergency room patients and death with unknown 
causes) 
1.1.2 The surveillance report and information sharing  policy 
1.2 Hospital  risk and safety 
1.2.1 The building code and locations of hospital critical infrastructures to meet of high 
risks (e.g., earthquake, fire safety, flood, typhoon) 
1.2.2 The safety and security issues of architectural components (e.g., ceilings, windows, 
doors, medical and laboratory equipment, mechanical, electrical and plumbing 
installations). 
1.2.3 The assessment strategies for hospital vulnerability and risks  
1.2.4 The strategy to evacuate and protect existing patients 
1.2.5 The alternative emergency energy and facilities for backup (e.g., power, water, 
oxygen and telecommunication) 
1.2.6 Area for radioactive, biological and chemical decontamination and isolation 
1.3 Laboratory test 1.3.1 The type of disease for laboratory to test 
Disaster 
preparedness and 
resources 
 
2. Emergency 
leadership and 
cooperation 
2.1 Emergency leadership 2.1.1 The emergency committee or command centre (e.g., workplace,  communication equipment, and staff) 
2.2 Community cooperation 
and communication 
2.2.1 The crisis communication within hospital 
2.2.2 The communication and cooperation with other community facilities (e.g., hospital 
facilities, government offices, media, and public utilities) 
3. Disaster plans 
3.1 Disaster plan system 
 
3.3.1 Plans for different kinds of disasters 
3.3.2 The period of evaluating and revising the plan 
3.3.3  Hospital plans are involved within community-wide plan 
3.2 Standard operating 
procedures 
3.2.1 The rapidity for staff, equipment can be in place when initiating the plan 
3.2.2 Emergency standard operating procedures to execute the plan (e.g., procedures to 
activate and deactivate the plan) 
4.  Disaster stockpiles 
and logistics 
management 
4.1 Disaster resources 
 
4.1.1 The stock quantity of different emergency supplies 
4.1.2 The strategies for management of emergency supplies (e.g. logistics and distribution, 
contracts with suppliers and other hospitals, adjusted standards for their usage) 
4.2 Emergency medicines 
administration 
4.2.1 The stock quantity of essential medicines for various disasters 
4.2.2 The strategies for management of medicine (e.g., drug-distribution and management 
plans, priorities limited drugs for critical departments and patients) 
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4.3 Disaster fund raising 
and 
4.3.1 Disaster fund amount and raising channels  
4.3.2 Disaster fund administration 
5. Emergency staff 
5.1 Constitution of 
emergency staff and group 
5.1.1 The emergency expert group (e.g., quantity, qualification, specialty, experience) 
5.1.2  The emergency rescue team (e.g., quantity, qualification, specialty, experience) 
5.2 The protective and 
incentive strategies for key 
staff 
5.2.1 The protective and incentive strategies for key staff  (e.g. staff role reassignment, staff 
incentives, insurance, immunization, living requirements, care for families, psychosocial 
support) 
6. Emergency trainings 
and drills 
6.1 Emergency training 
6.1.1 Different incident types for trainings 
6.1.2  The percentage of staff for training  
6.1.3  The contents of trainings (e.g., triage, emergency treatment, training of volunteers) 
6.1.4  The frequency of emergency training 
6.2 Emergency drills  
6.2.1 Different incident types for drills 
6.2.2 The period for the last drills 
6.2.3 The methods for implementing drills (e.g., desktop drill, community-wide drill) 
6.2.4 The frequency of drills 
6.2.5  Evaluation of emergency simulation exercise or drill 
6.3  Public emergency 
education  
6.3.1 Emergency education content 
6.3.2 Emergency education frequency and population coverage 
Continuity of 
essential services 
7. Emergency essential 
service capability 
7.1 Emergency surge 
capacity 
7.1.1 The surge capacity of emergency space (e.g., emergency beds, ICU, isolation rooms) 
within a limited period 
7.1.2 The surge capacity of emergency equipment,  medication and  resource within a 
limited period 
7.1.3 The surge capacity of hospital staff within a limited period 
7.1.5 The strategies for surging inpatient capacity (taking physical space, staff, supplies and 
processes into consideration) 
7.1.6 The strategies for surging key staff (e.g., transfer from non-critical departments and 
other hospitals, volunteers) 
7.2 Emergency response 
procedures 
7.2.1  The procedures to identify, prioritize, and maintain essential functions (e.g., 
cancellation of elective admissions, early discharge of patients, making new medical 
quality standard during disasters, extra protection for vulnerable population) 
7.2.2 Mass-casualty triage protocol based on severity of illness/injury, survivability and 
hospital capacity 
7.2.3 Procedures for referral and counter-referral of patients 
7.3 On-site rescue 7.3.1 The quantity of equipment for on-site rescue (e.g. ambulance,  helicopter, communication equipment) 
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Extracted from the included studies: (Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b; Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 2010a)
7.4 Hospital medical 
treatment 
7.4.1 The types and quantity of hospital emergency equipment (e.g., for medical treatment, 
decontamination, and personal protection) 
Recovery and 
adaptation 
8. Recovery and  
adaptation 
 
8.1 Recovery capability 
8.1.1 The reconstruction and recovery mechanisms 
8.1.2 The strategies for community recovery（e.g., mental counselling, chronic disease 
management, family support） 
8.2 Evaluation and 
adaptation 
8.2.1 The evaluation and adaptation report (e.g., incident summary, response assessment, 
vulnerability analysis, and risks reassessment, hospital adaptation strategies) 
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The domains and sub-domains included: hospital safety and vulnerability (surveillance, 
hospital internal safety), hospital disaster preparedness and resources (e.g., emergency 
leadership, community cooperation and crisis communication, disaster plans, disaster 
stockpiles and logistics management, emergency staff, emergency trainings and drills), 
continuity of essential medical service (emergency response, medical treatment, on-site 
rescue, surge capacity), recovery and adaptation (recovery, evaluation and adaptation). 
Recognition of an evaluation framework provides a foundation for a more comprehensive 
instrument for measuring a hospital’s resilience. This instrument could be converted to a self-
assessment questionnaire, using dichotomous indicators, multi-section indicators or 
quantitative indicators.  
 
3.4.3 Critical issues for enhancing hospital resilience  
 
Table 3-3 is a comprehensive matrix of hospital resilience with potential measures, adapted 
from the conceptual framework. All measures are categorised to various domains of the 
conceptual framework, for a higher level of interpretation and better understanding of the 
concept.  
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Table 3-3. Proposed metric of hospital resilience: critical issues for enhancing hospital disaster resilience [developed by the author from 
(Bruneau et al. 2003)] 
Domains 
Performance criteria 
Robustness   Redundancy Resourcefulness Rapidity  
hospital resilience illustrative measures* 
Hospital safety 
(surveillance, safety) 
• Surveillance 
procedures  
• The building code of 
infrastructures 
• Areas for isolation 
• The alternative 
emergency energy 
• Facilities for backup 
• The assessment strategies for 
hospital vulnerability and 
risks  
• The strategy to evacuate and 
protect existing patients 
• The rapidity for risk 
assessment 
• The rapidity for evacuation 
 
Disaster resource and preparedness 
(Leadership, communication and cooperation,  
plans, emergency resource, staff, training and drills)  
• Emergency 
committee  
• The quantity of 
emergency supplies 
and  essential 
medicines  
• Key staff disaster 
management skills  
• Training of backup 
non-ED personnel 
and volunteers for 
emergency  
• The cooperation with 
other facilities for 
backup resources  
• Plans for different disasters 
• Logistic management for 
supplies, medicine 
• Key staff administration  
• Various incident types for 
trainings and drills  
• Methods for implementing 
drills  
• The rapidity for the crisis 
communication  
• The rapidity for reassign the 
staff roles 
• The rapidity to response to 
the plan 
• The period for the last 
training/drill  
Continuity of essential medical service  
(emergency medicine,  
surge capacity)  
• The types and 
quantity of 
equipment for 
emergency medicine 
• The triage protocols  
• The proportion of 
surge capacity of 
beds, space, 
resources and key 
staff 
• Strategies for surge inpatient 
capacity 
• Strategies to identify, 
prioritize, and maintain 
essential functions  
• The rapidity for surging 
emergency space, resources 
and staff 
• The rapidity for on-site 
rescue 
Recovery and adaptation  
• Recovery strategies 
• Evaluation report 
• Extra hospital staff 
for community 
demands 
• Strategies for recovery 
• Strategies for adaptation 
• The rapidity for hospital 
recovery and adaptation 
* Source: Adapted by the author, from community disaster resilience (Bruneau et al. 2003)  
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Robustness describes a hospital’s inherent strength to withstand the consequences of an 
event. Redundancy is achieved through back up and surge capacity of staff, infrastructure, 
resources and equipment. Resourcefulness is an adaptive flexibility for maintaining hospital 
essential services. Rapidity reflects the speed of hospital responsiveness through fixing things 
up, bouncing back, functional recovery and adaptation. All the identified hospital resilience 
measures are included in one of the four basic resilience criteria (Bruneau et al. 2003). This 
matrix can be used to guide the operationalisation of the concept of hospital resilience, and 
for identifying critical issues for enhancing hospital resilience in disasters. It is noted that 
Table 3-3 is only used for illustration, and needs to be further developed.  
 
3.4.4 Strengths and weaknesses 
 
This is the first step in a comprehensive body of work designed to develop a conceptual 
framework for understanding hospital resilience and its domains, and to identify potential 
measures. This first step is to draft a working draft model, with a view to seeking expert 
commentary. We have attempted to adapt conceptual frameworks from other sectors, as a 
basis for a better understanding of the disaster resilience domains. However we have not 
included frameworks which do not appear to have significance for the health sector in this 
document. This adapted framework is expected to be consistent with an ‘all agencies’ 
approach, which promotes integration of hospitals within the community. But the new 
framework does need to adapt ‘non-health’ frameworks as direct translation is likely to be 
inappropriate, and there is little validation of those frameworks even in the principal areas of 
their focus. 
 
Measures were also identified on the grounds that these describe the domains of the 
framework, and provide a means of further evaluating hospital resilience. The potential 
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measures may form a suitable measurement tool for evaluating hospital resilience, and for 
measuring the impact of improvement strategies. However, before they can be used for 
empirical studies, reliable measures need to be selected, modified or validated further. The 
additional consideration by experts is needed for its development to a user-friendly 
instrument. The measures in the preliminary framework were still in the form of checklists, 
without clear evaluation standards or benchmarks. This is because the extant evidence base is 
insufficient to determine either the capacity or process measures that are linked to desirable 
outcomes or the levels of those measures that would be regarded as adequate (Asch et al. 
2005). In the future, empirical outcomes from hospital surveys are also needed for further 
testing the feasibility and validity of these measures, and further developing it into 
measurement instrument (e.g., self-report questionnaire) for evaluating hospitals in pilot areas. 
Then explicitly details regarding the average or desired level of capacity or performance of 
the hospitals in the pilot areas can be produced.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The identification of measures will be used for furthering the understanding and discussion of 
hospital resilience. The development and validation of a preliminary framework of 
measurement of resilience will form the basis of strategies intended to future developed 
resilience. In the next chapter, experts’ advice would be added into for further the 
development of the potential measures.  
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Part C: Results 
Chapter 4  : Study One: Content validation of the evaluation 
framework: Modified-Delphi study 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been under review: Zhong S, 
Clark M, Hou XY, Zang YL, FitzGerald G. Key indicators of hospital 
resilience to cope with disasters: A consensus in China. Journal of 
Health Services Research & Policy (under review) 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the importance of hospital healthcare functions during disasters, to date, there has 
been little consensus from experts regarding a comprehensive and validated framework for 
measuring a hospital’s ability to cope with disasters, especially one that integrates selected 
measures into disaster management phases (Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery 
[PPRR]). As stated in previous chapters, it is essential that the concept of hospital disaster 
resilience is consistent with this target. For this reason, a consensus is required about those 
key measures that would improve the consistency of a hospital’s emergency practices, 
especially the measures responsible for improving the hospital’s ability to cope with 
disasters. Thus, it is imperative that the previous assessment framework be further developed 
and validated with expert opinions. This newly modified framework can then be used as a 
means for assessment of the level of hospital resilience drawing upon the consensus achieved. 
Further, the assessment framework would provide an overview of the full extent of a 
hospital’s core ability to cope with a disaster. Also, it can be used as a decision-supporting 
tool for the evaluation of strategies that aim to improve hospital practices when they confront 
a disaster and other public emergencies.  
 
China is often severely afflicted by disasters of many kinds, including natural disasters, 
manmade disasters, epidemics, and so forth (Wikipedia the free encyclopedia 2008; Center 
For Strategic and International Studies 2009a). With China as the context, the current study, 
and this chapter specifically, aims to develop a comprehensive framework for evaluating 
hospital disaster resilience; it integrates a number of key measures that can be used for future 
empirical study, or as a checklist for further hospital capability development. The study is 
divided into three steps: (1) to revise the key domains and potential measures of hospital 
disaster resilience as identified by a group of experts; (2) to select and prioritise the key 
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measures as indicated by the expert groups’ importance scaling; and (3) to further develop 
and validate the preliminary evaluation framework for the further evaluation of hospital 
disaster resilience.  
 
4.2 Methods  
 
This study used a Delphi method to identify the potential elements of a framework for the 
evaluation of hospital disaster resilience. The Delphi method has been used extensively in 
acute health service research to identify indicators for the quality of patient care in 
Emergency Departments (Lindsay et al. 2002), the performance of emergency medicine 
(Beattie and Mackway-Jones 2004), and emergency and urgent care (Coleman and Nicholl 
2010). The method allows researchers to involve experts in a systematic method of consensus 
development and prioritisation. It involves multiple rounds (Dalkey and Helmer 1963), is 
designed to ensure the representation of varied experiences and areas of expertise, highlights 
the points of convergence and divergence in experts’ opinions, narrows the scope of the 
agreed upon information, and refines or modifies information to achieve consensus (Holey et 
al. 2007). The Modified-Delphi technique uses an initial event list rather than a blank piece of 
paper; the panellists are provided with a context within which to consider their responses 
(Custer,Scarcella and Stewart 1999).  
 
This chapter outlines the development of key measures of hospital disaster ability through an 
extensive review of the literature and a three-round online Modified Delphi study. The 
experts participated voluntarily in this Delphi Study, having a full understanding of the aims 
and objectives of the study. Ethical approval was obtained from the Queensland University of 
Technology (approval number 1200000170), with written informed consent obtained from 
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each participant through their reply to my email. The study processes are described in detail 
below.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, the literature was reviewed to identify potential 
instruments for measuring a hospital’s ability to cope with disaster. Eleven instruments were 
determined, and used to extract potential measures of hospital resilience. Such hospital 
resilience needed to meet one of the four inclusion criteria: pre-disaster robustness (strength), 
rapidity of response and recovery, redundancy resources, and resourceful (flexible) plans, 
procedures and strategies (Bruneau et al. 2003; Bruneau et al. 2007; Chang and Shinozuka 
2004; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010c; McDaniels et al. 2008). From the literature 
review, a preliminary evaluation framework was established. Please see details in Chapter 3. 
 
Next, the preliminary evaluation framework was revised and validated by the online 
Modified-Delphi questionnaire, sent to the expert group, and conducted between July and 
October 2012. Purposive sampling was used to ensure that the appropriate experts were 
invited to participate as the panel members. They were recruited through personal contact 
from a list of 125 experts1 attending the National Emergency Medicine and Disaster 
Management Training Conference (Beijing, July 2012). The conference aimed to enhance 
learning in the emergency medicine and disaster management field, and to build the 
capability of the health system to cope with disasters in China. China's Ministry of Health 
hosted the conference, which was attended, in the main, by hospital senior staff, academic 
researchers, and governmental emergency administration officers. The invited experts had a 
working or research background of at least five years in areas of relevance to healthcare 
disaster resilience.  
                                                          
1 The list of experts in the Delphi panel is available from the author. 
 Chapter 4: Study One--Modified-Delphi Method Page 71 
 
The online Delphi study comprised one qualitative and two quantitative rounds. In the first 
(qualitative) round, the study background was sent to the panel; they were asked to modify 
the key domains and potential measures derived from the literature. Two open-ended 
questions were included in the round: (1) Please give comments or modifications on these 
proposed domains and sub-domains (as illustrated in Table 4-1), with consideration to the 
concept of hospital disaster resilience; and, (2) Please modify these potential measures, or 
add additional ones that you feel essential. Their replies were collated into a series of 
modified and proposed measures covering the full range of domains. 
 
For the second round, the first quantitative round, a questionnaire was developed using the 
measures derived from the first round. The expert group from the first round were requested 
to rate the importance of each measure on a 5-point Likert scale (designated score), which 
ranged from: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree or disagree (3), agree (4), and strongly 
agree (5). The experts were also invited to further modify the measures or add new ones.  
 
In the third round, the questionnaire, integrating the comments and descriptive statistical 
outcomes, from the second round data analysis, was sent back to the experts. The panellists 
were invited to re-consider their rating in the light of the aggregated results. This round 
allowed the members to change their responses in the light of group’s opinions.  
 
This Modified Delphi study was completed online, using the web-based survey tool Survey 
Monkey (http://www.surveymonkey.com). Links to the surveys and the study’s introductory 
letter were distributed to each specialist via email. No missing data were allowed, and in the 
event of missing data, a reminder was sent to the experts, using the setup of Survey Monkey. 
The measures were included in the second, and then the third, round, if >70% of the 
 Chapter 4: Study One--Modified-Delphi Method Page 72 
 
responders rated the measure as ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ (a score of 4 or 5, respectively). 
This criterion, predetermined by referring to similar studies, such as Wakai et al. (Wakai et 
al. 2013), and Sithisarankul et al. (Sithisarankul et al. 2008), was assumed to be appropriate 
for this study. Only a moderate number of potential measures were included in the first round, 
as a higher criterion would have caused essential measures to be missed, and a lower criterion 
would have excluded very few measures, thus compromising the significance of the current 
study.  
 
A thematic analysis was applied manually to examine the first round comments. Then, 
standard descriptive statistical analyses for the second and third round data were carried out 
using SPSS version 21.0. The data were described using the mean score of the importance 
rating (mean score = the sum of the designated importance score from all the experts/number 
of experts), and the standard deviation of the last round. The mean score was used to describe 
the importance rating of these measures (the highest mean score was 5), while the standard 
deviation was used to describe the convergence of the range of importance ratings, designated 
by different experts within the third round (Greatorex and Dexter 2000). To determine 
whether there was a significant difference of the mean scores between the second and third 
round, t-test or non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney Test) were used. The choice of test 
depended on whether the data were normally distributed, with p < 0.05 as the level of 
statistical significance. Finally, to compare the results from the second and third rounds, 
Kappa statistics of the sub-domains were calculated to show a chance-corrected proportional 
agreement (%) between the two rounds (Holey et al. 2007). As the study was conducted in 
China, the Chinese language was used to capture the responses, however, the results were 
subsequently translated into English. 
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4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Results of the first round 
 
Based on the results from the literature search (Chapter 3), in the absence of any existing 
hospital resilience frameworks, domains were drawn from other sectors. For example, 
community or organisational resilience may have applicability to health services and may 
help inform hospital resilience domains (Arbon et al. 2012; Devlen 2009; McManus et al. 
2007). Thus, eight thematic domains were identified from these frameworks, based on the 
concept of hospital disaster resilience. Additionally, the literature review was conducted to 
identify potential measures. A detailed mapping of the range of elements contained in the 
aforementioned instruments revealed 50 potential measure indicators, which were classified 
into 21 sub-domains, under the eight domains (the domains and sub-domains are illustrated in 
Table 4-1) (Zhong et al. 2013a). 
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Table 4-1. Domains and sub-domains for proposing potential measures in round one 
(developed by the author) 
1. Hospital safety and vulnerability 
(Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 
2010a, 2011b) 
Surveillance  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
Laboratory test  
(Kaji and Lewis 2006; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004) 
Hospital risk and safety  
(Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 
2010a, 2011b) 
2. Emergency leadership, cooperation and 
communication 
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
The emergency committee or command center  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
Crisis communication and community linkage 
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b)  
3. Disaster plans 
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
 
Disaster plan system  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
Standard Operating Procedures  
(Braun et al. 2004)Error! Reference source not found. 
4. Disaster stockpiles and logistics management  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
 
Disaster resources  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
Emergency medicines  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; World Health Organization 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; 
Braun et al. 2004) 
Disaster fund raising and administrating  
(Higgins et al. 2004) 
5. Emergency staff  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; World Health Organization 
2011b; Niska and Shimizu 2011b) 
 
Constitution of emergency staff  and group  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; World Health Organization 2011b) 
The protective and incentive strategies for key staff 
(World Health Organization 2011b) 
6. Emergency trainings and drills  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 
2006; Niska and Shimizu 2011b) 
Emergency trainings  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Braun et al. 
2006) 
Emergency drills  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Niska and 
Shimizu 2011b) 
Public emergency education in community  
(Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004) 
7. Emergency essential service capability  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; World Health Organization 2011b; Niska and Shimizu 
2011b; Kaji and Lewis 2006) 
Emergency surge capacity  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Kaji and Lewis 2006; World Health Organization 2011b) 
Emergency response procedures   
(Niska and Shimizu 2011b; World Health Organization 2011b) 
On-site rescue  
(Niska and Shimizu 2011b; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008) 
Hospital medical treatment  
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008) 
8. Recovery and adaptation  
(World Health Organization 2011b) 
Recovery capability  
(World Health Organization 2011b) 
Evaluation and adaptation  
(World Health Organization 2011b) 
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The Delphi Method was then used for consultations with the experts for their opinions to 
develop and revise the above construct. In order to maintain the study’s consistency, only 
those experts who had attended the first round were sent invitations to attend the following 
rounds. Of the 125 invited experts, 33 panellists completed the first round, among those 25 
experts completed the second round, and 18 completed the third round. The response rates in 
these three rounds were 26.4%, 75.8%, and 54.5.0%, respectively. Most experts who 
participated in the previous round also took part in the following round. The qualifications of 
the experts are presented in Table 4-2. A large percentage (65.2%) of the experts, who had 
not attended the study, was comprised of physicians whose background was mainly relevant 
to emergency medicine. Approximately one fifth of the experts, who did not reply, came 
from the government, with 13% coming from academic institutions.  
 
Table 4-2. Expert qualifications for the three-round of Modified-Delphi study 
Items 
 
Categories 
 
First 
round 
Second 
round 
Third 
round 
N P (%) N P (%) N P (%) 
Education 
background 
PhD 14 42.42 11 44.00 7 38.89 
Master 16 48.48 11 44.00 9 50.00 
Bachelor 3 9.09 3 12.00 2 11.11 
Professional 
rank 
Senior professional 15 45.45 11 44.00 8 44.44 
Associate senior 
professional 18 54.55 14 56.00 10 55.56 
Working 
place 
Hospital 18 54.55 17 68.00 10 55.56 
Governmental emergency 
office 6 18.18 3 12.00 3 16.67 
Centres for disease control 
and prevention 5 15.15 3 12.00 3 16.67 
Academic institution 4 12.12 2 8.00 2 11.11 
Disaster 
experience 
Yes (e.g., SARS, H7N9 
infectious disease, mass 
casualty events) 
24   72.73 20 80.00 15 83.33 
 No experience   9   27.27   5 20.00 3 16.67 
Total  No Category 33 100.00 25 100.00 18 100.00 
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The first round data generated 76 potential measure points, which were classified into 8 domains 
and 21 subdomains, covering 46 indicators. Meaningful comments emerged from the first round 
and were summarized as groups, according to their nature, for revision or integration as follows: 
 
• Additional measures (n=4) were suggested for evaluating hospital disaster ability, including 
‘the plan initiation’; ‘the extent that the plan can be executed’; ‘different responsive 
procedures for different disaster levels and phases’; and ‘hospital internal rapid assessment’. 
• Some measures (n=7) were renamed for practical usage, and better understanding. For 
example, the phrase ‘community linkage’ was changed to ‘community cooperation’ as it was 
considered more specific. The phrase ‘emergency medicine capability’ was changed to 
‘emergency critical care capability’ as it was more acute. The phrase ‘recovery and 
adaptation’ was changed to ‘recovery and adaptation mechanisms’. The phrase ‘the 
protective and incentive strategies for key staff’ was changed to ‘emergency staff 
management’. 
• Some measures (n=4) were modified to give the possibility for merging or reorganizing those 
with similar meanings. For example, those measures targeted at knowledge and/or skills were 
transformed to the measure of participation in the relevant disaster training, as knowledge 
and skills are difficult to assess, while the content of disaster training can be used to reflect 
influences over this, to some extent. ‘Strategies for community short term recovery’ and 
‘long term recovery’ were merged as one measure. 
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4.3.2 Results of the second and third round 
 
After round 2 and 3, nine measures, in total, were excluded (when <70% of the panellists rating 
the measure in the high ‘agreement’ range of scores after the third round). For instance, three 
preliminary sub-domains have been deleted, namely, ‘public emergency education’, ‘laboratory 
test’ and ‘disaster fund raising and administrating’. The panellists commented that ‘public 
emergency education’ is mainly undertaken by community primary health centres rather than 
hospitals, while laboratory tests are within the responsibility for local Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) instead of hospitals. With limited funds in most developing 
countries, it is more feasible to establish alternative laboratories integral to local community 
disaster plans rather than their being based in separate hospitals. Additionally, disaster funding 
issues were rested within the government budget, rather than being dependent on the hospital’s 
ability.  
 
4.3.3 Revised evaluation framework of hospital resilience after consensus 
 
After the third round, a large percentage of measures (P=89.47%, n=68/N=76) reached 
consensus; these 68 measures were identified as having good potential to assess hospital disaster 
ability. A three-layered evaluation framework was validated and established, with these key 
measures being categorized into eight domains, 17 sub-domains, and 43 indicators (as shown in 
Table 4-3). The statistics of the last round, including the mean scores, standard deviations, and 
statistical significance (compared with the second round), of each measure, are also illustrated in 
Table 4-3. After the analysis, it was found that the mean scores for most (P=91.2%, n=62) of the 
measures in the last round did not have a significant difference when compared with the second 
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round. The value of the standard deviation ranged from 0.323 to 0.998 (mean = 0.787, median = 
0.802). Thus, the overall convergence range of ‘importance ratings’ were considered acceptable, 
as all these values were below 1, with a total score of 5.
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Table 4-3. Revised evaluation framework of hospital resilience after Modified-Delphi consensus  
Domains  Sub-domains Measurable indicators   (MS, SD.) 
Hospital safety standard 
and procedures 
(4.17,0.786) 
 1. Surveillance 
(4.06,0.802) 
 
1.1 The surveillance events (e.g., 
abnormity in admission diagnosis, 
surveillance of emergency room 
patients and death with unknown 
causes) 
1.2 Analysis, report and share of 
surveillance information 
(3.89,0.832) 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.06,0.802) 
 2. Hospital infrastructural 
safety and vulnerability 
(4.06,0.938) 
2.1 Evaluation of hospital risks and 
vulnerabilities (e.g., Hospital 
vulnerability assessment, risks 
assessment, the strategy to evacuate and 
protect existing patients) 
2.2 The safety standard for hospital 
critical infrastructures to meet high 
risks (e.g., for earthquakes, floods, fires 
and isolation for infectious diseases) 
2.3 The alternative emergency energy 
and facilities for backup (e.g., power, 
water, oxygen and telecommunication) 
(4.33,0.767)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.28,0.895) 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.28,0.958) 
 
 
Disaster leadership and 
cooperation  
(4.67,0.594) 
 3. Leadership  
(4.39,0.916) 
 
3.1 Committee staff, workplace (4.39,0.916) 
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 4. Disaster cooperation  
(3.94, 0.873) 
4.1 The crisis cooperation within 
hospital 
4.2 The cooperation with community 
facilities (e.g., other hospital facilities, 
government offices, media, and police, 
fire department, and other public 
utilities) 
(4.11,0.832) 
 
(4.06,0.998) 
Disaster plans 
(4.39,0.778) 
 5. Plan system (4.50,0.857) 5.1 Plans for different kinds of disasters 
(for different single risks) 
5.2 The staff coverage of disaster plans 
within hospital 
5.3 The period of evaluating and 
revising the plan 
(4.28,0.895) 
 
 
(4.17,0.707) 
 
 
(4.06,0.802) 
 6. Operating procedures to 
execute the plan  
(4.44,0.784)  
6.1 The plan initiation (e.g., The 
rapidity for staff, equipment can be in 
place when initiating the plan) 
6.2 The extent that the plan can be 
executed 
6.3 Different responsive procedures for 
different disaster levels and  phases 
(4.56,0.616) 
 
 
 
(4.44,0.856) 
 
(3.94,0.938) 
Disaster stockpiles and 
logistics management 
(4.17,0.786)  
 7.Disaster resources 
(4.28,0.669) 
7.1 Stock types and quantity for 
different emergency resources (e.g., 
clean water, food, blood, emergency 
medical suppliers, portable medical 
equipment ) 
7.2 The strategies for management of 
emergency resources (e.g. logistics and 
distribution, contracts with suppliers 
and other hospitals, adjusted standards 
for their usage) 
(4.33,0.767) 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.22,0.808) 
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 8. Emergency medication  
(4.50,0.786) 
8.1 Stock types and quantity for 
essential medications for various 
disasters 
8.2 Strategies for management of 
medications (e.g., drug-distribution 
plans, drug management policy) 
(4.39,0.778) 
 
 
(4.44,0.992)* 
 
Emergency staff capability 
(4.33,0.907) 
 9. Constitution of emergency 
group  
(3.83,0.618) 
9.1 Staff constitution of emergency 
expert group (e.g., quantity, specialty, 
and title) 
9.2 Staff constitution of emergency 
expatriate team (e.g., quantity, specialty, 
and title) 
(4.06,0.639) 
 
 
 
(4.00,0.686) 
 10. Staff management   
(3.78, 0.808) 
10.1 Staff  protection and incentives 
(e.g., insurance, immunization, 
psychosocial support) 
(3.78,0.808) 
Emergency training and 
drills  
(4.00,0.767) 
 11. Emergency trainings  
(3.94,0.802) 
11.1 Different incident types for 
trainings 
11.2 The percentage of staff for training 
11.3 The contents of trainings (e.g., 
triage, emergency medical treatment，
disaster management knowledge) 
11.4 The frequency of trainings 
(3.83,0.707) 
 
(3.83,0.786) 
 
(4.33,0.840) 
 
 
 
 
(3.72,0.826) 
 12. Emergency drill  
(3.78,0.878) 
12.1 Different incident types for drills 
12.2 The methods for implementing 
drills (e.g., desktop drill, community-
wide drill) 
12.3 The frequency of drills 
(3.72,0.669) 
 
(3.67,0.767) 
 
 
 
(3.78,0.732) 
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Emergency critical care 
capability  
(4.89,0.323) 
 13. Disaster surge capacity  
(4.28,0.958)  
13.1 Surge capacity of emergency beds 
(The surge rapidity, proportion and 
strategies for emergency space, 
emergency beds) 
13.2 Surge capacity of emergency 
resources (The surge rapidity, 
proportion and strategies for emergency 
equipment,  medication and resource) 
13.3 Surge capacity of emergency staff 
(The surge rapidity, proportion and 
strategies for emergency staff) 
(4.39,0.594) 
 
 
 
 
(4.28,0.752) 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.17,0.857) 
 14. Disaster response 
procedures 
(4.11,0.676) 
14.1 Hospital internal rapid 
assessment(e.g., evaluate the loss of 
manpower, beds, equipment after 
disasters) 
14.2 Hospital mass-casualty triage 
protocol 
14.3 The procedures to identify, 
prioritize, and maintain essential 
functions (e.g., cancellation of elective 
admissions, early discharge of patients, 
making new medical quality standards 
during disasters, extra protection for 
vulnerable populations) 
(3.72,0.669) 
 
 
 
(4.39,0.850) 
 
(3.94,0.725) 
 
 
 
 
 15. On-site rescue 
(4.50,0.707) 
15.1 The quantity and types of 
equipment for on-site rescue 
15.2 Equipment for referral and 
counter-referral of special patients 
15.3 Communication equipment for on-
site rescue 
(4.67,0.485)* 
 
 
            (4.50,0.786) 
 
 
(4.33,0.840) 
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 16. Hospital treatment 
(4.33,0.686) 
16.1 Emergency medical treatment 
places and capability for different types 
of diseases 
16.2 The types  and quantity of hospital 
emergency medical treatment 
equipment 
(4.44,0.922)* 
 
 
 
            (4.33,0.840) 
 
 
Recovery and adaptation 
mechanisms (4.11,0.758) 
 17. Recovery and report  
(4.00,0.767) 
17.1 Hospital reconstruction and 
recovery mechanisms and strategies  
17.2 The strategies for community 
health recovery (short term and long 
term) 
17.3 The content of the evaluation 
report (e.g., vulnerability analysis, risk 
reassessment, capability analysis) 
17.4 The adaptation strategies after 
disasters 
(4.00,0.907) 
 
 
(3.94,0.938)* 
 
 
(3.94,0.938)* 
 
 
 
 
(4.00, 0.840) 
 
MS: Mean Score of Round 3; the highest mean score is 5 
SD.: Standard. Deviation of Round 3 
* Statistical significance, P < 0.05; t-test or non-parameter test (Mann-Whitney Test) 2
                                                          
2 were used according to whether the data is normally distributed, in order to test ‘whether the means of indicators of the third round 
have statistical significance compared with the second round’ 
Adapted from (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska 
and Shimizu 2011b; Higgins et al. 2004; Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011b; Pan American Health Organization and 
WHO 2008a; World Health Organization 2010a) 
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In addition, the Kappa values for each sub-domain were also used to show a chance-corrected 
proportional agreement between rounds 2 and 3 (as illustrated in Figure 4-1). The Kappa 
values ranged from 0.473 to 0.916 (Mean = 0.742, Median = 0.763), and were between 0.61–
0.8. The results indicated there was a substantial agreement between rounds 2 and 3, 
according to the criteria of the Kappa classification (Anthony 1999). 
 
Figure 4-1. Kappa statistics to compare agreement (%) of sub-domains between rounds 2 and 
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As Table 4- 3 illustrates, the most highly rated domains (expressed by the mean score and the 
standard deviation of round 3) included: emergency critical care capability (4.89, 0.323), 
emergency leadership and cooperation (4.67, 0.594), disaster plans (4.39, 0.778), and 
emergency staff (4.33, 0.907). Other highly rated domains were hospital safety (4.17, 0.786), 
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disaster stockpiles and logistics management (4.17, 0.786), recovery and adaptation 
mechanisms (4.11, 0.758), and emergency trainings and drills (4.00, 0.767). Within these 
domains, the ten highest rated indicators were: the quantity and types of equipment for on-
site rescue (4.67, 0.485), plan initiation (4.56,0.616), equipment for referral and counter-
referral of special patients (4.50,0.786), the extent that the plan can be executed (4.44,0.856), 
strategies for the management of medications (4.44,0.992), conditions for emergency medical 
treatment (4.44,0.922), disaster committee staff and workplace (4.39, 0.916), stock types and 
quantities for essential medications (4.39,0.778), surge capacity of emergency beds (4.39, 
0.594), and hospital mass-casualty triage protocols (4.39,0.850). 
 
4.4 Discussions 
 
This section is divided in the sub-sections: evaluation framework and its key indicators, study 
contributions, study strengths and weaknesses. 
4.4.1 Evaluation framework and its key indicators 
 
The results revealed that the most important indicators of hospital disaster resilience focused 
on emergency critical care capability (e.g., on-site rescue, referral of special patients, 
emergency medical treatment, surge capacity, and hospital mass-casualty triage), as well as 
those factors that can be used to guarantee it (e.g., disaster committee, disaster plan, stockpile, 
and management of medications). It also implied that, compared with the stockpile of disaster 
resources, hospital disaster management elements should specifically be concerned with the 
future. According to the consensus indicators, hospital disaster management should be 
achieved and enhanced though a wide variety of flexible plans and strategies, such as 
cooperation with other facilities, strategies to prioritize and maintain critical care functions,  
and strategies to surge emergency resources, medications, and staff.  
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Ideal measurement systems span the Donabedian categories of structure, process, and 
outcomes (Donabedian 1978; Beattie and Mackway-Jones 2004). In the current study, the 
structural indicators include the human and physical resources available to provide medical 
care; the process indicators refer to emergency medical services provided to the patient; the 
outcome indicators denote hospital performance, such as the number, type or rapidity of 
patients assessed and treated (Bruneau et al. 2003). Further, in the present study, the 
researcher does not expect to generate an ideal instrument to cover all the domains for 
hospital emergency medicine and disaster management. However, a greater convergence 
extending to the entire scope would indicate a growing consensus on what constitutes core 
ability and how to evaluate them. Hence, the identified domains were grouped into four 
critical themes that contributed to the framework,  namely, hospital safety (surveillance, 
hospital safety and vulnerability), hospital disaster resources (disaster stockpiles and logistics 
management, emergency staff), disaster management mechanisms (emergency leadership and 
cooperation, disaster plans, recovery and adaptation mechanisms, emergency trainings and 
drills), and emergency critical care capability (surge capacity, on-site rescue, hospital 
treatment). Compared with similar studies (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Braun et al. 2006; 
Braun et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and Cwinn 2011; Niska and Shimizu 2011b; 
Higgins et al. 2004; Thome et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2011a), especially those 
related to hospital disaster preparedness, the most frequently recurring elements were 
‘disaster plan’, disaster resources’, ‘emergency leadership and cooperation’ and ‘emergency 
trainings and drills’. However, only a few studies referred to the essential elements, such as 
‘hospital infrastructural safety’ (Pan American Health Organization and WHO 2008b; World 
Health Organization 2010b, 2011a)’, ‘emergency critical care capability’ (Niska and Shimizu 
2011b; World Health Organization 2011a; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008), and ‘recovery and 
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adaptation mechanisms’ (World Health Organization 2011a)’. The wide variety of domains in 
this current study reflects the broad scope of hospital disaster ability, and ranged from 
hospital structural aspects to process aspects; these aspects may be causally linked to the 
hospitals’ performance in the face of disasters. Thus, the framework generated from this 
study can be considered as comprehensive, and it is expected to be able to evaluate a wide 
extent of hospital resilience, with a balanced suite of key indicators (i.e. four thematic 
measure domains) (Asch et al. 2005). 
 
4.4.2 Contributions 
 
This study makes several important contributions. Firstly, it facilitates the conceptual 
understanding. Initially, it provides a starting point for the broad agreement about what 
comprises hospital resilience, through to integrating a broader range of hospital resilience 
characteristics, together, into a comprehensive disaster management framework. The new 
conceptual framework tends to link the management approach with an achievable goal of 
improving hospital pre-event strengths (robustness) and promoting rapidity of disaster 
medical responses (McAslan 2010d; Rogers 2011; Kahan,Allen and George 2010; Sternberg 
2003). The strength and rapidity can be improved through redundancy or flexible plans, 
procedures and strategies (Bruneau et al. 2007). It should be noticed that most existing 
studies focus on hospital disaster preparedness before disasters. This resilience framework 
should be distinguished from preparedness and considered as more comprehensive. 
Preparedness is one aspect that the proposed framework measures. However, this framework 
also describes the underlying elements of disaster functions and health outcomes, i.e. hospital 
emergency medical response, recovery and adaptation strategies. This framework takes a new 
direction to challenge the issue of hospital disaster preparedness using the previously 
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described resilience conceptual model and criteria (Figure 3-3). This framework was 
validated through consensus using Modified Delphi method with an expert panel. 
 
Secondly, for practical usage, hospital practitioners and managers can assess the hospital’s 
overall disaster resilience using this framework, with reference being made to the hospital’s 
relevant internal data. The key indicators in this framework can effectively act as flags or 
alerts to identify good practice and provide comparability within and across similar hospital 
domains. The details regarding the average, or desired, level of ability can be derived, and 
based, on the local status. Thus, the framework can be used as a checklist to evaluate hospital 
vulnerabilities and identify priority practices that may confront future disasters.  
 
Thirdly, the framework should be transferable to hospital evaluations in other countries, 
especially developing countries. This is because most of the agreed measures were extracted 
from an international context, based on the general concept of hospital resilience. Hence, the 
methodological framework, conceptual framework, and key measures of the current study 
can inform the development of hospital resilience evaluation in other countries. Finally, it can 
be regarded as a foundation for further research. The development and piloting of this 
framework would be useful in forming a comprehensive user-friendly instrument (i.e., 
questionnaire or checklist); it could be used for the evaluation of the level of hospital disaster 
resilience. This framework also identifies key areas that are required for further detailed 
standards. For example, surge capacity, an indicator of the ‘surge capacity of beds’, failed to 
specify the thresholds for the extent and rapidity aspects, or whether those thresholds varied 
by the reportable conditions.  
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Thus, more evidence-based research is required to determine either the levels of the specific 
ability that are linked to the desirable outcomes, which would be regarded as adequate (Asch 
et al. 2005). More detailed investigations of the standards are also required for an assessment 
of the indicators, including: stock types and quantity for essential medications for various 
disasters, staff constitution of emergency expert groups and expatriate teams, hospital mass-
casualty triage protocols, and the content of the evaluation report. It is hoped that the key 
indicators and their standards can be incorporated into a national comprehensive framework 
for hospital evaluation in the context of disasters.  
 
4.4.3 Strengths and weaknesses 
 
A typical Delphi panel size ranges from 15 to 35, with the expectation that 35-75% of the 
invitees will actually participate (Steele et al. 2008). The panel size in the current study is 
appropriate and was chosen to represent a variety of viewpoints. The Delphi technique 
allowed the panel to express their views anonymously. In this way a consensus could be 
sought without prejudice, and without interpersonal relationships introducing bias. The 
panellists were able to change their minds after seeking opinions from the rest of the group, 
and from any relevant comments (Beattie and Mackway-Jones 2004). Additionally, this study 
used mix of expertise from different categorizes, which provided a wider view from different 
perspectives (i.e., research areas, government administration, and hospitals).   
 
The multiple statistics were also used to validate the results. The results from the third round 
showed that most measures had an acceptable level of consensus, with a relatively small 
convergence of the score range; they were also tested with little significant difference, and 
achieved high substantial agreement when compared with the second round. 
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Nevertheless, there were also several limitations (Beattie and Mackway-Jones 2004). Firstly, 
the pre-determined level of consensus depended on similar studies. However, the selection 
bias was difficult to fully prevent (Holey et al. 2007). Secondly, the response rate was 
relatively low, which was mainly due to the large potential pool of experts at the conference; 
however, there was a lack of an official enforcement from the government. Thus, a large 
percentage of the experts did not participate in the study, due mainly to an insufficient 
interest in the topic, or their limited time. Thirdly, the Kappa values demonstrated a stability 
of the ‘importance rating’ between the same expert group of rounds 2 and 3. However, 7 
panellists, who had attended round 2, quit during or before round 3. All of them were 
physicians whose background was mainly relevant to emergency medicine. They were treated 
as missing data for the Kappa test. The drop out of experts in each round may also have 
influenced the final production. Fourthly, the proposed measures reflected what the panellists 
considered priorities. If more experts were included in the study, more measures may have 
been modified or new ones added. Finally, the external validity of the findings was limited, 
with a few extant studies to compare to it. However, the preliminary resilience evaluation 
framework was derived from the existent literatures, such as hospital preparedness. Then a 
modified Delphi with an expert panel in a field was used as validation of this framework 
through consensus. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented an evaluation of the framework for the documentation of the revised 
measures of hospital disaster resilience, in the context of China; it integrated the selected and 
prioritized indicators. The content validity of these measures was also validated by the 
experts, to some extent. For this reason, further empirical data was sought to test the validity 
and reliability of this evaluation framework (see Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 5 : Study Two: Construct validation of the evaluation 
framework: using a cross-sectional survey 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been accepted by the journal: 
Zhong S, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G*:  Validation 
a framework of measuring hospital disaster resilience: using factor 
analysis. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public 
Health. 2014;11(6):6335-6353. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
As introduced in the previous chapters, hospitals play an important role during disasters, as 
they provide ‘lifeline’ services to reduce disaster associated mortality and mobility, and thus 
minimize the impact of disasters on the community (Albanese et al. 2008; Braun et al. 2006; 
Paturas et al. 2010; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010a). Efficient hospital disaster 
management is considered an essential way for hospitals to supply continuous health services 
during disasters, even if the hospitals are directly affected by the disaster (Sauer et al. 2009; 
Barbera,Yeatts and Macintyre 2009). Hospital resilience is an emerging concept that has been 
added into the hospital disaster management context (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 
2003; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010c; Zhong et al. 2013a; ZHONG,CLARK, et al. 
2014; Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007). It can be defined as “the ability of hospitals to resist, 
absorb, and respond to the shock of disasters while maintaining and surging essential health 
services (e.g., on-site rescue, pre-hospital care, emergency health treatment, critical care, 
decontamination and isolation), and then to recover to its original state or adapt to a new 
one”(Zhong et al. 2013a).  It implies a comprehensive perspective of a hospital’s ability to 
cope with disasters, including inherent strength (ability to resist and absorb disasters) and 
adaptive flexibility (strategies to maintaining and surging essential health services and 
adaptation for future disasters) (Carthey,De Leval and Reason 2001; Jeffcott,Ibrahim and 
Cameron 2009; McDaniels et al. 2008). There are four criteria of disaster resilience which 
can be adapted into hospitals, namely, robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity 
(Bruneau et al. 2003; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010c; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and 
Bruneau 2010a; Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007). To be more specific, hospital resilience aims 
to improve hospital pre-event strength, thus promoting the rapidity of response and recovery, 
through redundant resources and resourceful strategies (McAslan 2010e; Rogers 2011; 
Kahan,Allen and George 2010; Sternberg 2003; Bruneau et al. 2007; Zhong et al. 2013a). 
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Defining and measuring hospital resilience has been the subject of the previous chapters and 
the recent research (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and 
Bruneau 2010c; Zhong et al. 2013a; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2011, 2010a; Bruneau 
and Reinhorn 2007). Most of these measures were derived from the engineering perspective, 
and used mathematical calculations; there is little empirical evidence of a hospital resilience 
evaluation instrument that can be used easily by hospital managers and health administrators. 
Recently, the primary focus of studies in the area of health disaster management has been on 
the evaluation of disaster preparedness (Higgins et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006; Kollek and 
Cwinn 2011; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; World Health Organization 2010a, 2011b). 
However, such disaster preparedness studies tend to adopt a particular perspective of the pre-
disaster stage, instead of examining the institution’s overall ability to confront disasters. For 
example, previous research emphasizes the structural components (e.g., human, equipment, 
resources), but devalues the importance of functional components, such as safety 
infrastructure, and medical response and surge capacity (Nelson et al. 2007; Asch et al. 2005; 
Zhong et al. 2013a; Devlen 2009). Another weakness of most of the existing frameworks is 
that they are not validated by empirical data (Zhong et al. 2013a).  
 
To date, there was no consensus achieved around a comprehensive framework for evaluating 
a hospital’s ability through all phases of the disaster management (Nelson et al. 2007; Asch et 
al. 2005). Thus, there is value in developing a comprehensive instrument, which can be used 
as an evaluation tool by hospital practitioners, managers and government administrators to 
understand and assess the overall ability of hospitals to cope with disasters. The concept of 
disaster resilience (which is a measure of return of functions) is a new but important concept 
that is useful to help devise this instrument (Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007).  
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This chapter aims to develop and validate the preliminary framework for hospital resilience 
(from the previous chapters), and assess its validity and reliability using empirical data from 
tertiary hospitals. It has four objectives: (1) to develop a preliminary evaluation framework of 
hospital resilience from the previous chapter; (2) to extract key component factors from the 
primary domains of the framework for further conceptualization and measurement of hospital 
resilience; (3) to examine the construct validity and internal consistency of this framework; 
and (4) to establish scoring models to measure the level of hospital disaster resilience. 
 
5.2 Methods 
 
5.2.1 Study design 
 
This study was a cross-sectional study of tertiary hospitals in the Shandong Province of 
China. The survey was conducted between January 2013 and June 2013. Ethical approval to 
conduct the research was obtained from the Queensland University of Technology (approval 
number 1200000170) and written informed consent was obtained from each participating 
hospital. 
 
5.2.2 Study setting and sample 
 
In China a tertiary hospital is defined as a health facility covering a large administrative area 
and capable of providing comprehensive and specialized medical care. For tertiary hospitals, 
the total number of beds should be more than 500, with physician and nurse numbers being 
more than 1.03 and 0.4 per bed, respectively. Tertiary hospitals can be further classified into 
three subgroups: Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C. Such classification was derived from the 
national hospital evaluation according to each hospital’s comprehensive scores (the total 
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score is 1000) aggregated from respective perspectives, such as service levels, size, medical 
missions, medical technology, medical equipment, management, and medical quality (Guo 
1990; Chinese Ministry of Health 1989). Tertiary A hospitals have achieved higher 
comprehensive scores than tertiary B and tertiary C hospitals. Thus, tertiary A hospitals are 
supposed to be the most advanced hospitals in an area (Chinese Ministry of Health 1989).  
 
Shandong province is the second largest and first densest province and is located in the east 
of China. A total of 50 tertiary hospitals in the Shandong Province were selected using 
stratified random sampling, according to their subgroups (i.e., Grade A, B, or C). The sample 
was composed of 28 tertiary A hospitals, 20 tertiary B hospitals and 2 tertiary C hospitals, 
The hospital selection used the contact list obtained from the Provincial health department. A 
total of 41 fully completed questionnaires were received, representing an 82.0% response rate. 
The response quantity accounted for approximately half (53.9%) of the total quantity of 
tertiary hospitals in this province. 
 
5.2.3 Study protocol 
 
A preliminary framework for assessing hospital resilience was proposed through a systematic 
literature review (Chapter 3) (Zhong et al. 2013a). Then the content of the preliminary 
framework was validated by expert opinion gained from a three-round of Modified-Delphi 
study (as discussed in Chapter 4). As a result, a revised three-tiered framework (domains, 
sub-domains, measurable indicators) for evaluating hospital resilience was established as 
illustrated in Chapter (as Table 4-3). Within this framework, eight key domains were 
identified that can be used to reflect the level of hospital resilience. Then, based on the 
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revised evaluation framework, a hospital survey questionnaire was designed to collect the 
data. The resultant questionnaire consisted of 9 sections, with more than 100 items in total.  
As the study was conducted in China, the Chinese language questionnaire was used to 
capture the responses; the instrument was subsequently translated back into English for the 
final reporting. The English and Chinese versions of the questionnaires can be accessed in the 
Appendix I and II.  
 
Brislin’s model of translation was used to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of the 
translation of the questionnaires (Brislin 1986). The survey questionnaire was forward-
translated and then back-translated between the source language (English) and the target 
language (Chinese), by two independent translators (SZ, Y Zang). The detailed translation 
process was illustrated in Figure 5-1.  Firstly, the developed survey instrument was translated 
from the source language (English) to the target language (Chinese) by two independent 
translators (one is the thesis’s author, and the other is a supervisor who is an international 
health professional with the native language of Chinese). After the consensus discussion of 
the research team regarding the difference between the two translated versions of the 
instrument, the final (Chinese) version was ready. After that, the forward- translated version 
(Chinese language) was then sent back to the above two independent translator to conduct the 
back-translation. The research team then compared the two versions of the back-translated 
instrument for any differences, and came up with the final back-translated version. Finally, 
the two English versions (original version and back-translated version) are compared at the 
end in order to assess translational validity. 
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Figure 5-1. Translation Process (adapted from Brislin, 1986)  
 
Original Source language 
 
Chinese Version 1 
(The Author #1) 
Chinese Version 2  
(External supervisor #1) 
Compare the two 
versions by the research 
team: 
(SZ, X Hou, Y Zang) 
The final version of the 
Chinese questionnaire 
English Version 1 
(The Author #2) 
 
 
English Version 2 
(External supervisor #2) 
 
Forward 
translation 
Back 
translation 
Compare the two 
versions by the team 
The final version of the back-translated 
(English) questionnaire 
Compare 
the original 
document 
with the 
outcome 
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The feasibility and suitability of the questionnaire were evaluated and modified by a pilot 
study at three hospitals. The questionnaire, accompanied by an official letter from the 
Provincial Health Department outlining the importance of the survey, was sent to each of the 
sample hospitals by both email and post. Each hospital was asked to designate a director in 
the management department to be responsible for distributing and coordinating the 
completion of the questionnaire. The questionnaires were completed and signed-off by 
suitably knowledgeable staff from relevant departments within the hospital. These 
departments included the emergency department, human resource management, pharmacy, 
resource logistics, and facility maintenance department.  Each returned questionnaire was 
reviewed for its completeness and consistency. For those questionnaires which were 
incomplete and/or contained inconsistent responses follow-up telephone calls were made to 
ensure completeness and consistency.  
 
5.2.4 Measurements 
 
The data were collected and analysed that focused on the following areas of interest: (1) 
hospital demographic data; (2) hospital safety (e.g., infrastructural safety and strategies for 
infectious diseases); (3) emergency command, communication and cooperation system,; (4) 
disaster plan; (5) disaster stockpile and logistics management; (6) emergency staff; (7) 
emergency services and surge capability,  (e.g., on-site rescue, hospital treatment, surge 
capacity); (8) training and drills; (9) and disaster recovery and adaptation strategies. 
Excluding the first section of the survey which addressed demographic information, sections 
2–9 represent the eight key domains that were identified in the revised evaluation framework 
for hospital disaster resilience, as set out in Chapter 4 (Table 4-3).   
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Most questions are in the format of binary variables, and can be answered by “yes” or “no” 
(e.g., is there any disaster plan?). Some questions are in the format of numeric variables, and 
can be answered by quantity numbers (e.g., how many staff are there in the rescue teams?) 
The numeric indicators were mainly used for a qualitative description of hospital status (in 
Chapter 6), while the primary binary variables were included into the calculation of the 
resilience index. For the binary variables, the options of “yes” or “no” were assigned the 
score of "1"or "0", respectively. Then, the scores of each domain were calculated by adding 
together the score of all the relevant questions. A total score was calculated by summing the 
scores across all eight domains, which is a proxy for measuring overall disaster resilience in 
an institution. The higher the total score, the better the hospital’s disaster resilience.  
 
5.2.5 Data analysis 
 
The data from the returned questionnaires were transferred into a Microsoft Office Access 
2007 database. The data were checked, cleaned, and analyzed using SPSS Statistics (Norusis 
2007).  
 
The study used several steps and methodologies during the data analysis. Firstly, to test the 
construct validity, factor analysis was chosen to analyze the empirical data. Factor analysis 
can be used to identify the underlying component factors between the measured variables and 
the latent constructs, thereby allowing the formation and refinement of the theory. It also can 
provide evidence of construct validity evidence of self-reporting questionnaires (Pett,Lackey 
and Sullivan 2003). The steps of the factor analytical process included assessing the 
suitability of using factor analysis, correlation matrices, factor extraction, choosing the 
number of factors to retain, factor rotation, component score coefficient matrix, and factor 
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interpretation (O'Brien 2007). Secondly, the discriminate validity of the construct was tested. 
It assumed that the level of the hospital’s ability to cope with a disaster is associated with the 
level of the hospital’s categorization (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng 
and Da-Ling 2007). For instance, it was expected that tertiary A hospitals would report a 
generally higher level of resilience than tertiary B hospitals, as the missions of regional 
disaster centers are primarily assigned to tertiary A hospitals. The scores of each factor, 
according to hospital categorization, were compared using independent sample t-tests. 
Thirdly, a self-assessment scale was developed based on the items in the questionnaire to 
categorize hospitals into different resilience levels. Also a model for calculating the overall 
level of disaster resilience among hospitals was established through each component factor 
being weighted. Finally, to test the internal consistency of key domains, the Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha analysis was performed (Norusis 2008). In addition, the current status of the 
sample was investigated using descriptive analysis, and was reported in a published article 
(Zhong,Hou, et al. 2014). 
 
5.3 Results 
 
The result section includes the following sub-sections: (1) inspection, (2) extraction of 
component factors, (3) rotation and explanation of factors, (4) the construct of the framework, 
(5) discriminate validity of the framework, (6) scoring and modelling, (7) internal consistency. 
 
5.3.1 Inspection 
 
The value of the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy) in the current 
study is 0.792, which is over the threshold of 0.7. The result of Bartlett's Test (P<0.01) 
revealed that the eight primary domains are not independent, and have a high level of 
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correlation. Thus, factor analysis is suitable to be used to extract component factors in the 
study (Norusis 2008).  
 
5.3.2 Extraction of component factors 
 
The factor solution was determined by the number of factors generated with eigenvalues 
greater than 1, as well as by theoretical considerations. The domain scores were used as the 
independent variable for component extraction. Four factors had an eigenvalue greater than 
one that could be extracted to be representative of all the domains. The 4-factor solution was 
compared to solutions with larger and smaller numbers of factors. The 4-factors solution 
appeared to be more meaningful theoretically than the smaller or larger factor solutions, 
which were difficult to interpret. As illustrated in Table 5-1, the 4-factor solution accounts for 
about 86.9% of the cumulative variance, and all the domains loaded highly (at least 77.0%).  
 
Table 5-1. Total variance explained  
Domains Extraction Eigenvalues 
%of 
Variance 
Cumulative% 
1. Emergency command, 
communication and cooperation 
system 
.770 2.201 52.653  52.653 
2. Disaster plans .874 2.121 17.685  70.338 
3. Disaster stockpiles and 
management .924 1.199   9.050  79.388 
4. Emergency staff  .895 1.035   7.552  86.940 
5. Emergency training and drills .789   .604   4.906  91.846 
6. Emergency services and surge 
capacity .911   .311   3.883  95.729 
7. Hospital safety standard and 
procedures .973   .181   2.259  97.989 
8. Recovery and adaptation strategies .821   .161   2.011 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
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5.3.3 Rotation and explanation of factors 
 
The relationship between the initial domains and the extracted components was not obvious. 
Thus the varimax rotation was used to make the extracted components more decentralized, 
and their relationship clearer and easier to explain (Norusis 2008). These principal 
components can be explained with their significance; therefore, in this study these principal 
components are referred to as component factors.  
 
According to the Rotated Component Matrix (Table 5-2), each of the four factors extracted 
the majority of information from different domains (the percentage of the extracted 
information from domains is expressed in the parentheses). The first factor contains 
information mainly from three domains: essential service maintenance and surge capacity 
(.901), emergency staff capability (.891), and training and drills (.625). It was assumed that 
these three domains reflect or impact upon a hospital’s medical response performance during 
disasters, and thus is named ‘emergency medical response capability’. The second factor was 
closely related to the domains of disaster plans (.611), crisis leadership and cooperation 
(.762), and recovery and adaptation strategies (.878), and reflects ‘hospital disaster 
management mechanisms’. The third factor was mainly representative of the domain of 
disaster stockpiles (.896), which focuses on a hospital’s ‘disaster resources’. The fourth factor 
includes hospital infrastructural strength and safety strategies to cope with disasters, and was 
representative of ‘hospital safety and vulnerability’ (.951). Hence, the four factors were 
identified and named: emergency medical response capability (F1), disaster management 
mechanisms (F2), infrastructure safety (F3), and disaster resources (F4). They explain most of 
the overall level of the hospital’s disaster resilience.  
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Table 5-2. Rotated Component Matrix 
Domains 
Factors 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
1. Emergency services and surge capacity  .901 .265 .109 -.131 
2. Emergency staff capability .891  .238 .201 
3. Emergency training and drills .625 .491 .389  
4. Crisis leadership and cooperation .264 .762 .284 .196 
5. Disaster plans  .611 .538 .449 
6. Recovery and adaptation mechanisms .161 .878  .155 
7. Disaster stockpiles and logistics .313 .138 .896  
8. Hospital safety standard and procedures  .248  .951 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Format sort blank (.10)   
 
5.3.4 The construct of the framework  
 
The results of the factor analysis are largely consistent with the original, theoretically 
developed framework, established from the literature review and the Modified-Delphi 
Method (see Chapter 4: Table 4-3). In the validated framework the 43 measurable indicators 
were divided into four factors for conceptual understanding of hospital resilience. A summary 
of these results are presented in Table 5-3.  
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Table 5-3. Validated framework for evaluating hospital disaster resilience 
Construct of measurable items  
FACTOR 1:  EMERGENCY MEDICINE RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
Domain 1: Emergency services and surge capacity (include on-site rescue, hospital treatment, 
and surge capacity) 
1. The quantity and types of equipment for on-site rescue 
2. Equipment for referral and counter-referral (i.e., transferring patients from or between places of 
medical treatment ) of special patients 
3. Communication equipment for on-site rescue  
4. Emergency medical treatment places and capability for different types of diseases  
5. The types and quantity of hospital emergency medical treatment equipment 
6. Hospital internal rapid assessment (e.g., evaluate the loss of manpower, beds, equipment after 
disasters) 
7. Hospital mass-casualty triage protocol 
8. The procedures to identify, prioritize, and maintain essential functions (e.g., cancellation of 
elective admissions, early discharge of patients, making new medical quality standards during 
disasters, extra protection for vulnerable population) 
9. Surge capacity of emergency beds (the surge rapidity, proportion and strategies for emergency 
space, emergency beds) 
10. Surge capacity of emergency resources (the surge rapidity, proportion and strategies for 
emergency equipment,  medication and resource) 
11. Surge capacity of emergency staff (the surge rapidity, proportion and strategies for emergency 
staff) 
Domain 2: Emergency staff capability (refer to emergency staff specialties, qualifications and 
supporting strategies) 
12. Staff composition of emergency expert group for different types of events  
13. Staff composition of emergency expatriate team (i.e., send experts or emergency staff to support 
on-site rescue, or local hospital treatment) for different types of events  
14. Staff protection and resilient support (e.g., insurance, immunization, psychosocial support) 
Domain 3: Emergency training and drills (disaster training and drills involved in hospital daily 
work) 
15. Training for different incident types (e.g., natural disasters, epidemics, and bioterrorism) 
16. The percentage of key staff for training  
17. The contents of training (e.g., triage, emergency health treatment, disaster management 
knowledge) 
18. The frequency of training  
19. Different incident types for drills 
20. The methods for implementing drills (e.g., desktop drill, community-wide drill)  
21. The frequency of drills 
 
FACTOR 2:  DISASTER MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS  
Domain 4: Emergency command, communication and cooperation system 
22. Incident command system for disaster management (e.g., establishment of the disaster committee 
or responsible department) 
23. The crisis cooperation within hospitals  
24. The crisis communication and cooperation with community facilities (e.g., other hospital 
facilities, government offices, and police, fire department, the media, and the public) 
Domain 5: Disaster plans (plans to prepare all-hazards disasters in advance) 
25. Plans for different kinds of disasters (for different single risk) 
26. The staff coverage of disaster plans within hospitals 
27. The period of evaluating and revising the plan 
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28. The plan initiation (e.g., the rapidity for staff, equipment can be in place when initiating the plan) 
29. The extent to which the plan can be executed 
30. Different and flexible responsive procedures for different disaster levels and  phases (i.e., 
classification response system for different levels and phases of disasters) 
Domain 6: Recovery and adaptation strategies (for recovery and improvement after disasters ) 
31. Hospital reconstruction and recovery mechanisms (e.g., responsible department, reconstruction 
support) 
32. The strategies for community health recovery  
33. The content of the after disaster evaluation report (e.g., vulnerability analysis, risk reassessment, 
capability analysis) 
34. The adaptation strategies after disasters (i.e. to adapt to a better state to cope with future 
disasters ) 
 
FACTOR 3:  DISASTER RESOURCES  
Domain 7: Disaster stockpiles and logistics management (stockpile and management of 
emergency supplies and medications) 
35. Stock types and quantity for different emergency supplies (e.g., clean water, food, blood, 
emergency medical suppliers, portable medical equipment, ventilators and etc.  ) 
36. The strategies for management of emergency resources (e.g. logistics and distribution, contracts 
with suppliers and other hospitals, adjusted standards for their usage) 
37. Stock types and quantity for essential medications for various disasters (e.g., antimicrobial agents, 
cardiac medications, insulin, anti-hypertensive agents, IV fluids, etc.) 
38. Strategies for management of medications (e.g., drug-distribution plans, drug management policy) 
FACTOR 4:  HOSPITAL INFRASTRUCTRAL SAFETY 
Domain 8: Hospital safety standard and procedures (refer to hospital infrastructural safety, 
surveillance system, and network backup) 
39. The safety standard for hospital’s critical infrastructures to meet of high risks (e.g., for 
earthquakes, floods, fires, and isolation for infectious diseases) 
40. Evaluation of hospital risks and vulnerabilities before disasters (e.g., hospital vulnerability 
assessment,  risk assessment, the strategy to evacuate and protect existing patients) 
41. The surveillance events (e.g., abnormity in admission diagnosis, surveillance of emergency room 
patients and death with unknown causes) 
42. Analysis, report and sharing of surveillance information  
43. The alternative hospital networks for emergency backup (e.g., power, water, oxygen and 
telecommunication) 
 
5.3.5 Discriminate validity of the framework  
 
A comparison of the scores (total score and mean score of each factor) among different 
categories of hospitals is shown in Table 5-4. As illustrated, the mean score of each factor of 
tertiary grade A hospitals is higher than that of tertiary grade B hospitals; the statistical 
difference is confirmed among all the factors. The mean scores of the four factors for the 
general hospitals are higher than that of specialized hospitals, except for the factor of hospital 
safety and vulnerability. However, statistical difference among the factors of emergency 
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medical response (F1) and disaster resources (F3) was tested. The mean score of each factor of 
hospitals with the mission of ‘regional disaster rescue’ is higher compared to hospitals 
without this mission. Statistical differences among most factors were tested. The overall 
scores for the tertiary A hospitals, general hospitals, and hospitals with the mission, are 
higher than that of tertiary B hospitals, specialized hospitals, and hospitals without the 
mission, respectively. 
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Table 5-4. Comparison of four factors of hospital resilience, using the hospital sample in 
Shandong, China, 2012 
Var.  No.  Component Factors  
Emergency 
medical (F1) 
Management 
mechanisms 
(F2) 
Resources 
(F3) 
Safety 
(F4) 
Overall 
score 
(F) 
MS MS MS MS MS 
CI CI CI CI CI 
Level Tertiary A 27 29.26 12.89 2.26 8.07 52.48 
  24.33, 34,19* 11.85,13.93* 1.98,2.54*   7.44,8.70* 46.69,58.27* 
Tertiary B 14 24.29 7.86 1.29 6.93 40.36 
   15.95,32.62* 6.58,9.14* 0.63,1.94* 6.31,7.55* 30.45,50.27* 
Type General  27 31.60 11.30 2.00 7.63 52.52 
  26.23,36.96* 9.83, 12.76 1.59,2.41* 7.09,8.17 45.63,59.40* 
Specialized  14 19.79 10.93 1.79  7.79 40.29 
   14.96,24.61* 9.20,12.66 1.27,2.30* 6.72, 8.85 34.08,46.49* 
Disaster 
Mission 
Assigned  13 37.31 13.92 2.38 8.23 61.85 
  31.27, 43.34* 12.26,15.59* 2.08,2.69* 7.48,8.98 54.99,68.70* 
No mission 28 23.04 9.89 1.71 7.43 42.07 
   18.34,27.74* 8.74,11.05* 1.29,2.13* 6.81,8.05 36.42,47.73* 
No Cat. Total 41 27.56 11.17 1.93 7.68 48.34 
Highest score of each factor in the survey 3  
MS: Mean score  
CI: 95% confidence interval of means. 
* P < 0.05; Tested by non-parameter test (Mann-Whitney Test)  
 
5.3.6 Scoring and modelling 
 
(1) Hospital self-evaluation scale card (without weighted):  
When the questionnaire is used by hospitals for their self-assessment, the scale card as set out 
in Table 5-5 can be used to readily assess hospital vulnerabilities. There are 81 binary 
questions in the questionnaire that were included to reflect the key indicators in the 
evaluation framework. When all parts of the questionnaire were finished, the scores of these 
questions, 0’ or ‘1’, can be summed. The highest score of each factor is illustrated at the 
bottom of the Table 5-4. The overall resilience score was summed up by adding the scores of 
the four factors (the highest score was 81). The quartile (25%, 75%) was used to categorize 
                                                          
3 Emergency medical response capability, (highest score = 51); Emergency management mechanisms, (highest 
score = 17); hospital safety and vulnerability, (highest score = 9); disaster resources (highest score = 4); 
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the levels of overall resilience score, and each dimension score. Such classification criteria 
were derived from the research approach of the Torrens Resilience Institute, in 2012, 
regarding the development of a scorecard toolkit to measure community disaster resilience 
(Torrens Resilience Institute 2012). As a result, if the overall score is over 60, the hospital 
was likely to be extremely resilient to disasters. If the overall score is less than 20, the 
hospital was likely to be extremely impacted upon in a disaster and/or have greater difficulty 
in recovering. Particular attention needed to be paid to the scores in the four components of 
resilience. If the individual score in one component tended to be in the low zone, this aspect 
of resilience likely indicated the highest priority for action. Thus, all scores can be very 
useful in highlighting those aspects of resilience that most need attention from hospital 
managers and relevant decision-makers. For instance, adapting the data in this study sample 
(Table 5-4) into the scale card (Table 5-5), the hospitals’ average overall resilience was found 
to be located in the ‘moderate zone’ (score=48.34). Among the four factors, only the score of 
hospital safety (F3) was located in the ‘high zone’ of resilience (score=7.68), which indicates 
a good level of resilience for that factor. The scores of the other three factors (F1, F2, and F4) 
were located in the ‘moderate zone’.  
 
Table 5-5.  Scale card for self-evaluation and categorization of the level of hospital resilience 
 Low Zone Moderate Zone High Zone 
Overall score  25% (0-20) 26-75% (21-60) 76-100% (61-81) 
Emergency medical response 25% (0-12)  26-75% (13-38) 76-100% (39-51) 
Management mechanisms  25% (0-4) 262-75% (5-12) 76-100% (13-17) 
Safety and vulnerability 25% (0-2)  26-75% (3-6) 76-100% (7-9) 
Resources 25% (0-1)  26-75% (1-3) 76-100% (3-4) 
Note: Low zone (poor level of resilience); Moderate zone (moderate level of resilience); High zone 
(Resilient) 
The classification criteria4 
                                                          
4 The classification criteria of 25% and 75% were derived from the research approach of the Torrens Resilience 
Institute, in 2012 regarding the development of a scorecard toolkit to measure community disaster resilience 
(Torrens Resilience Institute 2012). 
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(2) Scoring model for comparison and rank of hospitals in an area (weighted):  
To compare or rank disaster resilience among hospitals, the weight of each factor was taken 
into consideration, as different factors make different contributions to the overall resilience.  
 
The score for each factor for each of the sample hospitals was obtained by the use of 
regression analysis based on the Component Score Coefficient Matrix (Table 5-6). Each 
factor score for the study hospital sample can be expressed using the Equation I. 
 
Table 5-6. Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
Domains 
Component Factors 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
1. Emergency critical care capability  (X1) .524 .030 -.253 -.144 
2. Emergency staff capability (X2) .570 -.315 -.116 .288 
3. Emergency training and drills (X3) .191 .138 .093 -.109 
4. Crisis leadership and cooperation (X4) -.080 .443 .007 -.119 
5. Disaster plans (X5) -.220 .182 .364 .148 
6. Recovery and adaptation mechanisms (X6) -.083 .659 -.318 -.167 
7. Disaster stockpiles and logistics (X7) -.147 -.214 .936 -.148 
8. Hospital safety standard and procedures (X8) .080 -.211 -.199 .972 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 
 
Equation I: 
F1=0.524X1 + 0.570X2 + 0.191X3 - 0.080X4 - 0.220X5 - 0.083X6 - 0.147X7 + 0.080X8 
F2=0.030 X1 - 0.315 X2 + 0.138 X3 + 0.443 X4 + 0.182 X5 + 0.659 X6 - 0.214 X7 - 0.211X8 
F3=-0.253 X1 - 0.116 X2 + 0.093 X3 + 0.007 X4 + 0.364 X5 - 0.318 X6 + 0.936 X7 - 0.199X8 
F4=-0.144 X1 + 0.288 X2 - 0.109 X3 - 0.119 X4 + 0.148 X5 - 0.167 X6 - 0.148 X7 + 0.972X8 
 
The weight of each factor was assigned by the proportion of the variance contribution of each 
principal to the cumulative variance contribution of the four primary factors (as in Table 5-1) 
(Norusis 2008). Then the evaluation model of hospital disaster resilience was established and 
the overall level of hospital disaster resilience (F) can be calculated using the Equation II:  
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Equation II: 
F=0.615F1 + 0.202F2 + 0.103F3 + 0.080F4 
 
The weight for emergency medical response capability was 0.615, for disaster management 
mechanisms 0.202, for hospital infrastructural safety 0.103 and for disaster resources 0.080. 
The disaster resilience score for each hospital in the study was calculated accordingly; their 
relative rank is listed in Table 5-7. Due to ethical issues and respect for confidentiality, the 
hospital’s name was replaced with a hospital ID.  
 
During the analysis, regression factor scores were standardized by construction. Thus, the 
illustrated scores were relative scores. A negative score means that the ratings of the level of 
resilience was lower than average. If a score was closer to the value of 0, it meant that the 
ratings of the level of overall resilience were closer to the average of the sample 
(DiStefano,Zhu and Mindrila 2009). According to Table 5-7, there were 20 hospitals whose 
average comprehensive scores (F) were positive, which accounts for approximately 50% of 
the sample. The results indicate that hospital disaster resilience in the province was 
insufficient with considerable variation in the likely resilience of those hospitals which were 
sampled. Similarly, the score of each four factors (F1, F2, F3, and F4) can be calculated and 
ranked respectively, and thus can assist in identifying areas for highest priority in relation to 
strengthening resilience.  
 Chapter 5: Study Two—Construct validation Page 111 
 
Table 5-7. Overall score and the order of hospital disaster resilience (F) in the hospital 
sample 
ID F Rank ID F  Rank ID F Rank ID F Rank 
1 -0.554 32 11 -0.33  31 21 0.7885 5 31 -0.235 28 
2 -0.997 37 12 0.482  11 22 0.3393 15 32 0.412 12 
3 0.384 13 13 -0.195  26 23 1.120 1 33 0.0990 18 
4 -0.206 27 14 -0.970  36 24 -0.093 23 34 0.733 7 
5 -0.750 35 15 -1.189  41 25 0.095 19 35 0.331 16 
6 -0.147 24 16 -1.126  40 26 -0.262 30 36 0.733 8 
7 0.049 20 17 -1.005  38 27 -0.085 22 37 1.088 2 
8 -0.239 29 18 -1.116  39 28 0.774 6 38 0.932 3 
9 0.262 17 19 -0.04  21 29 0.623 9 39 -0.176 25 
10 0.550 10 20 0.8624  4 30 -0.572 33 40 0.360 14 
          41 -0.729 34 
  
5.3.7 Internal consistency 
 
The results indicate that the four extracted component factors had a generally acceptable level 
of internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items is 0.744). The eight 
domains also had a good overall internal consistency (Cronbach alpha=0.780). The internal 
consistency (expressed by the Cronbach alpha) of most domains was over 0.6. Only one 
domain, that of emergency training and drills, had an internal consistency which fell under 
0.6 (0.406).  
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
5.4.1. Significance  
 
The concept of hospital resilience provides a comprehensive approach to improving a 
hospital’s ability to withstand the impact of a disaster, and to reduce the mortality and 
mobility associated with disasters through efficient health responses. In this chapter, the 
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principal factor analysis was conducted to provide a four-factor solution for hospital 
resilience.  
 
The significance of this study is three-fold. Firstly, the proposed framework launches an 
important discussion regarding the conceptual understanding of what constitutes hospital 
disaster resilience. Departing from the majority of existing research, that focuses on only one 
or two aspects of a hospital’s disaster ability (such as preparedness). the framework captures 
the principal and comprehensive components to depict a hospital’s overall ability to cope 
with disasters. It is proposed that a multidimensional measurement is more reliable and 
comprehensive for measuring a hospital’s overall resilience than examining its disaster 
capability through only one aspect or a limited number of aspects. Thus, the proposed 
framework measures preparedness before disasters, and also describes the underlying 
elements of disaster functions and health outcomes, i.e. hospital emergency medical response, 
recovery and adaptation strategies.  
 
Secondly, the results of the factor analysis are encouraging. It yielded factors largely 
consistent with the conceptualization of hospital resilience and the construction of its primary 
domains. It generated a four-factor structure of hospital resilience, namely: emergency 
medical response capability (F1), disaster management mechanisms (F2), hospital 
infrastructural safety (F3), and disaster resources (F4). It seems that the four factors move 
from the micro level to the macro level. The F1 was at the ground level and was about 
immediate ‘doing’, which encompasses emergency medicine capability, surge capacity, and 
staff capability; F2 was relevant to management, plans and cooperation. F2 was not immediate 
‘doing’, but rather, it was about having policies and procedures in place that can be enacted at 
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the right time. F3 and F4 were concerned with infrastructures and resources which involve 
macro-level planning for safety, such as standards, procedure, and disaster resources.  
 
Finally, the four-factor structure offers a way of modelling the overall level of hospital 
resilience and the level of four factors independently. There are two ways of modelling: one 
way is to use the self-assessment scales for categorizing the level of hospital resilience. It 
uses the questionnaire as a simple checklist for hospital self-evaluation. It can provide an 
overall score, as well as provide scores on particular areas of resilience. Thus, it can enable 
hospitals to drill down to identify areas for improvement and can be used as a basis for 
measuring improvement over time. Further, the scales can be adjusted and reconstructed with 
more items being added into the questionnaire for future studies. Even if the highest scores 
(i.e., total number of questions) are different, the same classification criteria (25%, 75%) can 
still be used for the classification of the levels (Torrens Resilience Institute 2012). 
Alternatively, the regression modelling of different weights for each factor can be used. The 
modelling also has regional application as it enables regions or provinces to drill down into 
the resilience of their hospitals. The scores can provide a comparison of hospital resilience 
for hospitals of similar size and function within and across regions. Thus, the regions and 
provinces can build capacity in a targeted and coordinated way.  
 
The strength of this study is that the preliminary evaluation framework and the derived 
questionnaire were developed from a systematic approach (using an international literature 
review, the Modified- Delphi Method in China, and the empirical data). The internal 
consistency of the framework and questionnaire was relatively high; its construct validity was 
validated to some extent. This preliminary framework can provide a foundation for further 
similar studies or evaluations.  
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Furthermore, according to the experts’ opinions in the Delphi study, except for the hospital 
routine treatment, tertiary hospitals are also expected to have outreach functions, and to cope 
with major disasters (e.g., earthquakes, bioterrorism, and epidemics) that can cause mass 
casualties on-site. Hospital resilience was an essential element of resilient communities, 
therefore, hospitals need to provide immediate healthcare services to the affected 
communities (Berkes 2007). However, critical healthcare services include both patient 
transport into hospital and the bringing of care to the patient on site (Farmer and Carlton Jr 
2006). Thus, during major disasters, tertiary hospitals need to be capable of providing expert 
teams, equipment and medical care services into the field, for on-site medical rescue, as well 
as to support the treatment provided by the local hospitals for a large number of patients (Shi 
and Zheng 2008; Zhang et al. 2012). At present, such functions are commissioned by the 
local government from the local tertiary hospitals, in order to build a district coordinated 
medical response network for major disasters (Zhang et al. 2012).  
 
5.4.2. Model justification 
 
The weights of these four factors were calculated using factor analysis. However, the 
calculated weights needed to be justified from the resilience concept and the actual resilience 
status of the hospital. Hospital resilience is a comprehensive concept; it includes structural 
components (e.g., facility and infrastructural safety), non-structural components (e.g., 
network, staff, equipment, medication), emergency healthcare service components (e.g., 
medical response and treatment, continuity of medical service, surge capacity, training and 
drills), and disaster management (e.g., plan and procedure, command, cooperation, crisis 
communication, recovery and adaptation strategies) (Veterans Health Administration 2008; 
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Zhong et al. 2013a; Zhong,Clarck, et al. 2014; Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007). Thus, the eight 
primary domains and the extracted four factors complied with the concept, and made intuitive 
sense. 
Among the four factors, hospital medical response capability (F1) was identified as the main 
component factor, as it was relevant to the emergency healthcare performance and was health 
outcome-oriented in times of disasters. F1 was merged with three other domains (i.e., 
emergency service capability and surge capacity, emergency staff capability, disaster training 
and drills); the combination made intuitive sense. The domain of emergency service 
capability (e.g., medical equipment, on-site rescue, triage of patients, and priority of 
functions) and surge capacity (i.e., surge beds, supplies and staff) were essential for the 
hospital medical performance during disasters. The presence of key staff, and ensuring that 
they were suitably trained and ready, also impacted upon the hospital’s disaster performance 
(World Health Organization 2011b; Niska and Shimizu 2011a). Hence, F1 was about the 
‘doing’ capacity at the ground level, and linked directly to the hospital medical care functions 
during disasters.  
 
Hospital disaster management mechanisms (F2) were the second most highly weighted factor, 
and it consisted of disaster plans, command and control system, cooperation, communication, 
recovery and adaptation strategies. The F2 reflects the basic disaster management system, 
which refers to the resourceful strategies (adaptive flexibility) that can be used to improve 
hospital operational functions and, thus, to achieve hospital disaster resilience. F2  was used 
to efficiently recover affected hospital essential functions, using a wide variety of disaster 
management approaches including ‘various disaster plans’, ‘command and control system’, 
‘communication protocols’, ‘cooperation with community facilities’, ‘strategies to prioritize 
and maintain essential health functions’, ‘strategies to share and manage emergency supplies 
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and staff’, and ‘recovery and adaptation strategies after disasters’ (these illustrated indicators 
are presented in Table 5-3). Thus, F1 and F2 were the key components influencing the speed 
with which the recovery of a hospital’s essential functions were achieved (rapidity); 
consequently, they should be the core component of hospital disaster resilience 
(Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2011). 
 
The factors of hospital infrastructural safety (F3) and hospital disaster resources (F4) weighted 
less highly. Physical infrastructure safety was found to have a significant effect on 
maintaining hospital functionality during various disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods, fires and 
epidemics), and the redundancies of network can increase hospital resilience (Jacques et al. 
2014; Myrtle et al. 2005). F3 in this study refers to two issues: the infrastructure (or 
procedures) of a hospital that were compliant with the construction standards to guarantee 
hospital internal safety; and using the redundancies of utility networks (e.g., equipment, 
communication, power, and water pumping) to continue hospital functions during disasters. It 
may be controversial that hospital infrastructure did not weight more prominently. After all, 
hospital infrastructure is essential to resilience as surge capacity and other response solutions 
could not occur in the face of infrastructure collapse (Mitrani-Reiser et al. 2012; Jacques et 
al. 2014; Myrtle et al. 2005). However, the evaluation framework of hospital resilience in this 
context was meant to be used by hospital managers and governmental administrators. Thus 
the engineering perspective, especially of infrastructure nonstructural components (e.g., 
transportation systems, elevators, ceilings and utility system) (Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007; 
Mitrani-Reiser et al. 2012; Jacques et al. 2014; Myrtle et al. 2005), was likely to have been 
understated, as more items focused on the perspective of disaster management, emergency 
medicine capability and capacity. 
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F4 was used to reflect the critical resources, including medications and supplies that were 
used to achieve health function continuity. The stockpile of these resources should comply 
with the hospital emergency medicine catalog and emergency resources reservation plan that 
were issued by the local health department. The critical supplies included food, water, hand 
hygiene, stretchers, wheelchairs, ventilators, IV pumps, tourniquets, personal protective 
equipment, etc., while the critical medications included antimicrobial agents, cardiac 
medications, insulin, anti-hypertensive agents, IV fluids, etc. (Kollek 2013). Although 
different levels of hospitals may have a wide variation in disaster resources and stockpiles, 
hospitals should be prepared with self-sustained supplies and medications for a disaster for 2-
3 days, regardless of the level of structural damage (Kollek 2013; Kirsch et al. 2010). Broadly 
based strategies for resources logistics management (e.g., share with other facilities, sign with 
pharmacy companies, priority distribution) should also be applied to maintain and surge these 
critical resources. In summary, F3 and F4 together can be used to reflect a hospital’s 
robustness (the extent to which function is maintained) to withstand disasters, initially 
without external assistance.   
 
5.4.3 Limitations 
 
There are several limitations to this study. Firstly, the framework was tested on a relatively 
small sample (n=41) of tertiary hospitals in one province in China, which restricts the 
generalizability of the findings. Thus, the results may not be directly transferable to hospitals 
in other areas or countries, or to smaller facilities. While the nature of this work can be 
considered as preliminary or exploration, it is appropriate to test the framework in a region or 
province, prior to a larger roll-out, such as a national study. Hence, the proposed framework 
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needs to be adapted into other contexts (e.g., other areas or countries) for further validation. 
Secondly, due to ethical considerations, the surveyed hospitals were guaranteed anonymity. It 
was, therefore, not possible to compare and validate their resilience score (see Table 5-7) 
with their real status of emergency medicine and disaster preparedness. Thirdly, the 
questionnaire tends to measure hospital resilience from different dimensions, with each 
dimension contributing different weights to the overall resilience. The weight was calculated 
through the empirical data, so it would be beneficial to be validated further with experts’ 
opinions and additional empirical studies. Finally, the framework was derived from a 
systematic review and Delphi study in China. Thus, the indicators in the framework may not 
capture all possible indicators, and its generalizability is limited. With the addition of further 
expert perspectives (e.g., engineering, emergency medicine experts from other countries), as 
well as newer information that became available since the conduct of the survey, more items 
may be added into the construct and retested for validation through ongoing research. 
Additionally, the self-evaluation scales and the score model could be adjusted accordingly. 
Despite the limitations, the framework can be regarded as a checklist to evaluate key 
indicators of hospital vulnerability and to identify priority practices that could better prepare 
the facilities for future disasters. The methodological framework and some of the agreed 
indicators may inform the development of indicators of hospital resilience in other countries 
or areas. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The comprehensive framework provides a way to conceptualize hospital resilience, and a 
foundation for developing a user-friendly instrument for measuring it. A four-factor structure 
of hospital resilience was identified. The reliability and construct validity of this framework 
was tested. The findings provide a validated framework that has been informed by the 
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literatures, experts’ opinions and empirical data. It also provides a survey instrument that may 
assist future research. Regarding to the feasibility of the framework, additional work is still 
needed and is described in the next chapter.
 
 Chapter 6: Study Three—Test utility using a sample Page 120 
 
Chapter 6 : Study Three: Testing the utility and feasibility of the 
evaluation framework: using the cross-sectional survey in 
Shandong Province 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been accepted for publication: 
Zhong S, Hou X-Y, Clark M, Zang YL, Wang L, Xu LZ, FitzGerald 
G. Disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals: a cross-sectional survey in 
Shandong Province, China. BMC Health Services Research. 2014; 
14(1):135. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
China is afflicted by many kinds of disasters, including natural disasters, manmade disasters 
and pandemics. Its population size amplifies the impact of these disasters on health and 
wellbeing. Since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the 
Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, substantial resources have been devoted to improving disaster 
resilience in China, with a particular emphasis on mitigating the impact of wide-spread 
infectious diseases and mass casualty incidents (Center For Strategic and International 
Studies 2009a; The United Nations Office for Disater Risk Reduction 2005b). Adequate 
progress can only be achieved by integrating local, provincial, and national systems (Zhang et 
al. 2012). Health systems are essential to enhance disaster resilience, and therefore planning 
at all levels should include health care facilities, such as tertiary hospitals, primary health care 
facilities, public health departments, and emergency medical services (Kaji,Koenig and 
Lewis 2007).Within regional health systems, tertiary hospitals are the key component, as they 
are the main providers of health care during disasters. They also provide leadership during 
response phase of a disaster, and represent a critical linkage for disaster management for the 
whole system.  
 
During disasters, hospitals need to withstand the event, whilst being able to maintain and 
surge their medical capacity, in order to respond to sudden and significant increases in health 
demand (Barbera,Yeatts and Macintyre 2009; Sauer et al. 2009; Rose 2004). As stated, 
resilience is an emerging concept that has recently been added to the disaster management 
context, which describes this ability (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; 
Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010c). The resilience of hospitals can be defined as their 
ability to resist, absorb, and respond to the shock of disasters while maintaining critical 
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functionality, and then to recover to their original state or adapt to a new one (Zhong et al. 
2013a). 
 
To date, however, few studies have evaluated the level of hospital disaster preparedness and 
management arrangement in China (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and 
Da-Long 2007; Zhang,Wu and Hao 2007; Yantao 2011b). Moreover, standardised or 
consistent methods for describing and measuring hospital resilience or relevant 
comprehensive ability are lacking (Xin and Xu 2012). Understanding the status of hospital 
disaster resilience is the first step in planning to enhance effective emergency response of 
hospitals.  
 
This chapter aims to explore the current status of disaster resilience in tertiary hospitals in 
Shandong Province. It has four objectives: (1) to identify the current status of tertiary 
hospitals' ability to cope with disasters in the Province; (2) offer references for similar studies; 
(3) to test the utility of an emerging framework as a basis for understanding and measuring 
hospital disaster resilience; and (4) to identify any variability in hospital disaster resilience in 
Shandong Province using this framework, in order to inform a more cohesive approach to 
health authorities and hospital managers. 
 
6.2 Methods 
 
This study used the same survey in the Chapter 5, and the questionnaire and the sample are 
the same, but using the same data with different analysis for different study purposes.  
 
The feasibility and suitability of the questionnaire were tested by a pilot study of three 
hospitals (n=3). For the purpose of this study, we collected and analysed the data focused on 
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the following areas of interest: (1) hospital demographic data; (2) hospital safety (e.g., 
infrastructural safety and strategies for infectious diseases); (3) emergency command, 
communication and cooperation system; (4) disaster plan; (5) disaster stockpile and logistics 
management; (6) emergency staff; (7) emergency services and surge capacity (e.g., on-site 
rescue, hospital treatment, surge capacity); (8) training and drills; (9) and disaster recovery 
and adaptation strategies. Excluding the first section of the survey which addressed 
demographic information, sections 2–9 represent the eight key domains of the established 
evaluation framework of hospital disaster resilience.  
 
A total of 50 tertiary hospitals in Shandong Province were selected using stratified random 
sampling according to their subgroups (i.e., Grade A, B, C). For the details of the sample and 
the study protocol, please refer to the method section of the previous chapter (Chapter 5: 
study design, study setting and sample, study protocol, measurements). The data from 
returned questionnaires were then transferred into a database, which was set up using 
Microsoft office access 2007. Data was checked, cleaned, and analysed using SPSS Statistics 
(Norusis 2007).  
 
A score was assigned for the binary variables (e.g., “is there”). Two options of “yes” or “no” 
are assigned to the score of "1"or "0" respectively. A total score was calculated by summing 
the score across all eight domains, which is a proxy for measuring disaster resilience in an 
institution. The higher the total score, the better the hospital’s disaster resilience.  
 
Most variables in this chapter were analysed using descriptive statistics such as frequencies 
and percentage of the sample. Further analyses were conducted to understand the correlation 
between resilience domains and the descriptive information about the hospitals. A mean score 
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and ninety-five percent confidence interval of means (95% CI) were used to describe each 
resilience domain. Comparisons of the mean score of each resilience domain among different 
hospital categorizes were performed, with p < 0.05 as the level of statistical significance. Due 
to the small sample, non-parameter test (Mann-Whitney Test) was used as the statistical 
method.  
 
6.3 Results  
 
The results section includes the following sub-sections: relationship between hospital 
characteristics and resilience, and the descriptions of the key indicators within the four 
component factors of hospital resilience.  
 
6.3.1 Relationship between hospital characteristics and resilience  
 
A response rate of 82% (n=41) was attained. After analysis of the data from these 41 
hospitals, it was found that the eight domains of disaster resilience have good overall internal 
statistical consistency (Cronbach alpha = 0.780). A comparison of these domains among 
different categories of hospitals is shown in Table 6-1. The mean score of each domain of 
tertiary grade A hospitals was higher than that of tertiary grade B separately, and statistical 
difference was confirmed among most domains. The mean score of general hospitals was 
higher than that of specialized hospitals in most domains. However, only the statistical 
difference among two domains was tested.  The mean score of hospitals that were assigned 
the mission of regional disaster rescue was higher than those hospitals without this mission. 
Statistical difference among most domains was tested.  In addition, most of the hospitals 
(92.3%) that has been assigned missions were tertiary A hospitals in the sample. 
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Table 6-1. Comparison of eight domains of hospital resilience, categorized by different characteristics of hospitals, Shandong, China, 2012  
Var.  No. Domains 
   Command Plan Stockpile Safety Emergency services Staff Training Recovery 
MS MS MS MS MS MS MS Ms 
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 
Level Tertiary A 27 5.78 6.22 2.26 8.07 9.34 10.59 8.98 0.89 
  5.35,6.21* 5.81,6.64* 1.98,2.54*   7.44,8.70* 7.53,11.16 8.16,13.02 7.62,10.33* 0.501.27* 
Tertiary B 14 4.43 3.36 1.29 6.93 8.71 10.29 5.32 0.07 
   3.89,4.97* 2.49,4.22* 0.63,1.94* 6.31,7.55* 5.74,11.69 6.26,14.31 3.56,7.08* –0.08,0.23* 
Type General  27 5.52 5.11 2.00 7.63 10.49 12.77 8.27 0.67 
  5.05,5.99 4.33,5.90 1.59,2.41* 7.09,8.17 8.59,12.39* 10.25,15.30* 6.65,9.89* 0.27,1.06 
Specialized  14 4.93 5.50  1.79  7.79 6.50 6.07 6.68 0.50 
   4.23,5.63 4.63,6.37 1.27,2.30* 6.72,8.85 4.55,8.45* 4.18,7.96* 5.17,8.20* 0.12,0.88 
Disaster 
Mission 
Assigned  13 6.23 6.46 2.38 8.23 11.77 14.23 11.06 1.23 
  5.57,6.89* 5.62,7.30* 2.08,2.69 7.48,8.98 9.29,14.25* 10.58,17.88* 9.43,12.69* 0.67,1.79* 
No mission 28 4.89 4.68 1.71 7.43 7.90 8.74 6.18 0.32 
   4.49,5.29* 4.00,5.35* 1.29,2.13 6.81,8.05 6.14,9.67* 6.49,10.99* 5.00,7.36* 0.04,0.60* 
Total  41 5.32 5.24 1.93, 7.68 9.13 10.48 7.73 0.61 
Highest scores for each domain of the survey5; *P < 0.05, Tested by non-parameter test (Mann-Whitney Test); MS: Mean score; CI: 95% confidence interval of means 
                                                          
5 Emergency command, communication and cooperation system, (highest score = 7); disaster plan, (highest score = 7); disaster stockpile and logistics management, (highest 
score = 4); hospital safety, (highest score = 9); emergency services and surge capacity, (highest score = 19); emergency staff, (highest score = 17); trainings and drills (highest 
score = 15); recovery and adaptation strategies (highest score =3)  
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Factor Analysis (using Initial Component Matrix, and Rotated Component Matrix by 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization) was chosen to extract key factors of disaster resilience 
from the eight different domains (Norusis 2008). After analysis, a four factor solution was 
identified that can be used to represent all the domains. Below we describe in detail of the 
status of each of these four factors in tertiary hospitals of the study province.  
 
6.3.2 Hospital emergency medical care capability (Factor 1)  
 
The most important function of hospitals during emergencies is maintaining and surging 
services to ensure medical care for victims of disasters, either on-site or within hospitals. For 
onsite-rescue, most (92.7%) had their own ambulances, among them 73.7% had ward-type 
ambulances, but only 15.8% had access to a negative pressure isolation ambulance. Only two 
of them had their own rescue helicopters and access to a helicopter landing pad. More than 
half (65.8%) could dispatch emergency staff during disasters for the on-site rescue. About 
one third (31.7%) could organise an independent rescue team that is equipped with 
emergency package of supplies for living 3 days (including daily necessities, a set of 
emergency package, and first aid kit, et al). Not surprisingly, among them most (92.3%) were 
tertiary A hospitals. Less than a quarter of the hospitals (22.0%) were equipped with portable 
medical equipment (e.g., portable breathing machine, ECG monitoring machine, and the X-
ray machine), and all of these hospitals were tertiary A. The rescue teams comprised 
physicians, nurses and administrative staff from various departments (e.g., surgery 
department, medicine department, psychology department, infection control department and 
management department), and the dispatched staff number had a wide range from 13 persons 
to 103 persons. Over a third (36.6%) of the responding hospitals had an on-site command 
vehicle and a similar proportion (39.0%) had on-site communication equipment for data 
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transmission, video-audio connection, and remote consultation. However, only 4.88% 
hospitals had a ‘portable hospital’ or the capability to support field surgery, and other critical 
care in the field, which is similar to the function of ICU (using vehicles which are equipped 
with beds, and portable medical equipment).  
 
For hospital treatment, 90.2% had emergency beds, 80.5% had isolation beds, and 65.9% had 
Intensive Care beds. In terms of capacity to treat patients with different medical needs or 
case-mix 73.2% had orthopaedic beds, 56.1% had special beds for burns (e.g., suspension bed, 
emancipated beds) and 59.5% had hyperbaric oxygen chamber. While 73.2% had achieved 
capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass casualty of trauma, 73.2% for 
infectious diseases, 48.8% for mass casualty of blast injury, gunshot wounds and crush injury, 
46.3% for acute chemical poisoning, only 17.1% could treat radiation issues. In this study 
mass casualty capacity refers to each hospital is to assess itself on its capacity to accept at 
least 30 patients of the same disease within a short period (Zhang 2006). Most of the 
responding hospitals had medical care equipment, such as breathing machine (100%), vital 
signs monitors (100%), defibrillator machines (90.2%), and cardiac resuscitation devices 
(70.7%).  
 
For surge capacity, 65.9% had prepared conditions (e.g., electricity, oxygen, water and space) 
to surge patient-care beds, while 53.7% had concrete surging plans, and among them 66.7% 
within tertiary A but only 28.6% within tertiary B hospitals. Only 36.6% adopted a wide 
variety of flexible procedures for surging their beds capacity, through early discharge of 
patients (85.4%), cancellation of elective admissions (63.4%), and transfer patients to 
primary health care and other facilities (61.0%). However, these hospitals can only surge 
12.52% of their total beds within an average of 24 hours (3.76% used extra space, 8.76% 
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could empty beds). Notably, of the14 tertiary B hospitals the surge capacity was even less, as 
claimed they could only surge 2.48% of their total beds within 24 hours. More than half 
(61.0%) had mass-casualty triage procedures for admission of patients who require urgent 
medical care during disasters, and 92% were tertiary A hospitals. Only a few (12.2%) could 
surge staff using a wide variety of flexible strategies, including recalling all the off work staff 
back to work (100%), rehiring retired staff (73.2%), suppling living places for staff (61.0%), 
training and transferring non-critical care staff to support critical care (41.5%), sharing staff 
from other hospitals (31.7%), and using volunteers or temporary employers (19.5%).  
 
Disaster trainings and drills can be used regularly to improve hospital medical response 
efficiency. Most of the responding hospitals (95.1%) had disaster training programs and 
53.7% had drills, to treat the following emergency types respectively, including: infectious 
disease (73.2%, 73.2%); mass casualty incidents (53.7%, 48.8%), career poising and food 
poising (48.8%, 36.6%), and bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism (14.6%, 7.3%). About 
85.4% had training curriculums, and 90.2% updated them regularly. The content of training 
included cardiopulmonary resuscitation (97.3%), trachea cannulation (89.2%), basic skills for 
the treatment of trauma (63.6%), transfer of casualties (56.4%), disaster management (12.2%) 
and triage (12.2%). Approximately one-fifth (19.5%) had attended community drills 
cooperating with the other emergency facilities. Among them, 25.9% within tertiary A 
hospitals and only 7.1% within tertiary B hospitals. All the hospitals that conducted such 
interagency drills were those that had been assigned rescue missions, and they accounted for 
61.5% of the mission assigned hospitals.  
 
In summary, the description of key indicators in Factor 1 (Hospital emergency medical care 
capability) was illustrated in the Table 6-2. 
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Table 6-2. Description of key indicators in Factor 1 (Hospital emergency medical care 
capability) 
Indicators Percentage 
Had their own ambulances 92.7% 
Had their own rescue helicopters 4.8% 
Could dispatch emergency staff during disasters for the on-site rescue 65.8% 
Could organise an independent rescue team 31.7% 
Were equipped with portable medical equipment  22.0% 
Had an on-site command vehicle  36.6% 
Had a ‘portable hospital’ capability to support field surgery, and other critical 
care in the field  
4.88%  
Had capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass casualty of 
trauma 
73.2%  
Had capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass infectious 
diseases 
73.2%  
Had capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass casualty of blast 
injury, gunshot wounds and crush injury 
48.8%  
Had capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass acute chemical 
poisoning 
46.3%  
Had concrete surging plans 53.7%  
Adopted a wide variety of  procedures for surging their beds capacity 36.6%  
Had mass-casualty triage procedures during disasters 61.0% 
Had  disaster drills 53.7%  
Had training curriculums 85.4%  
Had attended community drills cooperating with the other emergency 
facilities 
19.5% 
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6.3.3 Hospital disaster management mechanisms (Factor 2) 
 
All of the surveyed hospitals (100%) had a general plan for public emergencies. While only a 
small percentage (19.5%) had specific plans based on the specific requirements of a single 
hazard, this was 75% in tertiary A hospitals. The most common hazards identified in the 
specific plans are infectious diseases (92.7%), internal medical accidents (90.2%), and public 
health emergencies, such as occupational or food poisoning (73.2%). Only a small percentage 
had established specific plans of dealing with natural disasters, such as fire (68.3%), 
earthquakes (48.8%), floods (36.6%), and even less for bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism 
(31.7%). Regarding standard operating procedures, over four-fifths of the responding 
hospitals (85.4%) possessed a protocol to initiate the plan, so as to guarantee the availability 
of staff, equipment and resources, while less than three-quarters (73.2%) had a classification 
response system for different levels and different phases of events. Most hospitals (87.8%) 
reported that they could operate in accordance with the plan during disasters. Approximately 
half of them (51.2%) had evaluated and revised their emergency plan at least once in the last 
two years, and a similar percentage (53.7%) reported the content of plans was disseminated 
by key staff through regular meetings or training.  
 
Regarding the incident command system, all reported to have a command center and most 
(97.6%) had designated a specific department to be responsible for the relevant work. As for 
communication, 87.8% had coordinating meeting during emergencies with key staff from 
different hospital departments, and less (48.8%) had a public and mass media communication 
protocol, and less still (43.9%) had attended the local coordinating meeting with other 
emergency departments, such as CDC (Center for Disease Prevention and Control), pre-
hospital emergency system, healthcare facilities, blood and resource center, and local 
government.  It was noteworthy that general hospitals did not appear to be obviously superior 
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to specialized hospitals in disaster planning or cooperation with other facilities. However, the 
hospitals with assigned rescue missions had better cooperation mechanisms, among them 
with 61.5% attended the local coordinating meeting, while a smaller percentage (42.9%) in 
other hospitals.  
 
Less than half (48.8%) had after-event evaluation report to capture lessons to be learned, and 
to assist to evaluate hospital vulnerability, and adapt strategies for improving future 
performance. However, a larger percentage (59.3%) of tertiary A hospitals had this 
evaluation report compared with tertiary B hospitals (28.6%). Only 26.8% had specific 
channels of investing money, transferring staff, and purchasing equipment for recovery. 
Approximately one-fifth (19.5%) of hospitals indicated that they were involved or would be 
involved in the health related work of affected communities (e.g., rehabilitation and 
psychological consultation, health evaluation and health intervention of the community).  
 
In summary, the description of key indicators in Factor 2 (Hospital disaster management 
mechanisms) was illustrated as the Table 6-3 below. 
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Table 6-3. Description of key indicators in Factor 2 (Hospital disaster management 
mechanisms) 
Indicators Percentage 
Had a general plan for public emergencies 100% 
Had specific plans for a single hazard 19.5% 
Had infectious diseases included in the plans 92.7% 
Had earthquake included in the plans 48.8% 
Had floods included in the plans 36.6% 
Had bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism included in the plans 31.7% 
Had a protocol to initiate the plan, so as to guarantee the availability of staff 
and equipment 
85.4%  
Had a classification response system for different levels and different phases 
of events  
73.2% 
Had evaluated and revised their emergency plan at least once in the last two 
years 
51.2% 
Had a command centre for disasters 100% 
Had coordinating meeting within hospital 87.8%  
Had attended the local coordinating meeting with other facilities 43.9% 
Had a public and mass media communication protocol 48.8% 
Had after-event evaluation reports 48.8%  
Were involved in the health related work of affected communities 19.5% 
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6.3.4 Hospital safety and vulnerability (Factor 3) 
 
Most of the responding hospitals (92.7%) had developed syndromic surveillance systems for 
certain high risk of infectious diseases (e.g., SARS, Human H5N1 Avian Flu, and Human 
H7N9 Avian Flu) and required that physicians on duty report any suspicious cases to the 
hospitals’ presidents. 92.7% of responders had established a direct online reporting system to 
report suspicious cases and shared data with the local health authority. Most of responders 
(85.4 %) could analysis surveillance data regularly. 
 
Only 12.2% of all the responding hospitals had local risk evaluation for hospital prevention 
and mitigation, and all of them are tertiary A hospitals. More than half (68.3%) had evaluated 
critical infrastructure vulnerability and safety standards. Yet, this percentage varied with 
88.9% within tertiary A hospitals but only 28.6% within tertiary B hospitals. All the hospitals 
had considered construction safety standards for the risk of fire, and most (92.7%) had 
considered using isolated pathways and designated areas for infectious diseases. 
Comparatively, a relatively lower percentage had considered building to a higher standard or 
level of resistance than the local criteria for earthquake disasters (82.9%), and floods (73.2%). 
Almost all of them (97.6%) had strategies to evacuate and protect existing patients when the 
hospital is at risk, but only 61.0% reported to have alternative emergency energy and 
facilities for backup (including power, water, oxygen and telecommunication). The 
percentage having alternative backup was found different among tertiary A and tertiary B 
hospitals, with 74.1% and 35.7% respectively.  
 
In summary, the description of key indicators in Factor 3 (Hospital safety and vulnerability) 
was illustrated as the Table 6-4 below. 
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Table 6-4. Description of key indicators in Factor 3 (Hospital safety and vulnerability) 
Indicators Percentage 
Symptoms surveillance systems for certain high risk of infectious diseases and 
direct online reporting 
92.7% 
Analysis surveillance data regularly 85.4 % 
Evaluated critical infrastructure vulnerability and safety standards 68.3% 
Had local risk evaluation for hospital prevention and mitigation 12.2%  
Use isolated pathways and designated areas for infectious diseases 92.7% 
Built to a high standard of resistance for earthquake 82.9% 
Built to a higher standard of resistance for floods  73.2% 
Had strategies to evacuate and protect existing patients when the hospital is at 
risk 
97.6% 
Had alternative emergency energy and facilities for backup (including power, 
water, oxygen and telecommunication) 
61.0%  
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6.3.5 Hospital disaster resources (Factor 4)  
 
Our results revealed that 75.6% of the participating hospitals had stockpiles of emergency 
drugs, and 43.9% had signed contracts with emergency drug-supplies to provide drugs during 
emergencies, only 22.0% had signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with other 
hospitals to share emergency drugs during emergencies. 48.8% had drug-distribution plans to 
identify distribution priority of drugs during crisis, and 41.5% could be able to load and 
deliver emergency drugs for on-site rescue. With regards to other medical materials, 87.5% 
had stockpiles of emergency materials (e.g., food, water, stretcher, and tourniquet). But only 
29.3% could share and obtain these materials from other hospitals during emergencies. It was 
noteworthy that a greater percentage of tertiary A hospitals had a signed Memorandum of 
Understandings (MOUs) to share emergency materials than tertiary B hospitals (42.9% 
among tertiary A and 22.2% among tertiary B hospitals). To protect staff, some of the 
hospitals had biohazard protective suits (58.5%), goggles (63.4%), ventilator (73.2%), and 
N95 Masks (41.5%). Only 24.4% had purchased all the mentioned personal protective 
equipment (PPE). There was also a greater percentage of tertiary A hospitals had access to all 
PPE than tertiary B hospitals (33.3% among tertiary A and 7.1% among tertiary B). 
 
In summary, the description of key indicators in Factor 4 (Hospital disaster resources) was 
illustrated as the Table 6-5 below. 
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Table 6-5. Description of key indicators in Factor 4 (Hospital disaster resources) 
Indicators Percentage 
Had stockpiles of emergency drugs 75.6%  
Had signed contracts with emergency drug-supplies to provide drugs during 
emergencies 
43.9%  
Had signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with other hospitals to 
share emergency drugs 
22.0%  
Had drug-distribution plans to identify distribution priority of drugs 48.8%  
Could be able to load and deliver emergency drugs for on-site rescue 41.5% 
Had stockpiles of emergency materials (e.g., food, water, stretcher, and 
tourniquet) 
87.5% 
Could share and obtain these materials from other hospitals during 
emergencies 
29.3%  
To protect staff, had biohazard protective suits  58.5% 
To protect staff, had goggles  63.4% 
To protect staff, had ventilator  73.2% 
To protect staff, had N95 Masks 41.5% 
To protect staff, had purchased all the mentioned personal protective 
equipment (PPE) 
24.4%  
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6.4 Discussions 
 
This chapter has examined the utility of the validated evaluation framework and its derived 
questionnaire for furthering the understanding and measurement of the component parts of 
effective hospital resilience. There are 8 key domains of hospital resilience, and as a result 
four key factors were extracted from them. Among these factors, emergency medical care is 
the most important capability, while others (hospital safety, management mechanisms, and 
disaster resources) are supporting capability to guarantee its continuity and surging. This 
framework of hospital resilience provides a starting point for integrating these key 
components of hospital resilience together into a comprehensive disaster management 
framework (including prevention, preparedness, responsiveness, and recovery and adaptation 
phases). It also seeks to make an achievable goal of improving hospital pre-disaster strength 
(robustness) and promoting rapidity of response and recovery. This goal can be achieved 
through a wide range of management approaches including redundancy of processes and 
resources, and resourcefulness (or flexibility) of plans or strategies (i.e.: can be reflected by 
some key variables in the survey) (McAslan 2010e; Rogers 2011; Kahan,Allen and George 
2010; Sternberg 2003; Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007).  
 
Considerable variability in the scope of disaster resilience arrangement of hospitals in the 
Province was identified through a survey conducted using the self-report questionnaire. We 
have stratified our analyses by different level of hospitals. It was noticed that in some key 
areas (e.g., safety evaluation, planning and cooperation, MOUs, personal protective 
equipment, rescue, surge capacity and drills), there was a difference in disaster resilience 
arrangements between tertiary A and tertiary B hospitals. This may be due to different levels 
or types of hospitals having divergent functions in disasters. For example, most (92.3%) of 
the hospitals that have been assigned missions were tertiary A, and thus they should be more 
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resilient to disasters for health service supply, and should have better arrangements in the 
above areas for disaster preparedness and response.  
 
This chapter offered a four-factor structure as a way of modelling the overall level of hospital 
resilience and the level of each factor independently. Thus the questionnaire can be used to 
provide a helpful and comprehensive instrument for assisting hospitals to assess their level of 
resilience at a regional or a district level in regard to disasters, and assist them in identifying 
areas for further strengthening their resilience capability through comparison with similar 
components of other hospitals. The evaluation framework and its key measures in the 
questionnaire may inform the development of hospital resilience evaluation in other countries.  
 
Similar indicators in this study can be compared with other studies, especially on hospital 
disaster preparedness and management (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Yantao 2011b). One 
survey has been conducted in 2005 to evaluate secondary and tertiary hospitals of Shandong 
(Li,Huang and Zhang 2008).Comparing its results, it was found that the percentage of most 
similar indicators in our study is reasonable higher, such as the percentages of: syndromic 
surveillance systems, single-hazard disaster plans, public and mass media communication 
protocol, stockpiles of emergency resources, and training programs and drills. Thus, to some 
extent, it was validated the representativeness of the sample in this study to reflect the status 
of the province.  
 
It was found that hospital disaster preparedness in Shandong province is close to Beijing (the 
capital city), and it is above the average level of preparedness in China, due to economic 
factors and other factors (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008). It is expected that hospital disaster 
ability in many other parts of China may lag well behind that of Shandong province. Thus, 
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understanding the status of hospital disaster resilience in this province can be used as the first 
step in planning effective hospital resilience.   
 
Shandong province is an area in China that is prone to various kinds of disasters. The most 
frequent disasters were floods and droughts in the history. Recently, the disaster of new 
epidemics (e.g., SARS, H7N5, and H9N7) has raised increased attention from the province 
government. Our survey revealed, the preparedness of hospitals in China especially for 
infectious diseases has improved significantly (Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Long 2007). 
These tertiary hospitals had devised disaster plans and command structures. Almost all of the 
surveyed hospitals possessed strategies to evacuate and protect existing patients when there is 
risk in hospitals. Most of them had syndromic surveillance systems. Many had different 
personal protective equipment and had relevant training programs. A large percentage of 
them had stockpiles of emergency drugs and resources and had the ability to accept more 
than 30 cases of infectious diseases within a short period.  
 
The results of this study also highlighted the following shortfall areas in current hospital 
disaster resilience in Shandong. Firstly, for disaster management mechanisms, in US, nearly 
67.9% had specific plans for all the essential individual hazards in 2008 (Niska and Shimizu 
2011b).Comparatively, disaster plans in this Province of China had less considerable scope 
for improving their preparedness for natural disasters (especially earthquakes and floods), 
biological, nuclear radiation and other terrorist attacks. This may be caused by the fact that, 
there were few earthquakes and bioterrorists occurred during this decade in Shandong 
Province. 
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Secondly, for disaster resources, simply stockpiling materials fails to achieve adequate 
hospital surge capacity, especially in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster. The community 
should have functional inter-hospital arrangements to share personnel and resources 
(Kaji,Koenig and Lewis 2007). In the US, nearly 87.8% of hospitals had MOUs with other 
hospitals to transfer general patients, 84.1% had contract with other agencies to share 
suppliers, and more than 70% of hospitals performed mass casualty drills with outside 
organizations (Niska and Shimizu 2011b). However, in the Province of China, less than half 
of the responding hospitals had signed contracts with drug-supplies, and less than one third 
had signed MOUs with other hospitals to share resources and staff. Also less than half had 
attended the local coordinating meeting, and only one fifth had attended community-wide 
drills. The lack of cross-institutional interaction and coordination would likely hinder the 
availability of resources in a community, and limit timely disaster response. 
 
Finally, continuity of medical care is amongst the most important objectives for prompt and 
effective response to emergencies. As the experience from developed courtiers, on-site rescue 
can be enhanced either through dispatched rescue teams (be equipped with living supplies for 
3 to 5 days and portable medical equipment)  and advanced ‘portable hospitals’ (be equipped 
with various functional vehicles that can be used for operating surgery, accepting patients, 
on-site command and communication and etc.) (Farmer and Carlton Jr 2006). However, there 
is still insufficiency of on-site medical rescue, especially a lack of “portability” of critical 
care service (i.e., patient transport and bringing care to the patient on-site). These two models 
of on-site rescue still need to be further developed, as they are scalable, mobile and can surge 
medical care service significantly even after catastrophic disasters, such as an earthquake 
(Farmer and Carlton Jr 2006). Additionally, medical care capability requires significant surge 
capacity during disasters, with a critical feature of hospital staffed beds (Kaji,Koenig and 
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Lewis 2007). In US, most hospitals had plans and flexible procedures for surging staffed beds 
(Niska and Shimizu 2011b). Also it has been surveyed that in the hospitals of Kentucky, the 
surge capacity equal to 27% of licensed beds (Higgins et al. 2004). However, in this study, 
only less than one fourth of responding hospitals had a wide variety of flexible procedures for 
surging their beds and emergency staff. The surge capacity within 24 hours is 12.52% of 
fixed beds, which is relatively low.  
 
Cohesive approaches have been identified using the evaluation framework and its key 
variables. They can be used by hospital managers and health authorities to enhance general 
practices to achieve effective disaster resilient. It also can used to assess hospitals, so as to 
identify the vulnerabilities and improve disaster capability further. These cohesive resilience 
approaches include:  
 
• Hospital safety: (1) Evaluation of locally prioritized hazards (e.g., floods, earthquakes, 
epidemics), and enforcement of safety standards that need to meet or exceed the local 
standards (Shuai,Yang and Jiang 2004; International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005b); 
(2) Evacuation plan in place and have special procedures to protect and evacuate vulnerable 
people when there is risk within the hospital.  
 
• Disaster management mechanisms: (3) The existence of disaster plans that have been 
developed in advance of a disaster, taking into consideration the communities’ resources, 
hazards and other unique factors (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; The United Nations Office for 
Disater Risk Reduction 2005b); (4) The establishment of a specific department to take 
responsibility of incident command and control, crisis communication and cooperation, and 
after-event recovery (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008); (5) Incorporation of the hospital into the 
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overall local disaster planning, including inter-facility cooperation and alternative plans to 
transfer patients to other hospitals if the hospital is partly destroyed or become unusable 
(Farmer and Carlton Jr 2006); 
 
• Disaster resources: (6) Stockpile of self-sufficient resources and emergency drugs for at least 
48 to 72 hours, so as to cope with major disasters initially (Schultz,Koenig and Noji 1996); (7) 
Establishment of MOUs with other hospitals for transferring patient and the sharing of 
staffing, equipment, and supplies (Kaji,Koenig and Lewis 2007); A community-wide, 
integrated, inter-agency network should be built, with local hospitals working together to 
surge overall capacity collectively (Auf der Heide 2006). 
 
• Emergency medical care capability: (8) Transportation of the medical staff or transferring 
patients to hospitals in a timely manner, and the provision of medical care service on site, 
which can be in the form of rescue teams or ‘portable hospital’ especially during catastrophic 
disasters (Farmer and Carlton Jr 2006); (9) Disaster surge planning should be devised in 
advance by adoption of  a wide variety of flexible strategies (e.g., disaster triage, ability to 
surge beds and staff, ability to transfer patients, early discharge of patients) for surging 
medical demands from wide-spread infectious diseases or mass casualty incidents (Hick et al. 
2004; Auf der Heide 2006; Niska and Shimizu 2011b); (10) Development of hospital internal 
conditions (e.g., space, beds, treatment protocols and on-call specialists) for treating patients 
according to type and magnitude of event(s) (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008); (11) Systematic 
and ongoing training and drill staff for emergency medical care skills, equipment usage and 
disaster management skills in high risk communities (Sapir and Panaccione 1992). 
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The current study has several limitations. Firstly, the likelihood of non-response bias was 
likely to exist. As a relatively larger percentage of tertiary A hospitals replied to the survey 
than the tertiary B and tertiary C hospitals. Although two reminders were sent to the hospital 
coordinators, there were still 9 hospitals who failed to attend the survey. The follow-up 
telephones demonstrated that they could not assign the responsible staff to fill the survey, or 
they are lack of relevant data. Thus it is very possible that the 41 participating hospitals may 
have relatively good backgrounds of disaster rescue than other 9 nonparticipation hospitals. 
Also, we suspect that the participating hospitals are better prepared in terms of disaster 
management than the non-participating hospitals. Secondly, due to the sample size (n=41), it 
was possible that not all the significant difference of the mean score of each domain was 
tested statistically between different hospital categories (as illustrated in Table 6-1). Despite 
the limitation, the sample accounted for 52.1% of total hospitals that the study targeted, and 
did get a response rate over 80%. Thirdly, as the findings are self-reported by the respondents 
there may be a bias in their reporting. While the inclusion of official documents from 
Provincial Health Bureaus may have encouraged respondents to complete survey, this may 
have also been interpreted as an official assessment, thus leading some hospital 
representatives to overestimate their capability. Finally, the study was undertaken only in one 
Province of China. And due to the limitation of funding and investigation time, stratified 
sampling was used in this study rather than investigating all the tertiary hospitals.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the framework presented was tested for its utility and thus was proved that it 
can assist hospitals to better understand what constitutes effective hospital resilience. The 
validated evaluation framework of hospital resilience can also assist hospitals to undertake a 
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self-analysis or audit of their current plans and capacity, and to use this information for future 
planning. This study has identified considerable variability in the scope of hospitals’ disaster 
resilience arrangements in Shandong China. The difference between tertiary A and tertiary B 
hospitals was also identified in essential areas. Clearly, more progress is still needed to 
improve hospital disaster resilience, especially the focus of community-wide disaster 
cooperation, on-site medical rescue, and hospital patient care surging capacity. It has been 
shown that hospitals need to take a more cohesive approach to be resilient in order to position 
themselves to be able to best cope with a potential disaster. 
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Part D: Discussion and conclusion 
Chapter 7  Conceptual understanding and development 
The previous chapters (Chapters 2–6) presented the main results of the thesis, as well as a 
discussion and conclusion for each study. Chapter 7 now turns to review the most important 
findings of the thesis and making it an integrated body of work. The chapter also highlights 
how the new framework, which was developed for further conceptualizing hospital disaster 
resilience, may contribute to the disaster literature and practice. 
 
7.1 General Discussion 
 
The general discussion addresses the key findings and research concepts, as well as the 
limitations of the study. 
 
7.1.1 Key findings from the thesis 
 
A number of authors (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and 
Bruneau 2010c; Zhong et al. 2013a) have noted the need for tools that can measure hospital 
resilience. However, there is little empirical evidence of the development and validation of 
hospital resilience evaluation instruments. Thus, this research seeks to bring together the 
various sources of information to identify the components of hospital resilience and develop 
and validate key measures of it, including the literature, the opinions of experts derived 
through a Modified-Delphi method, and the outcomes of the hospital surveys. Therefore, a 
sensible starting point is a working definition and a conceptual understanding of hospital 
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disaster resilience. The key findings from each study, presented in Chapters 2-6, are 
summarized in the following sections. 
 
The narrative literature review helped the researcher to form a clear understanding of hospital 
resilience, and to build a draft conceptual framework. Hospital resilience has previously been 
assessed by the criteria of: robustness (pre-event strength); redundancy of resources; 
resourcefulness (flexible) plans, procedures and strategies; and the rapidity of response and 
recovery. However, hospital resilience, ideally, should be incorporated into a continuum, 
including disaster prevention and preparation before an event, responsiveness during the 
event and recovery, and adaptation after the event. This new way of thinking about, or 
conceptualizing, hospital resilience places hospital disaster capabilities, management phases, 
and disaster outcomes together into a comprehensive holist view, using an integrated 
approach.  
 
The systematic literature review also identified potential measures for the evaluation of 
hospital disaster resilience. A preliminary three-layered evaluation framework, including 8 
domains, 21 sub-domains, and 50 indicators, was established, with potential measures 
derived from the relevant instruments. Next, a three-round Modified-Delphi study was 
conducted in an attempt to validate the content validity of the potential measures. The 
opinions of 33 experts, regarding the importance of these potential measures, were collected 
and analysed using a 5-point Likert scale. An agreement on the measures was seen as having 
occurred if at least 70% of the responders rated a measure as ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’. 
After the final consensus was determined, a large proportion of the measures were identified 
as having a ‘good’ potential for assessing hospital disaster resilience. As a result, a revised 
evaluation framework was developed, from the preliminary one, according to the experts’ 
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opinions. These measures were modified and developed into 8 domains, 17 sub-domains, and 
43 indicators. The framework was tested and validated by its application to tertiary hospitals 
in Shandong Province, China. 
 
A questionnaire, designed and based on the revised evaluation framework, formed the basis 
of the survey. The empirical data of the hospitals were used to support the construct validity 
and the internal reliability of the framework, and the derived instrument. The eight domains 
contained in the questionnaire were: (1) hospital internal safety (e.g., infrastructural safety 
and strategies for infectious diseases); (2) emergency leadership and cooperation; (3) disaster 
plan; (4) disaster stockpile and logistics management; (5) emergency staff; (6) emergency 
critical care capability; (7) training and drills; and (8) disaster recovery mechanisms. Using 
Factor Analysis, four significant component factors were extracted from the eight domains, 
namely: hospital emergency medical response capability (F1), disaster management 
mechanisms (F2), hospital safety (F3), and disaster resources (F4). Thus, the overall level of 
the hospital disaster resilience (F) can be calculated using the model: F= 0.606F1+ 0.203F2 
+0.104F3+ 0.087F4. A validated evaluation framework was developed from the revised 
framework, according to the four-factors structure.  
 
By adopting the same questionnaire, the current status of disaster resilience in tertiary 
hospitals in Shandong Province was explored. It validated the feasibility and utility of the 
evaluation framework. The result also revealed considerable variability in the breadth of the 
arrangements for hospital safety, disaster management mechanisms, disaster resources, and 
emergency medical capability. The coherent strategies were proposed in these vulnerable 
areas for hospital resilience in China.   
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7.1.2 Key research concepts 
 
The following key points and concepts were identified as the foundation to guide the 
conceptualization and evaluation of hospital resilience. 
1. The common characteristics of disaster resilience (Chapter 2): Resilience is the 
inherent and adaptive capacity to cope with future uncertainty, through multiple 
strategies, and using an all hazards approach (ZHONG,CLARK, et al. 2014).  
2. Working definition of hospital disaster resilience (Chapter 2): Hospital resilience 
has been defined as: the ability of hospitals to resist, absorb, and respond to the shock 
of disasters while maintaining and surging essential health services (e.g., on-site rescue, 
pre-hospital care, emergency medical treatment, critical care, decontamination and 
isolation), and then to recover to its original state or adapt to a new one (Zhong et al. 
2013a). More specifically, it is a capacity to limit the damage to critical infrastructure 
and functions (termed resistance); to mitigate the consequences by maintaining the 
most critical functions (called absorption and responsiveness); and speed-up the time 
for recovery to the pre-event state (termed recovery), or to a new state of function 
(termed adaptation). It focuses on hospital sustainability and an ability to remain 
functional and to meet the service demands for the affected community (Bruneau and 
Reinhorn 2007; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010b).  
3. The criteria of hospital resilience (4 R in Chapters 2 and 3): Hospital resilience 
involves robustness, redundancy, resourceful, rapidity (Cimellaro,Reinhorn and 
Bruneau 2010c; Bruneau and Reinhorn 2007; Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010b). 
4. The disaster management phases/cycles (PPRR in Chapters 2 and 3): Pre-event 
prevention, preparedness, event relief and responsiveness, and post-event recovery and 
adaptation (Devlen 2009) (Rogers 2011).  
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5. The draft conceptual model of hospital resilience (Chapter 2, Figure 2-3): Within 
this conceptual model (the round model), healthcare resilience can be assessed by 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. Healthcare resilience is a 
comprehensive concept which includes a complex of key domains, including 
vulnerability and safety, disaster resources and preparedness, continuity of essential 
medical service, and disaster recovery and adaptation. It should be achieved through a 
comprehensive continuous approach, including disaster preparation before an event, 
responsiveness during the event, and recovery and adaptation after the event. It should 
be noted that this early work produced an original draft framework that was then further 
developed and refined in this thesis (ZHONG,CLARK, et al. 2014).    
6. A preliminary framework for guiding the measurement of hospital resilience 
(Chapter 3, Figure 3-3): It is a similar round model developed from Figure 2-3. It 
indicated that key component parts of hospital resilience that can be assessed by the 
four criteria and can be integrated into the whole disaster management phases. There 
are eight (8) preliminary key components for proposing further measurements, 
including: hospital safety infrastructure and procedures, emergency leadership and 
cooperation, disaster plan, disaster resource stockpile, emergency staff capability, 
training and drills, essential health service maintenance and surge capability, and 
recovery and adaptation mechanisms. This framework was used to guide proposing 
potential measures of hospital resilience in the following chapters.  
7. The preliminary evaluation framework of hospital resilience (Tables 3-2 and 4-1): 
A three-layer preliminary hospital evaluation framework was derived from the 
systematic literature review. It has 8 key domains, 17sub-domains and 42 measurable 
indicators for further validation and development from empirical data;  
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8. The revised evaluation framework of hospital resilience (Chapter 4, Table 4- 3): 
The revised evaluation framework of hospital resilience was developed from the 
preliminary hospital evaluation framework through the Modified-Delphi study. It 
should be used to be tested by the hospital empirical data for further validation. 
9. Eight key domains (Chapter 5): The eight key domains included in the preliminary 
evaluation framework are: (1) hospital internal safety (e.g., infrastructural safety and 
strategies for infectious diseases); (2) emergency leadership and cooperation; (3) 
disaster plan; (4) disaster stockpile and logistics management; (5) emergency staff; (6) 
emergency critical care capability; (7) training and drills; and (8) disaster recovery 
mechanisms. 
10. The evaluation instrument (questionnaire) of hospital resilience (Chapter 5, 
Attachment I): A hospital survey questionnaire, the design of which was based on the 
framework to collect empirical data, comprises 166 detailed self-report questions. The 
first 5 questions are relevant to hospital characteristics; the remaining questions are 
used to measure the above 8 key domains, most of which were in the format of binary 
variables with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers (e.g., Is there any disaster plan?); 
11. The four-factorial structure of the framework of hospital resilience (Chapter 5): 
The four component factors of hospital resilience were extracted from the above 8 key 
domains using Factor Analysis. They can be used to reflect the overall level of hospital 
resilience, namely hospital safety and vulnerability (weight value=0.087), disaster 
resources (weight value=0.104), disaster management mechanisms (weight 
value=0.203), and emergency medical responsiveness capability (weight value=0.606). 
All factors have good internal consistency (Cronbach alpha=0.744). 
12. The validated evaluation framework of hospital resilience (Chapter 5, Table 5-3): 
Through analysing of the hospital empirical data, a validated evaluation framework was 
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further developed from the revised evaluation framework. The framework used the 
four-factorial structure to categorize the key indicators.  
13. Hospital disaster resilience scoring (Chapter 5): There are two ways of scoring. The 
first is the score scale for categorizing the level of hospital resilience without 
‘weighting’. It uses the questionnaire as a checklist to summarize the factors’ score for 
a hospital to self-evaluate its capability. The second is the regression modeling of 
different weights for each of the four component factors using hospital empirical data, 
in this case from China. It can be used to calculate and compare the overall resilience of 
hospitals at a regional or a district level. 
14. Coherent resilience approaches for practice (Chapter 6): The validated framework 
has been used to survey the status of tertiary hospitals in Shandong Province. The 
vulnerabilities and cohesive approaches were identified using the evaluation framework 
and its key variables. The key approaches were included in the four factors of hospital 
resilience, including hospital safety, disaster management mechanisms, disaster 
resources, and emergency medical care. These approaches can be used by hospital 
managers and health authorities to enhance hospital practices to achieve effective 
disaster resilient. 
15. The major challenges for improvement of the healthcare resilience in China 
(Chapter 8): The evaluation framework and its key themes were used to review the 
major challenges of health system resilience in China.These challenges refer to the 
barriers both internal of the healthcare organization, including: low standards of 
disaster-resistant infrastructure; the lack of specific disaster plans and portable 
diagnostic equipment; the insufficiency in triage skills, surge capacity, and 
psychological health management; and additional barriers that arise from the context of 
the health system in China, including fragmentation of emergency medical service 
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systems, the lack of specific emergency legislation, irrational funding distribution, and 
inadequate cost-effective considerations. 
16. The recommended strategies to improve healthcare resilience in China (Chapter 8): 
The above challenges can be addressed through policy strategies from different levels 
(e.g., community level, health system level, and national level). The policy implications 
should include: improvement of the local community’s preparedness, adaptation of 
flexible surge strategies, close coordination of medical rescue services, and appropriate 
education or training curricula. 
17. The novel understanding of disaster resilience, with four elements for 
operaionalisation of the concept (SFRA) (Chapter 7): Four key elements were 
adapted by the author from the present knowledge and findings. They are strength, 
flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability. It is hoped that these four elements can be 
used for the conceptualization of disaster resilience with a wider contextual application 
for various organizations other than hospitals. 
 
7.1.3 Limitations of the thesis 
 
There are several limitations of the current research. Firstly, the preliminary evaluation 
framework, derived from the international literature review, was validated through the 
Modified- Delphi Method of expert opinions in China. Thus, the framework would benefit 
from its further validation in different jurisdictions before being determined as broadly 
applicable. Secondly, the research was limited in its testing by the relatively small sample 
(n=41) of tertiary hospitals, in one province, which restricts the generalisability of the 
findings. Thus, the results may not be directly transferable to hospitals in other areas, other 
countries, or smaller facilities. The nature of this work can be considered as preliminary or 
exploratory and, consequently, the proposed framework would need to be adapted to specific 
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contexts, for example, in other areas or countries. Nevertheless, the methodological 
framework, and some of the agreed measures, may inform the measurement of hospital 
resilience in other facilities. Thirdly, most questions required a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, which is 
somewhat reminiscent of neurological physiology; such categorical data forces a yes or no 
response. Therefore, it may be beneficial to add further categories in order to examine 
gradations in the level of preparedness. Finally, the questionnaire tends to measure hospital 
resilience from different dimensions, with each dimension contributing different weights to 
the overall resilience. However, as the weight was calculated through the empirical data, in 
the future, it may be better to validate such data with experts’ opinions. 
 
7.2 A Novel Understanding and Application of Disaster Resilience 
 
After reviewing the most important findings of the thesis, new models and frameworks were 
developed for further conceptualizing hospital disaster resilience. These new models and 
frameworks may contribute to the disaster resilience literature and for a better understanding. 
 
7.2.1 A novel understanding for disaster resilience  
 
This new way of conceptualizing disaster resilience consists of strength and adaptability 
(McDaniels et al. 2008); it includes four criteria of disaster resilience: robustness; redundancy; 
resourcefulness; and rapidity (4R) (Bruneau et al. 2003); and it is linked to any organisation’s 
actions to cope with disasters, such as resistance, absorption, responsiveness, recovery, and 
adaptation (Zhong et al. 2013a). 
 
From the literature, it can be seen that there is no agreed definition of hospital resilience and 
little clarity around our understanding of what constitutes hospital resilience. Also, there are 
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conflicting perspectives, as would be expected in a new area of intellectual endeavour, and 
these perspectives all draw commentary. Some attempts have been made to describe the 
different aspects as elements. For example, the four criteria of disaster resilience (4R) were 
adapted into four elements (namely: strength, flexibility, responsiveness and adaptation 
(SFRA)) to further define and conceptualize hospital resilience (SZ and GF). To be more 
specific, robustness was defined as a descriptive of infrastructural strength (a physical 
construct), while resourcefulness is one aspect that can reflect the flexibility of disaster 
management strategies (a management construct). Rapidity describes the pace of the 
functional response and recovery (a functional construct), and redundancy is an effective way 
for organisations to adapt to a more risk environment, in the future (resources construct). 
These elements are also consistent with the four component factors for evaluating a hospital’s 
resilience (as discussed in Chapter 5), including: hospital safety and vulnerability, disaster 
resources, disaster management mechanisms, and emergency medical responsiveness 
capability.  
 
The relationships among these perspectives are illustrated in Figure 7-1. In the figure, the 
internal circle is the criteria of disaster resilience, and the middle circle is its key component 
parts, while the outside circle includes the four elements (SFRA: strength, flexibility, 
responsiveness and adaptation), which can be used to operationalise the definition.  
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Figure 7-1. Criteria, component parts and elements (SFRA) of disaster resilience [developed 
by authors (SZ and GF)] 
 
Strength, flexibility, responsiveness and adaptation (SFRA) are the key elements for 
understanding and applying the concept of disaster resilience; they can be linked to the 
continuum of disaster management through the ‘pre-event’, ‘during event’, and ‘post-event’ 
phases. Figure 7-2 extracts the key points for these elements, which are linked to the means 
of the assessment and, therefore, reinforce the integration between the assessment means and 
the management strategies.  
 
As the above illustrates, strength refers to the infrastructural robustness and safety of the 
environment to prevent disasters. Flexibility reflects the pre-event disaster management 
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procedures, such as resourceful plans and strategies. Responsiveness focuses on the 
organisation’s rapidity and capacity to maintain and surge the essential functions during the 
event. Adaptability is the post-event capability for organisations to recovery from disasters 
and adapt to a new environment. Adaptability can be achieved through providing redundancy 
of infrastructure, resources, and staff.  
 
As disaster resilience is a relatively new concept, and the focus of attention in this doctoral 
project, there is still no agreed to conceptual framework. It is hoped that these four elements 
(as shown in Fig 7-2) will be used for further conceptualization and operationalisation of 
disaster resilience within a wider group of organisations, apart from hospitals, such as media, 
business, or public institutions That is to say, the work may have broader applications to 
other industries and institutions. 
 
 
Figure 7-2. Key points for elements of disaster resilience (SFRA) (developed by the author) 
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7.2.2 A framework of disaster health management   
 
The classic disaster management cycle includes the PPRR (prevention, preparedness, 
responsiveness, recovery) phases for comprehensive management of disasters pre-event, 
during event, and post-event (Rogers 2011). There are several focal areas for enhancement of 
each disaster management phase, as illustrated in Figure 7-3. These key focus areas for the 
PPRR phases were adapted from the key domains and sub-domains of the evaluation 
framework of hospital resilience (see Chapter 6). For example, infrastructure safety, risk 
analysis, risk surveillance, staff and patient protection were the key areas for improving 
disaster prevention ability. An organisation’s effective preparedness needs a well-structural 
leadership, cooperation mechanisms, planning, operational procedures, and sufficient disaster 
resources. An effective responsiveness should achieve the goal of maintaining essential 
services, being able to surge capacity to meet any change in disaster demand, and being able 
to evacuate people when there is an internal risk. Regular disaster training and drills, and the 
improvement of key staff capability, are also essential factors to improve response capability. 
After the event, the recovery, rebuild, evaluation and adaptation are the most important 
activities for an organisation to recover from the disaster and to be able to successfully face 
future disasters.  
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Figure 7-3. Focus areas for health disaster management phases (PPRR) (developed by the 
author) 
 
7.2.3 A novel disaster resilience cycle 
 
As analysed above, and shown in Figure 3-2, the four elements of disaster resilience (SFRA) 
are also integrated into a continuum disaster management phases (PPRR). Thus, it is essential 
to instil disaster resilience into disaster management phases (PPRR) to form a disaster 
resilience cycle. Figure 7-4 illustrates the disaster resilience cycle, which incorporates 
strength, flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptation (SFRA), and can be used to form a 
comprehensive or holistic view for continuous improvement of resilience through pre-event, 
during event, and post-event disaster management phases (PPRR). Of particular note, the 
time period between the pre-event and during event is the phase for awareness and readiness. 
Therefore, to improve preparedness and resilience, most of the strategies should be 
undertaken during this phase.   
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Figure 7-4. Disaster resilience cycle (the relationship between disaster management phases 
and disaster resilience elements) [developed by the authors (SZ and GF)] 
 
In the current study, a metric (as shown in Table 7-1) was developed with the basic items 
being reconstructed from the sub-domains of the evaluation framework for hospital resilience 
(Table 6-3 in Chapter 6). Table 7-1 was developed from Table 3-3 (in Chapter 3), with the 
validated items that could be categorised into the new concept of the hospital resilience cycle. 
Thus, the measurable indicators of resilience are divided into four key elements: strength, 
flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptation (SFRA), in order to form a continuous phase to 
improve resilience. This new metric will also contribute to the operationalisation of the 
concept of hospital resilience.   
 
 Chapter 7: General Discussion—Conceptual issues Page 160 
 
 
Table 7-1. Developed metric of hospital resilience cycle (SFRA): key elements and 
underpinned items (developed by the author) 
Hospital resilience measures divided by key elements 
Strength  Flexibility Responsiveness Adaptation 
prevention preparedness responsiveness recovery 
Pre-event  During event Post-event 
• The safety 
standard for 
hospital critical 
infrastructures  
• Evaluation of 
hospital risks 
and 
vulnerabilities  
• Surveillance 
• The strategy to 
evacuate and 
protect existing 
patients 
• The stockpile of 
emergency 
resources and 
medications 
• Equipment for 
on-site rescue, 
referral of 
special patients 
and 
communication  
• Emergency 
medical 
treatment 
equipment, place 
and conditions 
• Plans for 
different single 
risks 
• The staff 
coverage of 
disaster plans 
within hospitals 
• Different and 
flexible 
responsive 
procedures for 
different disaster 
levels and phases 
• Alternative 
emergency 
energy, and 
facilities for 
backup  
• The command 
and control 
committee 
leadership  
• The crisis 
cooperation 
within hospitals  
• Cooperation 
with community 
facilities  
• The rapidity for staff, 
equipment to be in 
place when initiating 
the plan  
• Hospital internal rapid 
assessment 
• Hospital mass-
casualty triage 
protocol 
• The procedures to 
identify, prioritize, 
and maintain essential 
functions 
• Surge capacity of 
emergency space, 
resources, and staff 
• Staff capability of 
emergency expert 
groups and expatriate 
teams  
• Staff protection and 
resilient support  
• Emergency training 
and drills 
 
 
• The period of 
evaluating and 
revising the plan 
• Alternative 
emergency energy 
and facilities for 
backup 
• Hospital 
reconstruction and 
recovery 
mechanisms and 
strategies  
• Strategies for 
community health 
recovery  
• The content of the 
evaluation report  
• The adaptation 
strategies after 
disasters 
 
 
7. 3 Summary of the Developing Logic of Discovery  
 
The above section outlines the development of the results towards a novel conceptual 
framework for a better understanding of hospital resilience and its broader application. The 
developing logic of the discoveries in the study is consistent with the progress of answers to 
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the research questions, and need to be summarised. Table 7-2 highlights how the research 
questions of the thesis were answered, and also provides a summary of the developing logic 
of the discovery.  
 
Table 7-2. Research questions addressed by the thesis and the logic of discovery 
 
Research Question One: 
What is the definition of hospital disaster resilience?  
• In Chapter 2, a narrative literature review was used to form a clear understanding of the 
characteristics of hospital resilience; then it was used to form a working definition. It 
attempted to propose the concept of hospital resilience (hospital core ability to cope with 
disasters) through integrating comprehensive continuous management phases. 
Research Question Two: 
What does hospital resilience look like conceptually (its components, key criteria and key 
domains)? 
• In Chapter 2, a narrative literature review was used to form a preliminary conceptual 
model for a clear understanding of hospital resilience. Hospital resilience can be assessed 
by four criteria: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. 
• In Chapter 3, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify potential measures 
for inclusion in a preliminary evaluation framework of hospital disaster resilience.  
• Chapter 7 reviewed the most important findings of the thesis, integrated the body of work, 
and discussed how to draw together the research findings and the criteria towards a novel 
conceptual understanding and broader application. There are four key elements for the 
conceptualization of disaster resilience (SRFA): organization pre-event strength, disaster 
responsiveness, organization flexibility, and adaptation to cope with disasters.  
 Chapter 7: General Discussion—Conceptual issues Page 162 
 
 
Research Question Three: 
What does an evaluation framework of hospital resilience look like and what are the key 
measures that together can describe the level of resilience? 
Research Question Four: 
Is the evaluation framework valid and practical for use in China? 
• Chapter 3 distils the concepts and the measures identified in the literature into a 
preliminary evaluation framework which forms the basic logic for the primary data 
collection and analysis. Through extracting and synthesizing the potential measures from 
the literature, a comprehensive preliminary evaluation framework was constructed to 
integrate 8 domains, 21 sub-domains, and 50 potential measures.  
• In Chapters 4-6, this research presented seeks to return to the initial sources of 
information through a Modified-Delphi study and a hospital survey of China and, thus, 
identify the key components, and develop and validate the key measures of hospital 
resilience. Through this process, an evaluation framework was developed from the 
preliminary framework; it was revised, and finally transformed, into the validated 
evaluation framework. 
• A three-round Modified-Delphi study was conducted, first, to define a three-layered 
revised evaluation framework from the preliminary one; the key measures were 
developed into 8 domains, 17 sub-domains, and 43 indicators.  
• A hospital survey was conducted in tertiary hospitals of the Shandong Province of China. 
The empirical data was used to support the construct validity and the internal reliability of 
the revised evaluation framework and the derived instrument. As a result, a validated 
evaluation framework was developed using Factor Analysis. Four component factors 
were extracted from the above 8 domains: hospital emergency medical response 
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capability (F1), disaster management mechanisms (F2), hospital safety (F3), and disaster 
resources (F4). Thus, the overall level of hospital disaster resilience (F) could be 
calculated using the model: F= 0.606F1+ 0.203F2 +0.104F3+ 0.087F4. The result also 
validated the feasibility of the validated evaluation framework using the sample hospital.  
Research Question Five: 
How to improve healthcare disaster resilience in China? 
• Chapter 8 uses the validated evaluation framework as a guide to identify the major 
challenges, and discusses implications for further improvement of the resilience of the 
healthcare system in China. However, there remain challenges to the healthcare 
organizations, with additional challenges arising from the context. These challenges could 
be addressed through policy strategies at different levels.  
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Chapter 8 The progress, challenges and implications for China 
 
Note: the essence of this chapter has been under review: Zhong S, 
Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, FitzGerald G. Progress and Challenges 
of Disaster Health Management in China: A Scoping Review. Global 
Health Action (in press) 
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8.1 Introduction   
 
The previous chapter discussed the issues that have arisen from conceptual understandings of 
disaster resilience, while this chapter discussed the findings from a practical perspective in 
China.  
 
As introduced in the previous chapters, during disasters, the healthcare system becomes a 
high profile element, critical to the immediate health response and recovery phase. The 
system can be directly subject to the consequences of the disaster, yet at the same time, the 
system can expected to have the capacity to surge in response to the sudden increases in the 
demand associated with the disasters (Sauer et al. 2009; Zhong et al. 2013a). The system can 
be viewed as community infrastructure essential to the life preserving frontline response, as 
they provide continuous health care (Barbera,Yeatts and Macintyre 2009). Disaster health 
management is fast becoming a unique specialty around the world, with its governing 
theories and principles (Koenig and Schultz 1994). It describes the essential phases of 
disaster management to improve the effectiveness of the disaster health response using the 
‘PPRR’ continuum of prevention and mitigation (P), preparation and planning (P), response 
and relief (R), and recovery (R) (Heath 1998; Schipper and Pelling 2006). The ultimate goal 
of disaster health management is to reduce the impact of disasters on human health and 
wellbeing, by providing urgent health interventions and ongoing health care, during and after 
disasters (Razzak and Kellermann 2002; Sauer et al. 2009). 
 
Most previous research has focused on the health system’s disaster management (disaster 
health management), or the capability to supply medical services during disasters, mainly in 
high-income countries, such as the United States of America (US) ( !!! INVALID 
CITATION !!!). However, there is little available information from low-income and middle-
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income countries (Razzak and Kellermann 2002). China, one such country, has been severely 
afflicted by multiple kinds of disasters, including natural and manmade disasters and 
pandemics of infectious diseases (Center For Strategic and International Studies 2009a; 
China - Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) 2008). To date, disaster management 
research into the health system on mainland China is in its infancy. While many studies have 
been published, in the Chinese language, in national medical journals, they often lack 
scientific rigor (e.g., inappropriate study design, and the lack of empirical data). Further, only 
a small number of investigators have published their studies in peer reviewed international 
journals. Additionally little research has been undertaken into the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the current disaster arrangements. Thus, there is still an opportunity for 
researchers to share China’s experience with international communities about the impact that 
disasters have on the health response systems. Hence, it is essential to identify the full extent 
of the challenges that confront China in order to gain an understanding of those areas that 
require policy improvement, as well as to identify strategies into the future. These challenges 
can also be used in a comparison with some high-income countries (e.g., US) and, so, identify 
the gaps and priorities for further disaster health management.  
 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the status of disaster health management in 
China. It has several objectives: (1) to identify the progress or current status of disaster 
management of the healthcare system in China; (2) to identify current challenges; (3) to 
discuss future strategies to overcome these challenges; and (4) to identify future research 
directions. The ‘PPRR’ disaster management continuum can be used to identify the progress 
and the challenges within each management phase. Then corresponding strategies are 
proposed to promote the overall effectiveness of the health system response during and after 
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major disasters and to reduce disaster-related mortality and morbidity by providing 
continuous healthcare.  
 
The previous chapters have established and validated an evaluation framework of hospital 
resilience and adapted it to survey the status of tertiary hospitals in Shandong Province in 
China. The previous established framework and its key indicators (Chapter 5, Table 5-3) 
were used as a guiding framework for analysis of relevant literature to identify major 
challenges of disaster management of healthcare system in China. Relevant literature in 
English and Chinese were selected through the search of accessible electronic databases. 
 
The research inclusion criteria were: (1) journal articles, governmental and institutional 
reports written in English or Chinese in the last two decades; (2) studies comprising relevant 
evaluations of the status or description of the progress and challenges of disaster management 
(i.e., disaster prevention, preparedness, responsiveness, and recovery) of the healthcare 
system in China; and (3) other jurisdictions that had direct relevance to disaster health 
management in China (e.g., disaster healthcare management, disaster medical responses, 
emergency medical care, and emergency healthcare systems). 
 
The research exclusion criteria were: (1) studies that only focused on disaster management of 
specific healthcare systems of other countries, without any implications to China; and (2) 
studies with no detailed evaluations or descriptions that could assist in informing the 
identification or description of the progress and challenges of disaster health management in 
China. 
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8.2 Progress of Disaster Health Management in China 
 
Over the last decade, China has witnessed a series of major disasters and, as a consequence, 
the ability of the health system to respond to disasters has been improved significantly. Many 
of the changes have from lessons learnt from these disasters and are an attempt to succeed 
better into the future. Firstly, in response to the 2003 SARS crisis, the government acted to 
improve the prevention and management of infectious diseases. These initiatives included: 
the establishment of a national infectious disease surveillance system and independent 
infectious disease hospitals, improved isolation facilities in Emergency Departments (ED), 
and upgrading the isolation wards, as well as the upgraded training and improved monitoring 
of hospital staff in infection-control procedures, and hospital compliance with the use of 
personal protection equipment (Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Ling 2007; Li,Huang and 
Zhang 2008; Chan-Yeung 2004).  
 
A national integrated emergency response system has also been developed and promoted. 
China’s National Committee for Disaster Reduction (NCDR) was established in 2005 as the 
state inter-agency coordination body. It composes 34 ministries and departments, as well as 
military agencies and social groups (China - Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) 2008). 
The integrated system seeks to ensure the effective management of resources and rescue 
forces from different facilities throughout China (Deng,Zheng and Shi 2010).  
 
Additionally, there has been an integration of military medical resources into the disaster 
management system. The army hospitals have the advantage of: intrinsic infrastructure, well-
trained staff, modern equipment, and communications and transportation systems (Jiang et al. 
1996; Hung et al. 2009). In 2010, China began establishing 22 medical emergency teams 
across the country to respond to different disasters, most from military hospitals (Ouyang 
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2013). They were fully equipped with portable medical equipment and independent living 
supplies, so that they do not need to use local supplies, and could provide healthcare services 
by establishing temporary field hospitals, transferring and accepting patients, or providing 
expert rescue teams on-site (Parker 2006; Ouyang 2013).  
 
Despite this progress, there remain challenges that hinder efficient disaster health 
management in China. Such challenges have been caused, in the main, because the country is 
still in the early stages, or infancy, of health disaster management development (Li,Huang 
and Zhang 2008). These challenges were identified and extracted from the literature; they are 
described in detail below.   
8.3 Challenges of Disaster Health Management in China 
   
8.3.1 Health infrastructural safety 
 
The 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction endorsed a number of policies to ensure 
that “all new hospitals are built with a level of resilience that strengthens their capacity to 
remain functional in disaster situations (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005b; 
Pan American Health Organization 2005b).” However, no standard has been endorsed or 
enforced so that the healthcare facilities would resist natural disasters. For example, the 
health facilities in the western and rural areas, which are earthquake prone, rarely comply 
with the standards of construction required to resist natural disasters (Zhang et al. 2012). The 
2008 Sichuan earthquake caused the collapse of 67.5% of the healthcare buildings in the 
worst affected areas (Chan 2008). As a consequence, a large proportion of the county 
hospitals were destroyed, and a number of the township hospitals and village clinics required 
temporary facilities to support their ongoing critical roles (You,Chen and Yao 2009). 
Importantly, disaster-resilient infrastructure is a primary guarantee for health care 
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organisations to maintain their functions during disasters; they achieve this outcome through 
being able to resist and absorb the disaster impacts on physical facilities. Thus, in China, the 
low standard of disaster-resilient infrastructure is the first challenge or barrier to the efficient 
disaster response, namely, the maintenance and supply of healthcare services (Zhong et al. 
2013a). 
 
8.3.2 Disaster preparedness  
  
An effective disaster response can be achieved only through sufficient preparedness before 
the occurrence of any disasters (Zhong et al. 2013b; Arbon 2009). However, several hospital 
evaluation surveys revealed that China was still at the early stages of developing hospital 
emergency preparedness (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Ling 
2007; Yantao 2011a). For instance, in many provinces, hospitals do not have specific disaster 
plans for unusual natural disasters, novel infectious diseases, or terrorism attacks (particularly 
attacks involving biological, nuclear, and radiation) (Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Ling 
2007; Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; Zhong,Hou, et al. 2014). For example, the health facilities 
in many regions have a low level of some essential preparedness aspects, such as: disaster 
vulnerability analysis, disaster stockpiles, and coordination with other institutions, emergency 
training in disaster first-aid, and the use of specialized supplies (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; 
Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Ling 2007; Yantao 2011a; Zhong,Hou, et al. 2014).Western 
and rural area hospitals are even less well prepared, having lower proportions of these 
essential aspects (Ali 2001; You,Chen and Yao 2009a; Chan 2008). 
 
The availability of medical devices and equipment, especially the miniaturization and 
portability of medical devices, are crucial for the initial disaster medical response, as well as 
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for the onsite rescue (Ma,Norvell and Subramanian 2007). For instance, portable kidney 
doppler ultrasonography devices are effective for the initial diagnoses and triage during mass 
casualty disasters (Ma,Norvell and Subramanian 2007). However, there are still inadequate 
portable medical devices in China. As happened during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, an 
enormous amount of hospital equipment was unavailable in the hardest hit areas, with the 
larger equipment not being appropriate for onsite triage and treatment. Further, during this 
event, most of the rescue teams were not prepared; they did not have portable radiography 
machines or ultrasonography facilities (Zhang et al. 2012). Such inadequacy may impede the 
ability of the rescue teams to provide first-line medical treatment during future natural 
disasters (Xiang et al. 2009). 
 
8.3.3 Disaster medical response capability 
 
A rapid and effective medical response by the local health services can be seen as the front-
line of rescue. This response is critical to facilitating the process of field triage, transport and 
transfer, as well as rescue, thus, ensuring the rational allocation of healthcare resources 
during disasters (Schultz,Koenig and Noji 1996). Currently, several aspects crucial to 
effective health responses are still inadequate. The establishment of the triage criteria, based 
on the severity of the disaster and the availability of the health resources, is central to 
improving the healthcare capacity during disasters (Chan 2008; Nie et al. 2011). A simple 
triage and rapid treatment (START) method was established after the Wenchuan earthquake 
to facilitate site triage and injury classification (Nie et al. 2011). However, a standard triage 
procedure and guidelines have not been fully adopted in China. Instead, most hospitals had to 
adopt disaster triage procedures from the general procedures used in the Emergency 
Department (Nie et al. 2011; Xiang et al. 2009). 
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The skill of the emergency staff in disaster management, such as disaster triage skills, were 
also found to be wanting, mainly due to the lack of targeted and proper disaster education and 
training programs. For example, the literature revealed that a large proportion of the doctors 
had not received formal training in triage and, thus, rely on their own judgment, which might 
cause bias, or a delay in treatment, or the wasting of scarce resources (Nie et al. 2011; Xiang 
et al. 2009). Additionally, medical students also fail to receive appropriate disaster training. 
They acquire their training and skills in the inpatient wards of large tertiary care hospitals, in 
urban areas, where the emphasis is on making the right diagnosis rather than on the principles 
of triage and emergency management (Macfarlane,Racelis and Muli-Muslime 2000).  
 
To be effective, it is essential that hospitals surge their patient-care capacity in the short 
period of time after a disaster (e.g., within 24-72 hours) (Barbisch and Koenig 2006; 
Kaji,Koenig and Bey 2006; Katz,Staiti and McKenzie 2006). However, the Chinese disaster 
surge capacity is still low compared with other countries, such as the US (Zhong,Hou, et al. 
2014). As revealed by previous research, most secondary and tertiary hospitals in Beijing 
acknowledged that they had insufficient surge (extra) beds to meet demands during disasters, 
such as an epidemic of infectious disease. The surge beds accounted for only 8.5% of all the 
fixed beds after the SARS crisis in 2004 (Hui,Jian-Shi,Xiong,Peng and Da-Ling 2007). In 
2012, only 65.9% of the tertiary hospitals in Shandong Province were able to surge patient-
care beds, with the total surge capacity being 12.52%, within 24 hours (Zhong,Hou, et al. 
2014). There are two main reasons for this low surge capacity. Firstly, there was a lack of a 
hospital surging plan that used flexible surging strategies during disasters (Hick et al. 2004; 
Barbisch and Koenig 2006; Kaji,Koenig and Bey 2006; Hick,Barbera and Kelen 2009; 
Bonnett et al. 2007). For instance, in 2012, only 53.7% of the tertiary hospitals in the 
Shandong Province had surging plans; only 36.6% adopted a variety of flexible procedures 
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for surging their beds (e.g., through the early discharge of patients, the cancellation of 
elective admissions, or the transfer of patients). Secondly, the health system was already 
under increased pressure from the growing daily demand (Center For Strategic and 
International Studies 2009b; Hou and FitzGerald 2008; Ali 2001). This human resource 
shortage compounded the limited surge capacity during disasters. As noted earlier, during the 
2008 earthquake, the local healthcare workers were overwhelmed by the large number, and 
severity, of casualties (Ouyang 2013).  
 
8.3.4 Disaster recovery  
 
When the acute phase of a disaster ends, the challenge moves to sustaining long-term 
rehabilitation for the population, particularly those with disabilities and chronic disease 
(Yaojun and An 2007; Zhong et al. 2013b). The psychological intervention guidelines for 
public emergencies were issued by the Ministry of Health; it stipulated two phases for 
psychological interventions. The first phase, the acute phase, occurs when general 
psychological counselling is used to reduce the incidence of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
The second phase, the chronic phase, occurs when psychological interventions are focused on 
issues associated with depression (Zhang et al. 2012). However, such interventions are still 
inadequate for the treatment of large numbers of victims with psychological problems, or 
with the potential for psychological problems that arise during disasters (Udomratn 2008). 
 
Two factors underpin this inadequacy. First, psychological problems have become common 
especially during natural disasters and widespread infectious disease outbreaks. The 
psychological problems affect both the victims and the rescuers (Udomratn 2008; Mollica et 
al. 2004). However, this awareness has not received the same emphasis that physical illnesses 
and injuries have received.  
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Second, the local medical staff have not been well trained in managing severe psychological 
effects, even in disaster prone areas (You,Chen and Yao 2009a; Udomratn 2008). Further, 
there has been a nationwide shortage of senior experienced doctors and mental health 
professionals, which contributes to a lack of sensitivity to patients’ psychological needs, and 
impedes the supply of post disaster psychosocial interventions (Chan 2008; Udomratn 2008). 
The shortage became apparent during the Wenchuan earthquake, when there were insufficient 
professionals in the local area and they were not able to be dispatched at short notice to 
respond to these psycho social problems (Chan 2008). 
 
8.3.5 Supporting systems 
 
(1) Fragmentation of emergency health service system:  
The pre-hospital emergency service is arguably the least developed aspect of the emergency 
medical service system. There are large variations in the structure of the pre-hospital 
emergency service across China (Hung et al. 2009). Some large cities have independent pre-
hospital emergency service, while others rely on hospitals (Hung et al. 2009). Hence, the 
roles of hospital emergency departments and emergency service centers overlap in some big 
cities, such as Beijing and Shenyang (Hung et al. 2009). However, there is no official 
guideline, protocol or legal standard for patient management and transfer between these two 
sectors. During disasters, the independence of these two sectors has had the tendency to lead 
to inefficiencies and the wastage of valuable resources (Hung et al. 2009; Ali 2001). In most 
regions, pre-hospital emergency services lack effective cooperation with the fire and police 
departments; such lack of cooperation may result in the loss of precious rescue time for 
advanced pre-hospital medical care.  
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(2) Lack of specific emergency legislation:  
In China, the legal foundation for disaster management has been established through the ‘Act 
on Tackling Emergency Affairs (2007)’ (Tao 2011; Yi and Yan 2012). The document is not, 
however, specific enough to be implemented in the local area. Additionally, there are 
numerous legal obstacles hindering appropriate disaster health management. 
Firstly, there is a lack of a guaranteed reimbursement back to the disaster healthcare services; 
this lack of reimbursement may encourage perverse financial disincentives. This situation 
may effectively discourage hospitals from becoming involved in disaster preparedness (Yi 
and Yan 2012). Without legal guarantees, few insurance companies will accept insurance for 
health staff working in the disaster areas (Lin and Hong-mei 2009). Additionally, the 
responsibility and authority of the different levels of government, the army facilities, and the 
non-governmental organizations are not clearly defined within the law. This lack of legal 
clarification may impede the formulation of an integrated response system for disaster 
command, control and cooperation (Liu 2004) and, for non-profit organizations, may cause 
chaos during disasters (Zhang et al. 2012). For instance, without a legal system to recruit and 
coordinate the volunteers, during the Lushan earthquake in 2013, the individual volunteers 
and unauthorized organizations entering the disasters area it resulted in road congestion and, 
even, unnecessary casualties (Ouyang 2013). Further, without legal enforcement to release 
details of the usage of donations to the public, embezzlement of the donations for the 
Wenchuan earthquake occurred. This event caused a credibility crisis for the public in regard 
to the donations given to the government-organized NGOs (Non-Governmental 
Organizations) (Ouyang 2013). 
 
(3) Disparities in funding distribution:  
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The funding gaps and disparities in the distribution are the major challenges for healthcare 
organizations that provide medical care during disaster response (Liu 2004). The first 
disparity occurs between the urban and rural area funding. For example, healthcare resources, 
modern healthcare facilities, and physicians are, in the main, concentrated in the urban areas 
(Razzak and Kellermann 2002; Ali 2001). There is also a tension between the allocation of 
resources for the immediate day-to-day needs and for disaster preparedness. Further, the 
investments put towards the improvement of emergency preparedness may compromise other 
more urgent programs, such as primary healthcare in rural and western areas (Razzak and 
Kellermann 2002). In addition, most funding was being used for the reimbursement of actual 
expenses after disasters. The 2008 government finance report indicated that most government 
funding was used for Wenchuan earthquake rescue [the central government has invested 38.4 
billion RMB (about US$6.28 billion)] compared with the earthquake relief and preparedness 
[2.4 billion RMB (about US$0.4 billion)]. Finally, since the health system reform were 
introduced in the 1980s, healthcare organizations have turned their attention to revenue-
generating services (Center For Strategic and International Studies 2009b). As a result, 
hospitals and professionals can be paid significantly more for their clinical services than their 
disaster related work (Center For Strategic and International Studies 2009b). Thus, without 
sufficient financial allocations, the motivation of hospitals to improve disaster preparedness 
will likely remain low.  
 
(4) Inadequate cost-effective considerations:  
The cost-effectiveness of disaster management is easily neglected, especially during 
catastrophic disasters (Arbon 2010). When the disaster occurs the decisions about who and 
what to send to the disaster zone might be determined by dogma, rather than by scientific 
analysis (You,Chen and Yao 2009a). For instance, a large number of search and rescue teams 
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are dispatched to the disaster zone during natural disasters for the purpose of moral 
inspiration (You,Chen and Yao 2009a). However, if there is an oversupply of search and 
rescue teams, the influx of too many teams may become a burden on the limited supplies for 
victims, such as food, shelter, sanitation, and healthcare services (You,Chen and Yao 2009a). 
Occasionally, outside aid agencies have been known to rush manpower, equipment, and 
supplies to the disaster area, regardless of the local requirements and without coordination 
with other organizations’ plans and resources; this situation may lead to the waste of 
resources and even low efficiency (You,Chen and Yao 2009a; Ouyang 2013). 
 
8.4 Implications to Overcome the Challenges  
 
The current chapter has revealed that healthcare facilities’ preparedness for disasters is 
challenged by the resilience of the infrastructure safety, the disaster plan, and disaster 
resourcing and funding. To enhance local disaster preparedness, multiple strategies need to be 
adopted.  
 
Firstly, the locally prioritized hazards need to be evaluated, while strict structural standards 
need to be enforcement; these aspects are essential for reducing casualties from disasters 
(Shuai,Yang and Jiang 2004; International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005a). For 
example, in the hardest-hit area of the Lushan earthquake, 96.32% of the public buildings, 
built after the Wenchuan earthquake, were able to be used; thus, the new structural standards 
reduced the impact of the disaster on human health and wellbeing (Ouyang 2013). Secondly, 
operational disaster plans for healthcare facilities need to be devised, in advance. 
Additionally, they need to take into consideration the communities’ resources, hazards and 
other unique factors (Li,Huang and Zhang 2008; The United Nations Office for Disater Risk 
Reduction 2005a). Thirdly, healthcare organizations need to have the capacity to be self-
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sufficient for the first 48 to 72 hours; this disaster coping capacity is essential as it may take 
this long for supplies to be delivered from the outside (Schultz,Koenig and Noji 1996). 
Fourthly, non-governmental mutual assistance, as well as a social insurance mechanism, need 
to be strengthened to decrease the gap between the governmental funding and the cost for the 
disaster relevant works (Su and Liu 2008 ; The United Nations Office for Disater Risk 
Reduction 2005a). Finally, the limited funds need to be allocated to the local primary 
healthcare centers and hospitals that demonstrate adequate capability to be the first disaster 
responders (Barbera,Yeatts and Macintyre 2009). 
 
The chapter also revealed that research on surge capacity exists in developed countries, such 
as the US; however, its concept and strategies have not been fully adopted in the Chinese 
context. Nevertheless, some international surge strategies would appear to have the potential 
to be adapted into the Chinese disaster planning environment, namely: firstly, providing staff 
with onsite accommodation, and the training of nonclinical staff to support the fully trained 
staff (Kaji and Lewis 2006; Toner and Waldhorn 2006); secondly, cancelling elective surgery 
to minimize the alternative sources for critical care (Kaji and Lewis 2006), triage the 
resources, and provide patients with adjusted standards of healthcare during the period of the 
disaster (Wise 2006; Challen et al. 2007); thirdly, converting non-clinical areas for surging 
clinical space (prepared in advance, with available power, water, oxygen, equipment and 
telecommunication) (Kaji and Lewis 2006; Sprung et al. 2010; Gomersall et al. 2006); 
fourthly, early discharging stable inpatients or referring them to ancillary healthcare services 
(e.g., nursing homes, primary healthcare centers) (Kaji and Lewis 2006; Sprung et al. 2010; 
Gomersall et al. 2006); and, finally, obtaining cooperative agreements with other facilities 
and off-site hospitals (Hick et al. 2004; Kaji and Lewis 2006). Such considerations would 
assist China in surging its capacity during times of disaster. 
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In China, psychological interventions, triage skills and other disaster management skills are 
limited by insufficient education in disaster management. Thus, appropriate education or 
training curricula need to be developed and implemented to address these issues, in the long 
term (The United Nations Office for Disater Risk Reduction 2005a; FitzGerald et al. 2010). 
These disaster management courses need to be available for hospital professionals as part of 
their ongoing professional development. Systematic and continuing training of staff for 
disaster skills and equipment usage should be conducted in high risk communities (Sapir and 
Panaccione 1992). For instance, staff should be trained in how to triage a large number of 
patients and triage limited resources during disasters. The training programs used in other 
countries could be implemented, modified to fit the Chinese environment, as necessary. The 
American Medical Association has developed two courses that have this potential, but which 
are largely directed to the initial triage and management in the field and in the emergency 
department, namely: the Basic Disaster Life Support course, and the Advanced Disaster Life 
Support course (Parker 2006).  
 
Currently, the fragmentation, or lack, of the coordination of the emergency systems in China 
hinders efficient disaster management. The close coordination of the medical rescue services 
(e.g., government and non-government, domestic and international) is essential to overcome 
this challenge (The United Nations Office for Disater Risk Reduction 2005a). Such 
cooperative channels should include: strengthening effective cooperation from pre-hospital 
centers, hospital emergency departments, and fire and police departments (Hou and 
FitzGerald 2008); establishing a unified command and information platform for 
governmental agencies, national delegations, and nongovernmental organizations (Liu 2004; 
The United Nations Office for Disater Risk Reduction 2005a); and, finally, strengthening 
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nongovernmental organizations, particularly their management of volunteers. A system 
similar to the US national verification system to enable or facilitate the quick identification, 
recruitment and coordination of medical volunteers is worth consideration (Sauer et al. 2009).  
 
8.5 Future Research Directions   
 
 
Based on this chapter, a number of research questions have been proposed with the aim of 
providing scientific evidence as the basis for disaster health management in China and 
facilitating policy-making that would overcome future challenges. These questions are listed 
below: 
 
Q 1: How can the new concept of ‘disaster preparedness’ and ‘surge capacity’ be best 
implemented to prepare the local health system as the first disaster responder and integrate 
the health system into the local planning network?  
 
Q 2: Can user-friendly and validated tools be developed to evaluate hospital capability to 
cope with disasters? In order to evaluate the hospitals’ actual ability to cope with disasters, 
the relevant validated evaluation tools will need to be tested during disaster simulations to 
identify the beneficial factors. Hence, the tools can be used to monitor and analyze hospital 
response performance through the disaster drills.  
 
Q 3: How can the research-to-policy interface be bridged? For example, can context-specific 
domestic disaster guidelines or plans be formulated to encourage vulnerable healthcare 
organizations to take adequate actions before or during disasters? Can a minimum number of 
items be identified that should be stored in emergency departments and which take into 
account specific regional and geographic needs and resources.  
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Q 4: How can evidence-based research be used to determine and specify whether the levels of 
ability are linked to a desirable outcome, and is the outcome regarded as adequate? For 
example, in terms of surge capacity, the thresholds for the extent of, and rapidity for, surge 
capacity should be investigated with considerations being given to different regional 
conditions.8.6 Strengths  
 
Several contributions have been made, by this chapter, to the broader body of knowledge. 
Firstly, the chapter identified, comprehensively, the challenges of disaster health management 
in China; this outcome was achieved through the extraction of relevant information from the 
literature, in both the English and Chinese language. Indeed, the topic was revealed to be 
poorly covered. Importantly, the chapter offered the opportunity to assess and evaluate the 
status of disaster health management. It also provided a foundation for further in-depth 
analysis of these individual challenges. Secondly, some challenges involve the internal 
aspects of the health system, while others arise from the external environment. The ‘PPRR’ 
disaster management continuum integrates the internal challenges; it also offers a preliminary 
framework which can be used to highlight the progress and the weaknesses of each 
management phase. Further, this continuum can be used to develop a proposed multi-strategic 
approach to address corresponding challenges and, hence, enhance disaster management in 
the future.  
 
8.6 Strengths 
  
Several contributions have been made by this chapter to the broader body of knowledge. 
Firstly, the chapter identified comprehensively the progress and challenges of disaster health 
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management in China; this outcome was achieved through the extraction of relevant 
information from the literature, in both the English and Chinese languages. Indeed, the topic 
was found to be poorly covered. Importantly, the review offered the opportunity to assess and 
evaluate the current status of disaster health management. It also provided a foundation for 
further in-depth analysis of the individual challenges and the progress achieved. Secondly, 
some challenges involved the internal aspects of the health system while others arose from 
the external environment. The ‘PPRR’ disaster management continuum integrates the internal 
challenges; it also offers a preliminary framework which can be used to highlight the progress 
and the weaknesses of each management phase. Further, this continuum can be used to 
develop a proposed multi-strategic approach to address corresponding challenges with a view 
to enhancing disaster management in the future. 
 
8.7 Limitations 
 
Most information in of disaster health management in China is in the format of qualitative 
descriptions and analyses. Because the topic has been poorly researched, few quantitative 
studies, with empirical data, were available for appraisal in this chapter. Further, these 
quantitative studies have limitations include the shortness of the study period and the 
imperfectly investigated areas (e.g., cross-sectional studies in Beijing, Sichuan and 
Shandong).  
 
Most of the information that informed this chapter of disaster health management in China 
was in the format of qualitative descriptions and analyses. Because the topic has been poorly 
researched, few quantitative studies with empirical data were available for appraisal. Further, 
these quantitative studies had limitations including the short length of the study period and 
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the examination of samples of hospitals in a small number of locations or regions e.g. 
Beijing, Sichuan and Shandong. Hence, what empirical data is used is mainly for illustration 
in this chapter. Additionally, the literature included this chapter came from a wide variety of 
Chinese jurisdictions. However, key individual challenges can be identified, while future in-
depth analysis topics are determined. The limitations identified in the literature in terms of 
need for more rigorous research designs and information on health services in more areas of 
China provide considerable potential for future research. 
8.8 Conclusions 
 
Effective disaster management of the health system is essential for disaster response. This 
chapter identified the challenges for the Chinese health system in providing continuous health 
care services during disasters using the key indicators of the evaluation framework. These 
challenges emanate from both the internal components of the health organizations and the 
external environment, which can directly or indirectly impede effective disaster health 
management. Solutions that identified to address these challenges appear to be through 
corresponding policy strategies at different levels, including community level, healthcare 
system level, and hospital level. These strategies can be used by policy makers and other 
disaster management stakeholders to promote the overall effectiveness of the health response 
to reduce disaster related mortality and morbidity. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
9.1 Summary of the Thesis 
 
Currently, the concept of hospital disaster resilience is a novel one, with only a limited 
amount of research having previously sought to identify its characteristics and the strategies 
required to develop hospital resilience (Albanese et al. 2008; Bruneau et al. 2003; 
Cimellaro,Reinhorn and Bruneau 2010c; Zhong et al. 2013a). Few instruments exist that can 
evaluate a hospital’s disaster resilience. However, efforts to improve and develop the concept 
of hospital resilience are critical in achieving the optimal outcome for those people being 
affected by disasters. Such outcomes rely on a functioning health system, especially one 
which can surge to meet the increased demands for health care for those ill or injured as a 
result of the disaster.  
 
This research sought to contribute to an enhanced understanding of hospital resilience. It 
achieved this goal by examining and evaluating the current state of the knowledge from the 
published literature, and by developing a conceptual model that could form the basis for 
furthering our understanding and evaluation of hospital resilience. Then, the study validated 
the conceptual model by collating expert opinions through the Modified-Delphi method. Next, 
it tested the validated model by using a specially developed survey instrument, which tested 
the extent of hospital resilience in Shandong Province of China. 
 
Firstly a narrative literature review was used to form a clear understanding of hospital 
resilience, and to build a preliminary conceptual framework. Thus, the thesis contributed to 
the theoretical understanding of hospital resilience. Hospital resilience was assessed by the 
criteria of robustness (pre-event strength); redundancy of resources; resourcefulness (flexible) 
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plans, procedures and strategies; and rapidity of response and recovery. Further, hospital 
resilience should ideally be incorporated into a continuum, which included disaster 
prevention and preparation before an event, responsiveness during the event, and recovery 
and adaptation after the event. This new way of conceptualising hospital resilience placed 
hospital disaster capabilities, and the management phases, practices and disaster outcomes 
together into a comprehensive holistic view, using an integrated approach.  
 
Then, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify possible measures for 
evaluating hospital disaster resilience. Four primary measurable domains were identified 
through the aggregation of the full array of factors, namely: hospital internal safety 
(surveillance, safety/security); hospital disaster preparedness and resources (disaster 
planning and procedure, crisis communications, community connectedness, available 
resources and logistics management); continuity of essential medical services (emergency 
medicine, medical continuity and surge capacity); and recovery and adaptation (recovery, 
evaluation and adaptation).  
 
As a result, a preliminary three-layered evaluation framework was established; it included 8 
domains, 21 sub-domains, and 50 indicators, including potential measures. This framework 
was used for a three-round Modified-Delphi study of the disaster management experts. The 
opinions of 33 experts were obtained; their opinions on the importance of these potential 
measures which were collected and analysed using a 5-point Likert scale. Agreement on the 
measures was deemed to be at least 70% of the responders rating a measure as ‘agree’ or 
‘strongly agree’. After the final consensus was obtained, a large proportion of the measures 
(P=89.47%, n=68/N=76) were identified as having a good potential for assessing hospital 
disaster resilience. A three-layered evaluation framework was established, which categorized 
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the key measures into 8 domains, 17 sub-domains, and 43 indicators. The framework was 
tested and validated using empirical data from the survey undertaken at the tertiary hospitals. 
 
Based on the framework, a questionnaire was designed to survey the status of disaster 
resilience in tertiary hospitals in the Shandong Province of China. The questionnaire that 
derived from the previous framework, which contained the eight domains: hospital safety, 
emergency leadership and cooperation, disaster plan, disaster stockpile and logistics 
management, emergency staff, trainings and drills, emergency critical care capacity, and 
recovery mechanisms. Using Factor Analysis, four component factors were extracted from 
these domains, namely: hospital emergency medical response capability (F1 weight 
value=0.606), disaster management mechanisms (F2 weight value=0.203), hospital safety (F3 
weight value=0.104), and disaster resources (F4 weight value=0.087). Thus, the overall level 
of hospital disaster resilience (F) was able to be calculated using the model: F= 0.606F1+ 
0.203F2 +0.104F3+ 0.087F4. The empirical data also supported the construct validity and 
internal reliability of the framework and the derived instrument. 
 
Concurrently, the present status of disaster resilience in the tertiary hospitals of Shandong 
Province was explored. The survey was used to identify any variability in hospital disaster 
preparedness and the utility of the instrument to guide management strategies. The result 
revealed considerable variability in the breadth of arrangements of hospital internal safety, 
disaster management mechanisms, disaster resources, and emergency critical care in the 
Province. A capability difference, between tertiary A and tertiary B hospitals, was also 
identified. The survey work and analysis also validated the feasibility of the previously 
described evaluation framework for the empirical study. The results highlighted that the 
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hospitals needed to adopt a more cohesive approach to resilience development, built around 
the framework for understanding hospital disaster resilience. 
 
In summary, this thesis used a mixed-method to achieve its aims and objectives, step-by-step. 
Overall, the study has made a number of important contributions to the field. It provided:  
(1) A new definition and conceptual framework for hospital disaster resilience;  
(2) Improved our understanding of what constitutes hospital disaster resilience, and 
how to measure it from different dimensions, using the four component factors (F1, F2, 
F3, and F4);  
(3) Provided hospitals with a validated instrument to evaluate the status of hospital 
resilience. This instrument was the first of its type in the field; it allowed hospitals to 
measure their own resilience levels, so that it could make a comparison between 
hospitals and regions. Further, it also enabled hospitals and regions to identify priority 
areas for improvement. 
(4) Explored the status of disaster resilience in the tertiary hospitals of Shandong 
Province. 
(5) Identified and discussed the major challenges and priority issues for future 
improvement of the healthcare system’s disaster resilience in China; and  
(6) Developed a novel hospital resilience framework which provided a basis for a 
better understanding of the concept. Thus, this framework could be used to further 
evaluate disaster resilience in different jurisdictions and in different organisational 
settings.  
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9.2 Future Research Directions 
 
Only in recent years has the concept of ‘hospital resilience’ been added, as an important 
concept, into the disaster management lexicon, reflecting the critical role of healthcare in the 
face of disasters (Carthey,De Leval and Reason 2001; Jeffcott,Ibrahim and Cameron 2009; 
McDaniels et al. 2008). Thus, improving healthcare resilience, particularly hospital resilience, 
is considered as an important step in enhancing the health system’s ability to effectively cope 
with disasters, minimising the damage to health service provisioning and, thus, reducing the 
impact that disasters may have on the society (Bruneau et al. 2003; Paturas et al. 2010). 
Although research in this field is growing, there are still many gaps in the research, due to the 
uncertainty of disasters and the inadequate responses that may arise from a wide spread 
disaster. Based on the literature and my research, I recommend several directions for future 
research. 
 
Firstly, the newly developed framework identified the key areas that are needed to investigate 
the detailed standards to achieve the required capability level, such as surge capacity. The 
indicators of the ‘surge capacity of beds’ failed to specify the thresholds for the extent to 
which the hospital could surge beds and rapidity with which they could achieve this surge, or 
whether those thresholds varied because of different regional conditions. Thus, more 
evidence-based research is required to determine whether the levels of specific ability are 
linked to the desirable outcomes that would be regarded as adequate. For a provincial 
Chinese hospital to effectively surge patient-care capacity during a disaster, surge plans and 
strategies should be adopted and modified, from other countries, to suit the local needs, based 
on the estimation of disaster demands, the availability of hospital staff, and emergency 
resources. As a result, standard triage procedures and guidelines for hospitals during disasters 
should be devised. Further, more detailed investigations of the standards are also required for 
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an accurate assessment of the indicators, including: stock types and quantity for essential 
medications for various disasters, staff composition of emergency expert groups and rescue 
teams, hospital mass-casualty triage protocols, and the content of the evaluation reports.  
 
Bridging the research-to-policy interface is the most urgent area for further research. To date, 
research has mainly focused on the conceptual understanding and evaluation of healthcare 
resilience, with less focus on adaptation strategies for healthcare systems to improve their 
ability to cope with disasters. Thus, this gap should be addressed, especially for vulnerable 
areas. This research is important as, during many disasters (such as earthquakes and floods), 
susceptible areas rarely evaluate risks or make specific disaster plans in advance (Ali 2001; 
You,Chen and Yao 2009b; Chan 2008). Therefore, research is needed on how to make 
context-specific domestic guidelines and benchmarks to encourage these vulnerable 
healthcare organisations and to take adequate actions before or during disasters.  
 
Moreover, research should be undertaken into the construction and distribution of a set of 
lists, which can be used as a guide or benchmark to identify the minimum items that should 
be stockpiled in hospitals to prepare for disasters. These lists should take into consideration 
the specific regional needs and resources. Additionally, education curricula for medical 
school courses and training curricula for hospital professionals should be devised. These 
curricula should incorporate the knowledge and skills of emergency management, such as the 
initial triage, management in the field and in the emergency department, and the basic and 
advanced disaster life supports.  
 
Finally, more analysis is needed into the disaster areas themselves. For example, a large 
amount of public resources have been allocated to post-event tasks, such as rescue, recovery, 
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and rebuilding. However, it may be more cost effective to apply resources to prevention and 
mitigation rather than the post-events. Thus, there is a need for a cost-effective analysis of 
disaster projects, rescue efforts, health interventions, and recovery strategies. Moreover, as 
most healthcare organisations have not experienced major disasters, it appears necessary to 
evaluate their actual ability to cope with such disasters. For this reason, research is needed to 
simulate and analyse their response performance through disaster drills; this research should 
involve the monitoring of their responses, to ascertain what benefits are accrued by such 
drills. In conclusion, the current research has provided an important framework for future 
study and, at the same time, has identified the concepts pertinent to hospital disaster 
resilience in provincial China.
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Questionnaire (English translation version) 
Questionnaire for assessment of disaster resilience capability in tertiary hospitals 
of Shandong Province 
 
Introduction note (please read first before filling the form) 
1. Public emergencies and disasters in the questionnaire refer to events that suddenly 
happened and can cause serious impact to the society, which require emergency 
measures to be taken. These events include natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods), 
disasters arising from accidents (e.g., transportation incidents, environmental 
pollution), public health incidents (e.g., emerging infectious diseases, food poisoning) 
and public security incidents (e.g., terrorism).  
2. Fill method: There are two types of questions: (1) choice questions: Unless it is 
marked with "this question has multiple choices", these questions are single choice 
(i.e. select one answer), please choose the option that can meet the hospital’s situation, 
which is after each question (e.g., ①②) / by tick "√"; (2) fill in the blank: please fill 
out the relevant data / content into the underscored place after each question. Note the 
logical question to jump to the next question.  
3. Please be sure to complete the form within the required time. After its completion, 
please report them simultaneously both via e-mail and postal. 
Thank you for your assistance and support to the investigation! 
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Hospital name：                       fill date：    month    date 2012 
The informant（signature）         Audit dean（signature）      Official seal：
（stamp） 
 
A、The general situation relevant to emergency medicine  
1. Hospital level: Tertiary                (e.g., A, B, C). 
2. Hospital location（in details to the county, city, and district）:                                        
3. Hospital attribution: ①government health administrative office ②industry 
hospital ③others 
4. Hospital type: ①general hospital ②specialty hospital ③others 
5. Hospital mission: ①be assigned regional disaster rescue mission ②not-assigned 
the mission 
B、Hospital safety 
6. Whether the hospital establishes a syndromic surveillance and early warning 
system for public health emergencies？①Yes ②No； 
6.1 The syndromic that need to be surveillance, report and early warning include:                      
6.2 Whether develop and require that physicians on duty report any suspicious 
cases to the hospitals’ presidents? ①Yes  ②No; 
7. Whether the hospital has direct online reporting system of surveillance information 
and suspicious symptoms? ①Yes  ②No; 
7.1 Whether the hospital could analyze surveillance data regularly and share this 
system with the local health authority? ①Yes  ②No; 
8. Is there any evaluation of types and impact of the potential risks to hospitals in its 
location? ①Yes  ②No; 
8.1 When the disaster occurred, within the hospital is there any hazards 
identification system for different types of risks? ①Yes  ②No; 
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8.2 When there is hospital internal risk, are there any strategies for hospitals to 
evacuate and protect existing patients? ①Yes  ②No; 
9. Is there any evaluation of the safety standards of hospital’s critical infrastructures? 
(e.g., construction safety standards, safety level of resistance to earthquakes, fires and 
floods). ①Yes  ②No; 
9.1 If yes, were the critical infrastructures built to meet or excess the local criteria 
of resistance to earthquake? ①Yes  ②No; 
9.2 If yes, were the critical infrastructures built in a higher position in the area to 
prevent floods? ①Yes  ②No; 
9.3 If yes, was the critical medical equipment located in a higher level of the 
building to prevent floods? ①Yes (e.g., the first floor with a higher location, the 
second floor) ②No (e.g., underground, the first floor with a lower location); 
      9.4. If yes, is there any consideration of the safety standard for the risk of fire?  
①Yes  ②No; 
9.5 If yes, is there any consideration of using isolated pathways and designated 
areas for infectious diseases within the hospital? ①Yes  ②No; 
10. When disaster occurred, are there any alternative emergency energy and facilities 
for backup (including power, water, oxygen and telecommunication)? ①Yes  ②No; 
C、 Hospital disaster leadership and cooperation  
11. Is there any disaster committee or disaster group within hospital that is responsible 
for public emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
11.1 Is there any official document that has been used to establish hospital 
disaster committee or disaster group? ①Yes  ②No; 
12. Is there any department within the hospital that has been assigned responsibility 
for the work relevant to emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
12.1 Is there any official document that has been used to assign emergency 
relevant work to this department? ①Yes  ②No; 
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13. Is there any coordinating meeting with key staff from different hospital 
departments during emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
14. Is there any public and mass media communication protocol that can be used for 
communication during emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
15. Has the hospital attended regional coordinating meeting with other emergency 
departments during emergencies, such as CDC (Center for Disease Prevention and 
Control), pre-hospital emergency system, healthcare facilities, blood and resource 
center, and local government? ①Yes  ②No;   
D、 Hospital disaster plan  
16. Is there any general disaster plan and relevant document in place for preparedness 
of public emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
16.1 Please illustrate the document name of the disaster plan?                 
17. Are there any specific disaster plans based on the specific requirements of a single 
hazard, such as infectious diseases, internal medical accidents, public health 
emergencies, natural disasters, bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism, and others? 
①Yes  ②No; 
17.1 Please illustrate the document name of the specific disaster plans?                 
18. Is there any protocol to initiate the plan, so as to guarantee the hospital be in place 
to face emergencies immediately, (i.e., guarantee staff, equipment and resources are in 
place immediately)? ①Yes  ②No; 
19. From the experience of the hospital dealing with the past public emergencies (i.e., 
mass casualty incident, disasters, pandemics), whether the hospital could operate in 
accordance with the disaster plan during emergencies? ①Yes  ②No; 
20. Is there any classification response system to cope with different levels and 
different phases of events? ①Yes  ②No; 
21. Is there any evaluation and revision of the disaster plans in the last two years?  
①Yes  ②No; 
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22. Is there any dissemination of the content of disaster plans to the key staff (e.g., 
through regular meetings or training)? ①Yes  ②No; 
E、Emergency stockpiles and logistics management  
23. Are there any stockpiles of various types of emergency drugs within hospitals? 
①Yes  ②No; 
23.1 If yes, please illustrate the type names and quantities of these stockpiled 
drugs?              
24. Are there any stockpiles of various types of emergency materials (e.g., food, water, 
stretcher, and tourniquet)? ①Yes  ②No; 
24.1 If yes, please illustrate the type names and quantities of the stockpiled 
materials?             
24.2 Whether the hospital has the following personal protective equipment (PPE) 
(multi-choices)?  
①biohazard protective suits; ②goggles; ③ventilator; ④N95 Masks 
25. When there is mass casualty incident, whether the hospital could be able to load 
and deliver emergency drugs for on-site rescue? ①Yes  ②No;  
25.1 If yes, please illustrate the names and quantities of the emergency drugs that 
could be loaded and delivered for on-site rescue?             
26. Whether the hospital has the following strategies for management of drugs and 
materials? 
Strategies for management of drugs and materials？ Yes No 
26.1 Drug-distribution plans to identify distribution priority of drugs 
during crisis 
□ □ 
26.2 Signed contracts with emergency drug-supplies to provide drugs 
during emergencies 
□ □ 
26.3 Signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with other 
hospitals to share emergency drugs during emergencies 
□ □ 
26.4 Share and obtain these materials from relevant industries during □ □ 
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emergencies 
26.5 Share and obtain these materials from other hospitals during 
emergencies 
□ □ 
26.6 Others: (please illustrate) □ □ 
F、Emergency Staff 
27. The constitute of hospital experts group (refer to those members within the 
hospital that are involved in development of the emergency plans and specific 
emergency medical treatment)  
① General surgical treatment         persons, including senior         persons; 
② General medical treatment        persons, including senior        persons; 
③ Neurosurgery         persons, including senior        persons; 
④ Bone surgery        persons, including senior        persons; 
⑤ Burn         persons, including senior        persons; 
⑥ Psychological         persons, including senior        persons; ; 
⑦ Emergency Department          persons, including senior        persons; 
⑧ ICU         persons, including senior        persons; 
⑨ Nosocomial infections       persons, including senior        persons; 
⑩ Total experts       persons, including senior        persons; 
28. Is there any emergency staff that could be dispatched during disasters for the on-
site rescue? ①Yes  ②No; 
If yes, please fill the constitute (i.e., specialty and numbers) of emergency staff 
that can be dispatched 
① General surgical doctors,       persons, general surgical nurse       persons ; 
② Therapeutic,       persons, general medical nurse       persons; 
③ Neurosurgeon doctors       persons, neurosurgery nurses       persons; 
④ Orthopedic surgeon doctors       persons, orthopedic surgeon nurse       persons; 
⑤ Burn treatment doctors       persons, burn treatment nurses       persons; 
⑥ Psychological doctors       persons; 
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⑦ Emergency department doctors       persons, emergency nurses       persons; 
⑧ ICU doctors       persons, ICU nurses       persons; 
⑨ Infections control doctors       persons, infections control nurses       persons; 
⑩ Manager people       persons, including managers       persons, information 
people       persons; logistics       persons; and other relevant personnel       persons 
○11  Total doctors       persons, total nurses       persons; 
29. Whether the hospital has the following incentive and protective strategies for 
management of emergency staff?  
Incentive and protective strategies for emergency staff?  Yes  No 
29.1 Incentive strategies for emergency staff  □ □ 
29.2 Vaccination for emergency staff and their family members □ □ 
29.3 Insurance for emergency staff □ □ 
24.4 Others (please illustrate):  □ □ 
30. Whether the hospital has the following incentive strategies? (Can be multiple-
choices) 
① increase the salary; ② increase the vacation; ③ priority for hiring and position 
promotion; ④ Honours; ⑤ issue the grant 
G、Emergency critical care capability 
Hospital treatment 
31. The total number of hospital beds     sheets; 
31.1 Among them, the number of licensed beds     sheets;      
31.2 The number of beds in emergency department or emergency care centre 
                sheets; 
31.3 Whether the hospital has isolation beds? ①Yes  ②No; 
31.4 Whether the hospital has orthopedic beds? ①Yes  ②No; 
31.5 Whether the hospital has suspension bed for burns? ①Yes  ②No; 
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31.6 Whether the hospital has emancipated bed? ①Yes  ②No; 
31.7 Whether the hospital has surgery rooms? ①Yes  ②No; 
31.8 Whether the hospital has hyperbaric oxygen chambers? ①Yes  ②No; 
32. The number of intensive care beds        sheets; 
32.1 Whether the hospital has breathing machines? ①Yes  ②No; 
32.2 Whether the hospital has vital signs monitors? ①Yes  ②No; 
32.3 Whether the hospital has defibrillator machines? ①Yes  ②No; 
32.4 Whether the hospital has cardiac resuscitation devices? ①Yes  ②No; 
32.5 Whether the hospital has CRRT devices? ①Yes  ②No; 
33. Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating mass 
casualty of incidents (i.e., here mass casualty treatment capacity refers to each 
hospital is to assess itself on its capacity to accept at least 30 patients of the same 
disease within a short period)?  ①Yes  ②No;  
33.1 Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating 
general mass casualty of trauma?  ①Yes  ②No; 
33.2 Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating 
mass casualty of infectious diseases?  ①Yes  ②No; 
33.3 Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating 
mass casualty of blast injury, gunshot wounds and crush injury?  ①Yes  ②No; 
33.4 Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating 
mass casualty of acute chemical poisoning?  ①Yes  ②No; 
33.5 Whether the hospital has capacity (e.g., space, beds and experts) for treating 
mass casualty of radiation issues?  ①Yes  ②No; 
Hospital surge capacity 
34. When disaster occurs, is there any internal evaluation mechanism for rapid 
assessment of the available emergency resources and the disaster losses? (i.e., 
manpower, equipment, number of emergency beds)? ①Yes  ②No; 
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35. Are there any prepared spaces and conditions (e.g., electricity, oxygen, water, heat) 
in place to temporary surge numbers of emergency beds? ①Yes  ②No; 
35.1 If yes, are there any plans and work procedures for surging emergency beds?  
①Yes ②No; 
35.2 The maximum surge capacity of emergency beds are        sheets (within 24 
hours) 
36. Are there any procedures and strategies to vacate part of the occupied emergency 
beds for treating the sick and wounded from emergency events according to the 
requirement? ①Yes ②No; 
36.1 When emergency occurs, according to the instruction from health 
administrative departments and the actual situation of admitted patients, within 24 
hours, the hospital can maximum vacate the occupied emergency beds of              
sheets? 
37. Whether the hospital has a wide variety of flexible procedures for surging beds 
capacity when it faces the emergencies?  
Surge procedures for emergency beds Yes No 
37.1 cancellation of elective admissions □ □ 
37.2 early discharge of patients □ □ 
37.3 transfer patients to primary health care and other facilities □ □ 
37.4 others (please illustrate)： □ □ 
38. Whether the hospital has a wide variety of flexible procedures for surging 
emergency staff capacity when it faces the emergencies?  
Surge procedures for emergency staff Yes No 
38.1 training and transferring non-critical care staff to support critical 
care 
□ □ 
38.2 recalling all the off-work staff back to work  □ □ 
38.3 rehiring retired staff □ □ 
38.4 sharing staff from other hospitals □ □ 
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38.5 using volunteers or temporary employers □ □ 
38.6 suppling living places for staff   
38.7 others (please illustrate)： □ □ 
39. Are there any mass-casualty triage procedures for admission of patients who 
require urgent critical care during disasters?  ①Yes  ②No; 
On-site Rescue 
40. Whether the hospital has its own ambulances? ①Yes  ②No; 
40.1 If yes, are there any ward-type ambulances? ①Yes  ②No; 
40.2 If yes, are there any negative pressure isolation ambulances? ①Yes  ②No; 
40.3 Whether the hospital has on-site command vehicle? ①Yes  ②No; 
41. Whether the hospital has rescue helicopters and access to a helicopter landing pad?  
①Yes  ②No; 
42. Is there any on-site communication equipment for data transmission, video-audio 
connection, and remote consultation? ①Yes  ②No; 
43. Whether the hospital could organise an independent rescue team that is equipped 
with emergency package of supplies for living 3 days (the teams include those health 
administrative departments or other departments assigned to construct based on the 
hospital)?  
①Yes  ②No; 
43.1 If yes, please illustrate the number of staff for the rescue teams, and their 
departments and specialty:                        
43.2 If yes, are the rescue teams equipped with portable medical equipment 
equipped (e.g., portable breathing machine, ECG monitoring machine, and the X-
ray machine? ①Yes  ②No; 
44. Whether the hospital has ‘portable hospital’ or the capability to support field 
surgery, and other critical care in the field, which is similar to the function of ICU 
(using vehicles which are equipped with beds and portable medical equipment)?  
①Yes  ②No; 
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H、Emergency training and drills 
45. Are there any disaster or emergency training programs? ①Yes  ②No; 
46. Are there any disaster or emergency drills? ①Yes  ②No; 
47. If yes, are there any disaster training programs and drills treating the following 
emergency types respectively during 2011-2012? 
48. Are there any disaster training curriculums? ①Yes  ②No; 
48.1 If yes, were the training curriculums updated regularly? ①Yes  ②No; 
49. In 2011-2012, is there any emergency training including the following content? 
Content of emergency trainings Yes No 
49.1 basic skills for the treatment of trauma □ □ 
49.2 cardiopulmonary resuscitation □ □ 
49.3 trachea cannulation □ □ 
49.4 transfer of casualties □ □ 
49.5 triage □ □ 
49.6 disaster management □ □ 
49.7 others（please illustrate）：           □ □ 
50. Is there any emergency or disaster training regularly every two years? ①Yes 
②No; 
51. Are there any disaster drills regularly every two years? ①Yes  ②No; 
52. Are there any drills the hospital cooperating with all the other emergency facilities 
of the community (such as police, fire, water, and transport sectors)? ①Yes  ②No; 
I、Recovery and reconstruction 
53. Is there any mechanism of after-event evaluation report? ①Yes  ②No; 
Types for disaster training programs and drills has training has drills 
47.1 infectious disease （e.g., SARS, H7N9） □ □ 
47.2 mass casualty incidents (e.g., natural disasters) □ □ 
47.3 career poising and food poising  □ □ 
47.4 bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism □ □ 
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53.1 If yes, is the following content need to be included in the evaluation report?  
54. Is there any special department that would be assigned to be responsible for the 
work relevant to recovery and reconstruction? ①Yes  ②No; 
55. Are there any specific channels of investing money, transferring staff, and 
purchasing equipment for recovery phases after the event? ①Yes  ②No; 
56. Whether the hospital has been involved or would be involved in the health related 
work of the affected communities?  
 
Evaluation content Yes No 
53.1 local high risks re-evaluation □ □ 
53.2 hospital capability evaluation  □ □ 
53.3 hospital vulnerability evaluation  □ □ 
53.4 experience and lessons that have been learned □ □ 
53.5 the adaptation strategies in the future □ □ 
53.6 others (please illustrate)：                                   □ □ 
Be involved in the health related work of the affected communities?  Yes  No 
56.1 be involved in the design of the recovery strategies for the 
community  
□ □ 
56.2 health status evaluation of the population in the community □ □ 
56.3 health social or health interventions to the community □ □ 
56.4 rehabilitation for the victims □ □ 
55.5 psychological consultation for relevant people □ □ 
55.6 others (please illustrate）：           □ □ 
  Page 222 
 
Appendix II: Questionnaire (Chinese version) 
 
山东省三级医院突发应急事件 
弹性能力评估调查表 
 
填表说明(必读) 
  
一、调查中规定的突发公共事件是突然发生，造成或者可
能造成严重社会危害，需要采取应急处置措施予以应对的
事件，包括自然灾害、事故灾难、公共卫生事件和社会安
全事件。 
二、填写方式：调查表中有两种类型的问题：1、选择题：
除非有注明“此题可多选”外，其它选择题均为单选题
（即选择一个答案），请在每个问题后符合医院情况的选
项（例如  ①②)）/打“√”；2、填空题：请在每个问题
后的下划线处填写相关数据/内容。注意问题中的逻辑跳转 
三、请务必在规定时间内完成调查。 调查表完成后通过电
子邮件和邮寄两种方式同时上报。 
 
感谢您对调查工作的协助和支持！ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
医院名称：                                  填报日期：2012年    月    日 
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填报人（签名）           审核院长（签名）          单位公章：（加盖公章处） 
 
 
 
一、与应急医疗有关的基本情况 
1. 单位级别：三级     等医院。 
2. 单位所在地（详细到县、市、区）：                          。 
3. 单位归属：①卫生行政部门 ②行业医院   ③其他。 
4. 单位类别：①综合医院 ②专科医院 ③其他。 
5. 单位任务：①区域突发应急事件救援职责 ②无职责。 
二、医院安全性 
6.医院是否建立了突发公共卫生事件症状监测及预警系统？①是  ②否； 
6.1 对哪些流行病症状进行监测、上报、预警：                     。 
    6.2 医院是否要求值班医生向院长上报任何可疑病例？①是  ②否；                                           
7.对于监测信息及可疑症状是否有网上直报体系？①是  ②否； 
    7.1 对于监测信息是否有分析、共享的制度？①是  ②否； 
8.医院是否对本医院可能面临的突发公共事件种类及其危害性进行过评估? 
①是  ②否     
  8.1发生突发事件时，医院是否有针对不同风险的院内危险识别机制？①是 ②否 
  8.2发生突发事件院内存在危险时，医院是否有保护、疏散、撤离院内病人程序？  
  ①是  ②否 
9. 医院是否对医院内基础设施建设抗灾等级进行过评估？（如建筑结构，防震、防
洪、防火等级）？ ①是  ②否        
    9.1如是，关键基础建设是否满足或高于当地抗震标准？ ①是  ②否        
    9.2如是，主要建筑物是否考虑到防洪而建在当地较高地势：①是  ②否； 
    9.3 如是，CT等检查设备与主要大型医疗设备是否位于较高楼层以防洪： 
    ①是 （如：地势较高的一层，二层）  ②否；（如：负一层，地势较低的一层）  
    9.4 如是，是否考虑到防火：①是  ②否； 
    9.5 如是，医院内部是否设置有传染病单独通道及隔离区：  ①是  ②否 
10.突发事件发生时，医院是否有下列应急备用能源储备 （如备用电源、水源、供
氧、通信设备）? ①是  ②否    
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三、应急领导组织与合作     
11.医院是否成立卫生应急工作领导委员会或小组负责公共突发事件：①是  ②否 
   11.1医院是否有成立卫生应急工作领导小组的正式文件：①是  ②否 
12. 医院是否成立或指定专门科室负责卫生应急工作：①是  ②否 
   12.1 医院是否有成立或指定专门科室负责卫生应急工作的正式文件：①是 ②否                                     
13.突发事件发生时，医院内部是否有不同科室关键人员参加的应急会商制度？ 
①是  ②否 
14. 在遇突发公共事件时，医院是否有与公众及媒体的沟通协调机制？①是 ②否 
15. 在遇突发公共事件时，医院是否参加过地区范围内整个卫生系统的应急会商协调
会议（例如：疾控中心、120急救中心、医院、血站、物资供应站、行政部门）？ 
①是  ②否 
四、应急预案 
16. 是否制定有突发事件紧急医学救援工作的应急预案和相关文件：①是 ②否 
   16.1如有，请列出预案和文件名称：                                     
17.医院是否制定印发有针对单项风险的特殊应急预案，例如针对传染病、内部医疗事
故、公共卫生事件、自然灾害、生化恐怖袭击等突发情况：①是  ②否。 
    17.1如有，请列出预案和文件名称：                                                             
18.当应急预案启动时，是否有相应细则保证医院能立即进入应急状态（即，人员、设
备、资源能否立即到位）？ ①是  ②否 
19.从医院处理过往突发公共应急事件处理经验来看，各类医疗人员是否能大体按照预
案要求开展各类救援工作？  ① 是 ②否  
20.是否有分级响应体系能根据突发公共应急事件的不同等级，不同阶段，达到不同的
响应水平？ ①是  ②否 
21. 医院是否在过去的两年中，有评估及更新修改应急预案？ ①是  ②否 
22. 医院是否让关键人员学习过医院应急预案细则（如，通过医护培训或员工定期会
议）？  ①是  ②否                                                         
五、紧急物资储备及物流管理 
23. 医院内部是否储备有各类应急药品：①是  ②否。 
   23.1如有，请列出目前已储备药品的品目、数量 
24. 医院是否储备有各类应急物资（如，食物，水，担架及绷带）：①是  ②否。 
   24.1如有，请列出目前已储备物资的品目、数量 
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   24.2医院有以下哪些个人防护设备 （可多选）：①生物防护服 ②护目镜 ③换气
扇 ④N95口罩。 
25. 如遇大量人员伤亡的突发事件，医院是否具备对医药物资进行灾害现场分装配送
的能力：①是  ②否。 
   25.1请列出本院医药物资的配送、分装设备的品目和数量：    
 
                                                                                    
26.医院的应急药品、物资是否有以下管理策略 
药品管理策略？ 是 否 
26.1药物优先分配方案（如药品供给有限的情况下） □ □ 
26.2与药品供应商签署书面协议,建立应急药物供给系统 □ □ 
26.3与其他医院签订药品合作协议在应急性况下实现药品共享 □ □ 
26.4与供应商签订物资合作协议 □ □ 
26.5与其他医院签订物资合作协议 □ □ 
26.6其他 □ □ 
六、应急人员 
27. 医院专家组的人员构成情况（是指医院内部参与急救方案制定与应急医疗救治成
员）。 
① 外科       人，其中高级       人； 
② 内科       人，其中高级       人； 
③ 神经外科       人，其中高级        人； 
④ 骨外科       人，其中高级       人； 
⑤ 烧伤科       人，其中高级      人； 
⑥ 心理科       人，其中高级      人；  
⑦ 急诊科       人，其中高级      人； 
⑧ ICU        人，其中高级      人； 
⑨ 院内感染      人，其中高级      人； 
⑩ 合计      人，其中高级      人， 
28.一旦发生突发事件，本单位是否能够派出院外紧急救援人员？ ①是  ②否。 
① 外科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
    外科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
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② 内科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
    内科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
③ 神经外科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      
人， 
    神经外科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
④ 骨外科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
       骨外科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
⑤ 烧伤科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
    烧伤科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
⑥ 心理科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人；  
⑦ 急诊科医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
    急诊科护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
⑧ ICU医生       人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人， 
    ICU护士       人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
⑨ 院内感染医生      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人 
    院内感染护士      人，其中高级      人、中级      人、初级      人； 
⑩ 管理      人，其中管理      人、信息      人；后勤      人，其他有
关人员   人 
    ○11  总计医生      人，护士      人。 
29、请问，医院是否包含以下应急人员激励及保护制度： 
应急人员激励及保护机制 是 否 
29.1 急人员激励机制   □ □ 
29.2 应急人员及家属免疫保护措施 □ □ 
29.3 应急人员保险   □ □ 
29.4 其他（请注明）：              □ □ 
30.请问，医院是否有以下应急人员激励措施（可多选）：1）提高工资待遇  2）增加
休假  3）职称评定、聘用优先 4）荣誉表彰 5）发放有关补助  
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七、应急重症急救能力 
院内急救能力 
31.医院现有病床总数     张， 
31.1 其中，许可床位   张；  
31.2医院急诊科或急救中心场所拥有床位   张；        
31.3 是否有隔离病床？ ①是  ②否；  
31.4是否有骨科床？ ①是  ②否 
31.5是否有烧伤翻身床？ ①是  ②否 
31.6 是否有烧伤悬浮床？ ①是  ②否 
31.7医院是否有手术间：①是  ②否。 
31.8医院是否有高压氧舱：①是  ②否。 
32.医院现有      张重症监护病床 
32.1是否有呼吸机：①是  ②否 
32.2是否有生命体征监护仪：①是  ②否 
32.3是否有床旁 CRRT机：①是  ②否 
32.4是否有除颤仪：①是  ②否 
32.5是否有心肺复苏器：①是  ②否 
33.医院是否有以下处理各类大量人群伤亡事件的灾害救治能力 （如，空间、床位和
专家）？（此处大量人员伤亡事件的灾害救治能力是指医院具备可以在短时间内同时
接受至少 30位同一此类型病人的能力）①是  ②否。 
33.1 如有，医院是否有处理大量人群普通外伤事件的灾害救治能力（如，空间、
床位和专家）？①是  ②否。 
33.2如有，医院是否有处理大量人群传染病事件的灾害救治能力（如，空间、床
位和专家）？①是  ②否。 
33.3如有，医院是否有处理大量人群爆震伤、枪伤、挤压伤事件的灾害救治能力
（如，空间、床位和专家）？①是  ②否。 
33.4如有，医院是否有处理大量人群急性化学中毒事件的灾害救治能力（如，空
间、床位和专家）？①是  ②否。 
33.5如有，医院是否有处理大量人群核辐射问题的灾害救治能力（如，空间、床
位和专家）？①是  ②否。 
医院扩容能力 
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34. 突发事件发生后，医院是否有医院内部快速评估机制，对医院损失情况及可使用
的应急资源进行快速评估？（例如，人力、设备、急救病床数量）①是  ②否。     
35. 医院是否有临时扩增一定数量应急病床的场所及相关条件（例如，水、电、气暖
供应及氧气等）： 
①是  ②否。 
35.1如有，医院是否已制定临时扩增床位的方案和工作流程：①是  ②否。 
35.2最多可扩增      张应急病床（24小时内）。 
36.医院是否制定有根据突发事件伤病员收治需要腾空应急床位的制度和工作流程：①
是  ②否。                                                       
36.1如遇突发事件，根据卫生行政部门的指令和医院收治病人的实际情况， 24
小时内，本院可腾出应急床位          张； 
37. 医院在应对突发事件时，能否采取以下灵活措施来扩容别医院床位: 
识别、优化、维持基本功能的措施 是 否 
37.1取消部分非急诊医疗服务而腾出备用病床以供使用 □ □ 
37.2让轻症病人提前出院回家接受治疗 □ □ 
37.3将提前出院的病人安置到下一级医院或转到其他医疗机构 □ □ 
37.4其他： □ □ 
38. 发生突发事件时，医院是否有以下多样灵活的应急人员扩容策略？ 
人员扩容策略 是 否 
38.1通过院内其他非急诊科室借调到急诊科室 □ □ 
38.2将所有休假的工作人员招回上班 □ □ 
38.3聘用本院的退休人员上班 □ □ 
38.4通过院间借调与共享 □ □ 
38.5使用合同工或临时工或志愿者招募 □ □ 
38.6为工作人员提供住所 □ □ 
38.7其他： □ □ 
39. 灾难发生后，医院是否设有突发事件批量伤病员二次检伤分流操作流程： 
①是  ②否。 
现场救援能力 
40.医院是否有能够被紧急动用的救护用车       辆，其中： 
40.1如有，其中是否有监护型救护车？ ①是  ②否。 
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40.2如有，其中是否有负压救护车？ ①是  ②否。 
40.3如有，其中是否有指挥车？ ①是  ②否。 
41.是否设有直升机及停机坪/停机场地：①是  ②否。 
42.是否设有现场信息数据传输分析、视音频联通和远程会诊场所和条件：①是  ②
否。 
43.是否已建立具备野外 3天生存能力，能够在院外独立开展紧急医学救援的队伍（包
括各级卫生行政部门或者其他部门委托或依托医院建设的）：①是   ②否 
    43.1如有，请详述每支队伍的人员数、人员专业、科室等（可列表填写） 
43.2.如有，应急队是否有便携式装备 (如，便携式呼吸机，便携式生命体征监护
仪、及便携式 X光机) ？ 
44. 医院是否已有能在灾害或突发事件现场展开二级医院功能的移动医院能力，其需
要具备手术室及其他现场重症急救方面的功能，类似于重症监护室 ICU的功能。（利
用移动车辆来装配病床及可移动医疗设备）：①是   ②否 
八、应急培训与演练： 
45.医院是否有应急培训项目或课程？①是  ②否 
46.医院是否曾参加过应急演练？①是  ②否 
47.如有2011年-2012年医院工作人员是否参加以下突发公共事件的培训或演练？  
 
48.医院是否有应急培训教程？①是  ②否 
    48.1.如有,医院是否定期更新应急培训教程？①是  ②否 
49.请问2011年-2012年，医院是否有进行过以下应急知识与技能培训？  
应急培训内容 是 否 
49.1创伤救治基本技能 □ □ 
49.2心肺复苏基本技能 □ □ 
突发公共事件培训与演练种类 有培
训演
练 
无培
训演
练 
47.1传染病（如: SARS 和禽流感等）  □ □ 
47.2大型灾害事故（如:自然灾害） □ □ 
47.3职业中毒与食物中毒 □ □ 
47.4生物/化学恐怖 □ □ 
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49.3气管插管基本技能 □ □ 
49.4伤员转运（搬运）基本技能 □ □ 
49.5检伤分类基本技能 □ □ 
49.6灾难管理基本知识技能 □ □ 
49.7其他（请注明）：           □ □ 
50.医院是否定期每两年培训？①是  ②否 
51.医院是否定期每两年演练？①是  ②否 
52. 医院 2011年～2012年曾参与全地区联合演练？（如公安、消防、水利、交通部
门等）①是  ②否 
九、恢复重建 
53．医院是否有专门灾后评估报告？①是  ②否 
    53.1 如是，医院灾后总结评估报告包括以下哪些内容？ 
 
54. 否医院是否有专门机构负责恢复重建工作？①是  ②否 
55. 医院是否有灾害恢复所需资金、设备、人员的援助渠道？①是  ②否 
54. 突发事件发生后医院是否会协助所在地辖区恢复？①是  ②否 
    如是，医院会协助所在地辖区进行以下哪些工作帮助其恢复? 
总结评估内容 是 否 
53.1医院危险因素重估 □ □ 
53.2医院应对能力评估 □ □ 
53.3医院脆弱性分析 □ □ 
53.4经验教训总结 □ □ 
53.5针对评估，提出医院未来改进及适应性建议 □ □ 
53.6其它(请注明)：                                   □ □ 
灾后协助所在地辖区开展评估及恢复工作 是 否 
54.1参与所在辖区的恢复策略制定 □ □ 
54.2对所管辖的辖区居民的健康状况评估 □ □ 
54.3根据所管辖的辖区居民的评估提供相应的社会和/或医疗干预 □ □ 
54.4向受害者提供复健康复训练 □ □ 
54.5向受害者及相关人员提供心理服务 □ □ 
55.6其它(请注明)： □ □ 
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Appendix III: Publications and conferences 
 
 
Published journal Articles: 
1. Zhong S*, Clark M, Hou XY, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G: Proposing and Developing the 
Definition and Conceptual Framework for Healthcare Resilience to Cope with Disasters. 
Emergencias 2014, 26:69-77  
2. Zhong S, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G*: Development of hospital disaster 
resilience: conceptual framework and potential measurement. Emergency Medicine Journal 
2013, 9. doi:10.1136/emermed-2012-202282  
3. Zhong S*, Hou X-Y, Clark M, Zang Y, Wang L, Xu LZ and FitzGerald G*: Disaster 
resilience in tertiary hospitals: A cross-sectional survey in Shandong Province, China. BMC 
Health Service Research. 2014. 14(1):135.  
4. Zhong S, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G*: 2010–2011 Queensland floods: 
Using Haddon's Matrix to define and categorise public safety strategies. Emergency Medicine 
Australasia 2013, 25(4):345-352. 
5. Zhong S*, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G*:  Validation of a framework for 
measuring hospital disaster resilience using factor analysis. International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health. 2014. 11(6):6335-6353. 
6. Zhong S*, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y, and FitzGerald G*: Progress and Challenges of 
Disaster Health Management in China: A Scoping Review. Global Health Action. 2014. (in 
press) 
 
Manuscripts under Review: 
1. Zhong S*, Clark M, Hou X-Y, Zang Y and FitzGerald G*: Development of key indicators of 
hospital resilience to cope with disasters: a consensus study in China. Journal of Health 
Services Research & Policy (Under review) 
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Attended conferences: 
1. “9th International Institute for Infrastructure Renewal and Reconstruction”, July 2013, 
Brisbane, Australia, held by Queensland University of Technology (Oral presentation: 
Establishing Healthcare Resilience to Cope With Disasters: Theory, Definition and 
Conceptual Framework)  
2. “18th World Congress on Disaster & Emergency Medicine”, May 2013, Manchester, UK, 
held by The World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine (Co-chair, and Oral 
presentation: Development of hospital disaster resilience: potential measurement) 
3. “Australia China Centre For Public Health Research Forum”, August 2014, Brisbane, held by 
Faculty of Health, QUT (Registered and attend) 
 
 
 
 
